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Preface
Mikko Palonkorpi
In the past twenty-ﬁve years, the Caucasus region – North and South
Caucasus combined – has been a semi-permanent epicenter of reoc-
curring ethno-separatist conﬂicts and inter-state wars. This has led
not only to redeﬁnitions of identities, borders and boundaries in the
region, but also to the contested and controversial political and le-
gal statuses among the regions’ recognized and unrecognized con-
stituent parts. In recent decades the military clashes in the area
of former Soviet Union (FSU) have concentrated in the Caucasus
region, with just a few exceptions due to conﬂict ﬂare-ups in Cen-
tral Asia (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan) and in Moldova
(Transnistria). Given the fact that the entire Caucasus region is only
a minuscule slice of the total landmass and population of the FSU, its
proven tendency for conﬂict and over-representation in this regard
are all the more surprising.
The military crises in Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine that
succeeded the prolonged violent standoﬀ between President Victor
Yanukovych and the protestors in the Maidan Square sent shock
waves to the West partly because these crises brought epicenter of
the FSU conﬂicts hundreds of kilometers westward, closer to the
doorsteps of the EU and NATO. At the heart of the demonstrations
which eventually ousted the pro-Russian Yanukovych from the
power in Ukraine was a widespread dissatisfaction to the U-turn in
its negotiations with the EU, and in particular the abandonment of
the Accession Agreement at the very last minute in November
2013. What made matters worse was a declared intention of the
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Ukrainian leadership at the time to deepen trade relations with
Russia and the Eurasian Union.
Much less attention has been paid to the fact that the small Ar-
menia, highly dependent on Russia for its energy, security and trade,
also had to turn down its Accession Agreement with the EU (allegedly
also due to a Russia’s pressure) months before Euromaidan. Now
that Armenia is about to sign a treaty on joining the Eurasian Union,
and Georgia has already signed Association Agreement with the EU,
these two decisions will have an impact on the power and trade dy-
namics of the South Caucasus.
One of the outcomes of the recent developments is an introduction
of a new dimension into the concepts of borders and boundaries in
the South Caucasus. From the geopolitical (or rather geo-economic)
perspective, the South Caucasus is becoming one of many border
regions between two integrationist projects: the European Union
and the Eurasian Union. These border regions – South Caucasus in-
cluded – could be regarded as buﬀer zones between the integration
processes or spheres of inﬂuence rivalry areas between them.
In recent years, the states comprising the EuropeanUnion and the
Eurasian Union have been relatively stable and tranquil, unlike some
of the countries in the border regions between two blocks (Georgia,
Ukraine and Moldova for example) which have been riddled with
conﬂicts and instability. Although this might be true in very gen-
eral terms, a closer look reveals a somewhat diﬀerent picture. The
Eurozone has had its ﬁnancial crisis, which aﬀected most severely
the economies of Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal. The ﬁnancial
crisis also led to various degrees of domestic political turmoil in
these southern EU-member states. In a slightly longer historical
perspective, the stability and tranquility of the Eurasian Union mem-
ber states is even more questionable. Russia’s two wars in Chech-
nya are not too distant in memory, and ongoing armed clashes be-
tween Islamist militants and Russian security services in the volatile
North Caucasus are often recurring phenomena in this restless part
of the Russian Federation bordering the South Caucasus. Add to
this the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, in which Russia was an ac-
tive party of the conﬂict. Also exchange of ﬁre over the line of con-
tact in Nagorno-Karabakh has intensiﬁed recently, and August 2014
witnessed ﬁercest ﬁghting since 1994 ceaseﬁre between Azerbai-
jani and Karabakh Armenian forces, leaving up to forty people killed
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and many more wounded. Downing of an Armenian helicopter over
Karabakh by Azerbaijani forces in November has increased tensions
even further. Therefore, the member states of the Eurasian Union
appear far less stable and far more threatened by military conﬂicts
inside or near their borders than their counterparts in the EU.
Even the wider Eurasian geopolitical landscape is in ﬂux. Pak-
istan and India are expected to become new member states of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2015. This would im-
ply greater security integration of the Central Asian states with the
South Asia (India & Pakistan) and the East Asia (China). Not only
could this signify further orientation of Central Asian states away
from Europe, but in a long run it could also erode Russia’s dom-
inant role in Central Asia and add to Russia’s fears that China is
becoming the dominant partner in the SCO. This would be detrimen-
tal to Russia’s proclaimed aim to recapture the FSU (excluding the
Baltic States) in its sphere of inﬂuence. The end result could be
Russia’s further emphasis on the importance of the Eurasian Union
and such organizations, where its leadership of the block remains
unchallenged.
The recent developments in the adjacent regions like the Middle
East also need to be taken into consideration. The latest round of the
Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict further strained the relations between Is-
rael and Turkey, but the strategic cooperation between Israel and
Azerbaijan has remained on a high level. The ISIS advancement in
Iraq and Syria has almost put Turkey and the Kurds back on the war
path, but ISIS threatens the security of all three regional powers
surrounding the South Caucasus (Turkey, Iran and Russia) more di-
rectly, Russia’s volatile North Caucasus being the main concern in
this regard. This, in turn, has raised fears for the security of the
Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge. Just over two years ago, Georgian security
forces battled with the armed militants in Lapankuri near Pankisi
Gorge. The same is true for Azerbaijan, which also shares the fear
of Islamist radicalism. Armenia, on the other hand, has to cope with
the inﬂux of Armenian refugees from Syria and Iraq, as they have
ﬂed the ﬁghts and the ISIS rule. Some of these refugees have been
resettled in Nagorno-Karabakh, which in turn has had an impact on
the ethnic composition of the enclave. This could complicate con-
ﬂict resolution eﬀorts in the future by adding a new obstacle for any
referendum on the political status of the Nagorno-Karabakh.
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In many respects, the prospects for cross-border cooperation in
the South Caucasus appeared muchmore optimistic in the beginning
of 2010, when the project “The South Caucasus Beyond Borders,
Boundaries and Division Lines: Conﬂicts, Cooperation and Develop-
ment” was launched than what the prospects are now. The Turkish-
Armenian rapprochement seemed in 2010 like a promising exception
for conﬂict transformation in the South Caucasus, but currently the
normalization process is as frozen as the conﬂicts in the region. Rus-
sia has been erecting physical obstacles for movement across the ad-
ministrative boundary line (ABL) in South Ossetia and Abkhazia as
part of its “borderization” policy. The new draft treaty on alliance
and partnership between Russia and Abkhazia will further reduce
possibilities for cross-border cooperation. Heightened tensions in
Nagorno-Karabakh are not promising any progress in this regard ei-
ther. Therefore the quick pace of the developments on the ground in
the South Caucasus region and beyond has reshaped the empirical
reality of the study, and as a result, the project has at times resem-
bled the eﬀort to catch a moving train. Paradoxically, at a same time
as the environment for the cross-border cooperation in the South
Caucasus has become more diﬀicult, the importance of the CBC as
one of the few instruments for conﬂict resolution and trust-building
has remained.
The Aleksanteri Institute’s project was implemented within the
Security Cluster of the Wider Europe Initiative (WEI), funded by the
Ministry for Foreign Aﬀairs of Finland, as a part of a research con-
sortium with the Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI) and the
Karelian Institute at the University of Eastern Finland.
Research themes in the project ranged from cross-border coop-
eration to Turkish-Armenian reconciliation and trans-border energy
issues. Project activities included several conferences, seminars,
guest lectures and round table discussions in Tbilisi, Yerevan, Baku
and Helsinki, where opposing side(s) of the conﬂict(s) were repre-
sented. Also researcher exchanges from South Caucasus to Finland
and vice versa were organized.
This book is a second publication to appear within the framework
of the project, the ﬁrst one being “Armenia’s Foreign and Domestic
Politics: Development Trends”, published in late 2013 by the Cauca-
sus Institute and the Aleksanteri Institute. This publication is a result
of the Aleksanteri Institute’s research cooperation with three part-
ix
ner organizations in the South Caucasus: the Heinrich Böll South
Caucasus Oﬀice in Georgia, the Caucasus Institute (CI) in Armenia
and the Center for Strategic Studies (SAM) in Azerbaijan.
The project team of the Aleksanteri Institute would like to thank
for everyone who contributed to this volume with their expertise. We
would also like to express our sincerest gratitude to the Ministry for
Foreign Aﬀairs of Finland for ﬁnancial support. The views expressed
in this publication are solely those of the authors and do not repre-
sent those of the partner organizations or sponsors.
We are most grateful to Ambassador Petri Salo, Ambassador Harri
Kämäräinen, Mrs. Leena Liski, Ms. Johanna Ketola, Mrs. Katari-
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bitidze and Mrs. Tamuna Shvangiradze from the Heinrich Böll South
Caucasus Oﬀice; Dr. Alexander Iskandaryan, Dr. Sergey Minasyan
and Mrs. Nina Iskandaryan from the Caucasus Institute; Ms. Gul-
mira Rzayeva, Dr. Gulshan Pashayeva and Dr. Kamal Makili-Aliyev
from the Center for Strategic Studies for their support, cooperation
and friendship. Without their invaluable help and input, organizing
the events, ﬁeld trips and research visits would have been impossi-
ble. It is also more than appropriate to thank all of the visiting schol-
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Last, but not least, we would like to oﬀer our thanks to our consor-
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Chapter 1
A Region of Regions:
The Historical Failure of
Integration in the South
Caucasus
Jeremy Smith
Look at any map, and it is clear that, geographically, the South Cau-
casus constitutes a distinct and clearly deﬁned region. Bounded to
the East and to the West by the Caspian and the Black Seas respec-
tively, and to the North by the Caucasus mountains, it is only the
southern border which is deﬁned purely by history, and even there
the border runs more or less between the southern corners of the
two seas. Conﬁned in this shared space for centuries, the three ma-
jor and numerous smaller nationalities of the region have developed
much in common when it comes to culture, cuisine, style of dress and
so on. All have suﬀered, and occasionally beneﬁtted, from the preda-
tory appetites of the great empires that have surrounded the region –
the Russian, Ottoman, and Persian – as well as several that have been
more distant, notably the British and Germans. Given these common
external threats, a high level of cooperation and integrated institu-
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2tional organization among the small states of the region might have
been expected. For outside actors, such as the European Union or
academic bodies, the South Caucasus is treated as a region, with in-
stitutions, publications and representations organized accordingly.
More important, for the EU in particular an integrated approach is
taken whereby the three main countries are linked in certain policy
areas of intervention. But this regional approach has never been a
reﬂection of the situation on the ground.
In a recent series of articles, the journalist/analyst/scholar
Thomas De Waal (2012) has drawn attention to the persistent
failure of the entities that make up the South Caucasus to act as a
region. Today the most obvious sign of the division is the
unresolved state of war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the
status of Nagorno Karabakh, an echo of the conﬂicts of 1918–1920.
The continuing lack of diplomatic relations between the two
countries also forms the most immediate barrier to integration,
while the failure of the third, Georgia, to contain the two
breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia shows up
another level of fragmentation.
Issues of historical distrust, power rivalry, religious and ethnic
diﬀerence are certainly a part of this story, and the eﬀort to over-
come such divisions informs many of the chapters in this volume.
But, as De Waal argues, the pattern of division is so repetitive that
deeper forces must be at work. The complexity of this question is
reﬂected in and in part determined by the complexity of the region
itself – ethnic, geographic, and political. But we can start by exam-
ining the historical record in order to advance some ideas as to why
integration and cooperation has been so hard to achieve.
Before the nineteenth century, the South Caucasus was divided
into a number of political entities and was frequently the object of
incursions from the greater powers to the South. To talk about inte-
gration at that time would be anachronistic. Starting from the early
nineteenth century and up until 1991, there have been four attempts
(two of them overlapping) to create political integration in the region,
whether initiated from within or without: the Russian Empire, which
included the whole region (with some border variations) from soon
after 1800 up until 1917; the Transcaucasian Federation agreed be-
tween the independent states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia on
22nd April 1918 but lasting only until 26th May in the same year; the
3Soviet Union, which included all three countries as Union Republics
from February 1921 until the end of the Soviet Union in 1991; and a
more local Soviet federation – the Transcaucasian Soviet Federal So-
cialist Republic (Zakavkazskaya Sovetskaya Federativnaya Sotsialis-
ticheskaya Respublika or ZSFSR) which lasted from 1922 to 1939.
Of these it was the Russian Empire that had most success in cre-
ating a uniﬁed region. As the Empire acquired territory through a
combination of cooptation, conquest, and war with Turkey and Per-
sia, the region was administered initially as a series of provinces
within the the general administrative framework of the Empire. They
were run along military lines, with the harsh methods of the notori-
ous General Alexei Ermolov typifying the earlier period of Russian
rule. But the Georgian, Armenian and Muslim nobility chose coop-
tation into the Russian noble system over the sporadic revolts that
characterized the ﬁrst two decades, and a Russian victory over Per-
sia in 1828 consolidated Russian control. This allowed the South
Caucasus to develop under more regular forms of administration,
even as war between the imperial armies and local resistance led by
Imam Shamil continued to rage in the North Caucasus. In 1844, a
single administrative unit was created in the form of the Viceroy-
alty of the Caucasus. The ﬁrst viceroy of the Caucasus, Mikhail
Vorontsov, had already proved himself in transforming the cities of
Odessa and Sevastopol as Governor General of NewRussia, to the ex-
tent that Nicholas I delegated his own powers to Vorontsov in a man-
ner unprecedented in the history of Russian autocracy. Vorontsov
was granted the title of ‘Commander in Chief of Caucasus forces and
viceroy of all domains with full and unlimited powers’.
And he did not disappoint. Under Vorontsov’s energetic and, for
a tsarist oﬀicial, enlightened rule, the South Caucasus not only
achieved administrative unity but came together in other ways.
Russian was established as the lingua franca of the region, and
remained so until recently. Transport networks were developed
across the region, including the construction in 1890 of a rail
tunnel through the Surami mountain range, the biggest
geographical obstacle dividing the region. In 1906, the world’s ﬁrst
major fuel pipeline carrying kerosene from Baku followed the same
route. The social structure of the South Caucasus also achieved a
certain standardization. The fact that the North Caucasus mountain
range had not been fully subjugated to Russian authority by the
4time Vorontsov arrived, and was diﬀicult to cross even after control
was established, meant that the region remained isolated and the
viceroy could not rely on timely intervention from Central Russia
when the need arose. Hence the nobility of the region were
incorporated into the Russian system with rights equal to those of
the Russian nobles, while retaining many of their local historical
privileges. After the emancipation of the Russian peasantry in
1851, a series of land reforms enacted across the South Caucasus
served to bring more social uniformity to the various ethnic groups
of the region.
But this social and ethnic integration was not suﬀiciently
advanced to overcome the forces that tore the region apart when
the regime’s stability was ﬁrst shaken by the revolutionary
upheaval of 1904-06. While the Georgian region of Guria became a
virtual self-ruled peasant state, in Baku to the east a successful
strike movement in the oil industry at the end of 1904 gave way in
the following year to horriﬁc scenes of violence between Armenians
and Muslims in and around the city. The violence spread rapidly,
igniting for the ﬁrst time the continuing dispute over the Karabakh
region. When the Russian Empire broke up in 1917, political
leaders of the new independent states were quick to recognize that,
if they were to survive, these diﬀerences needed to be put aside
and common cause made with each other. Hence the
Transcaucasian Federation was formed as a political and military
common front against hostile outside forces. But it was the same
logic of defensive necessity which undid the Federation. Faced with
predatory neighbouring big powers, a small power needs the
support not of other small powers, but of another big power. So it
was that the Georgian leaders concluded an alliance with Germany
in May 1918, and consequently declared independence from the
Federation. In the two and a bit years of independence that
followed, territorial and border disputes led to warfare between all
three independent states, while ethnic violence in Baku, Karabakh
and elsewhere reached new levels, and Georgia had to suppress a
series of risings in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
The short-lived Transcaucasian Federation of 1918 was the only
serious initiative at integration to come from within the region. With
the defeat of Germany and Turkey in the world war, the reluctance of
the American public to involve the US in the region meant that, with
5the exception of half-hearted eﬀorts by Britain and some interven-
tions on the part of Turkey’s new leaders, the way was left open to
Bolshevik Russia, which duly established Soviet power across Azer-
baijan, Armenia and Georgia by the end of February 1921. Partly in
deference to the eﬀorts of 1918, and inspired by the Bolshevik leader
of the Caucasus, Sergo Orjonikidze, the ZSFSR was set up in 1922.
This served two main, and limited functions: one was to coordinate
the economic activity of the region, and in this regard Orjonikidze
followed Vorontsov in recognizing that the relative isolation of the
region from Russia meant that, for a time, it would need to stand on
its own feet to a greater extent than other parts of the USSR. The
second function of the ZSFSR was to manage ethnic relations, which
had become a major source of violence and territorial disputes dur-
ing the years of independence. The idea was that creating an extra
administrative layer between the Union Republics (Armenia, Azer-
baijan, and Georgia) and the USSR centre, the region’s minorities
would feel less vulnerable to the three dominant nationalities and
would be able to identify with Soviet power at the regional level.
Abkhazia, in particular, enjoyed a special relationship to the ZSFSR
and was in a privileged position for much of the 1920s.
But this was not a project for political integration, and with
Moscow the key arbiter the functioning of the ZSFSR depended
very much on the personalities in leading positions in the region.
The leaders of Soviet Georgia had always opposed the Federation,
and with Orjonikidze’s appointment to a Moscow post with
responsibility for heavy industry in 1932 the ZSFSR lost its main
supporter. The inﬂuence of the charismatic leader of Abkhazia,
Nestor Lakoba, was also on the wane by then, and the ZSFSR was
losing most of its raison d’être. Ethnic disputes had died down
under Soviet rule but had little to do with the ZSFSR, while the
advent of the ﬁve year plans brought the South Caucasus under the
economic direction of the economic authorities in Moscow. When
Lavrenti Beria, an opponent of the ZSFSR from the beginning,
emerged as the head of the South Caucasus, he was able to quietly
abolish the largely forgotten ZSFSR in 1936.
By that time, in any case, the Soviet leadership under Iosif Stalin
was taking nationality politics in a diﬀerent direction. National re-
publics as the building blocks of the Soviet Federation were rein-
forced in their national character through a series of cultural mea-
6sures, but also through encouraging by incentive or by force the
movement of populations between republics. In the rest of the So-
viet Union, a general trend of the migration of Russians and other
Slavs into non-Russian cities counterbalanced this ethnicisation of
the republics’ population, but the low level of Slavic migration to the
South Caucasus meant that there the trend was for the multi-ethnic
character of the republics to diminish. In each of the three republics,
the share of the majority group in the overall population increased
steadily in the Soviet period. But the biggest changes were felt in the
cities, especially Tbilisi, which had as many Armenians as Georgians
in 1921, but was overwhelmingly Georgian by 1991.
The leaders of the three republics were also encouraged to de-
velop links with Moscow rather than with each other. The fact that
a number of Georgians and Azerbaijanis eventually made it into the
top levels of leadership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
which was otherwise dominated by Russians and Ukrainians, shows
how successfully leaders pursued these vertical ties. With the disap-
pearance of the ZSFSR there were no formal institutions in which the
republic leaders wouldmeet. Economic integration of the region was
poor, and was disrupted by a competitive rivalry which became more
evident after Stalin’s death. In the 1950s this went as far as Azerbai-
jan refusing to deliver oil to Georgia, which was one of the causes of
the downfall of ImamMustafaev as leader of the Azerbaijan Republic.
This period also saw the intensiﬁcation of territorial disputes, begin-
ning in 1954with claims by the Georgian ethnologist Pavle Ingorovqa
about the origins of the Abkhaz people. As academics from a variety
of disciplines devoted themselves almost exclusively to proving the
ancient territorial claims of the Georgians, Abkhaz, Armenians and
Azerbaijanis, politicians and the general public became embroiled in
the disputes, laying the ground for the violence that erupted ﬁrst in
Nagorno Karabakh at the end of the 1980s. So in spite of its reputa-
tion as a centralizing regime, the Soviet Union not only failed to in-
tegrate the South Caucasus, but in many ways its policies promoted
diﬀerence.
Given that under the very diﬀerent circumstances of Russian im-
perial rule, Soviet rule, and independence in the early and late twen-
tieth centuries, the lasting integration of the South Caucasus has not
been achieved, it would seem reasonable to look for some underly-
ing causes. In spite of the cultural features common to all the na-
7tionalities of the region, they are divided from each other by ethnic-
ity, religion and language. Irreconcilable claims on territory are the
biggest cause of division, following a notion of territoriality linked
to nationhood which was only reinforced by the Soviet period. De
Waal concludes that ‘political diﬀerence continues to outweigh ra-
tional economic interest’, emphasizing the role of Georgian nation-
alism in particular as a divisive force. And the great powers that
have surrounded the region must take some responsibility for their
interventions.
But it may be that ‘why has the South Caucasus failed to inte-
grate?’ is the wrong question to ask. We can ask instead ‘Why should
the region integrate?’ The combined forces of the region would leave
it still militarily too weak to resist its powerful neighbours, so while
in 1918-1920 individual countries looked for military support to Ger-
many, Turkey, Britain or Russia, so today the choice seems to be
between NATO and the CSTO. While Armenia, especially as long as
its border with Turkey remains eﬀectively closed, is dependent for
transport links through Georgia, the other two countries enjoy inde-
pendent links by sea to the east and west respectively. The fact that
the region is relatively small and homogenous in terms of climate
means that the agricultural structure of all three is similar, reducing
the need for trade, while the current state of industrial development
means that independent external links are more important than in-
ternal trade promoted by industrial specialization. The exception
here is energy, which ought to promote regional unity, but has failed
so far to do so in a meaningful way. This is not to say that greater
regional integration would not beneﬁt all three states and possibly
provide a mechanism for resolving the deeper fragmentation that
has seen Abkhazia and South Ossetia join the Russian sphere of in-
ﬂuence while Karabakh remains an object of war, albeit a passive
one. But the current reality is that the motives for closer integration
are not big enough to outweigh the contrary pull of international
orientations or to overcome the sources of distrust and competition
which have characterized the South Caucasus politically for at least
the past century.
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Chapter 2
Nagorno Karabakh
under Soviet Rule
Jeremy Smith
The eruption of violent ethnic conﬂict in the South Caucasus and
elsewhere in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s drew the attention
of the world to the signiﬁcance of the national question in the USSR.
The subsequent escalation of independence movements in the Baltic
republics and elsewhere, culminating in the 1991 break-up of the
Soviet Union, inspired a series of serious scholarly studies of Soviet
nationality policies and of the national histories of the major nation-
alities of the USSR. These studies tended to focus, naturally enough,
on the major nationalities that eventually constituted the post-Soviet
successor states. Among western scholars, little attention was ini-
tially paid to the smaller nationalities or cross-border nationalities
which populated what had been autonomous republics or regions
within the Soviet federal structure. Historians who were themselves
aﬀiliated with one or other of these territories took a naturally par-
tisan view of their status, and a great deal of eﬀort was expended
on staking historical claims stretching back to the Middle Ages and
beyond. Historians on both sides are adept at mobilising their under-
standing of distant history in support of current claims, but they are
of little use in explaining the origins of what are, in historical terms,
9
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very recent disputes. Thus it is with appropriate sarcasm that Laitin
and Suny (1999, 46) have characterised the origins of the dispute
over Nagorno Karabakh as ‘shrouded in the mists of the twentieth
century’.
The persistence of apparently unsolvable disputes over a num-
ber of the post-Soviet territories –Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno
Karabakh, Transdniester and Chechnya –has ensured that the in-
terest of western scholars in these regions has remained high, but
mostly from the viewpoint of Security Studies. The importance of
these disputes to international, especially European, stability, nat-
urally encourages perspectives which view them in terms of inter-
national relations. But this should not disguise the fact that their
origins and persistence stem, essentially, from local problems which
are based in speciﬁc cultural and historical contexts. In the absence
of serious historical study, it was easy to conclude that not just in-
dividual decisions such as that to locate Nagorno Karabakh inside
Azerbaijan, but the whole system of national autonomy was funda-
mentally misconceived, or was deliberately designed to perpetuate
ethnic rivalry. Thus Dov Lynch, writing with the 1980s in mind, has
summarized much of the current accepted wisdom as follows:
This experience [the system of autonomous republics
and regions] discredited the very notion of autonomy as a
valid institution for the protection of a group’s rights. De
jure, these areas had autonomy but de facto power resided
elsewhere….The legacy from this was paradoxical. Struc-
tures of autonomy did support the territorialization of eth-
nicity. However the experience of autonomy was negative
for the titular nationality in the autonomous structure, well
aware that power lay elsewhere. It was also negative for
the titular nationality in the Union Republic in which the
autonomy was embedded, who saw it as a means of So-
viet/Russian “divide and rule” (Lynch 2001, 9–10).
How such conclusions have been arrived at is clearly illustrated
by Audrey L. Altstadt (1988, 63): ‘The recent conﬂict in the So-
viet Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan concerning the Nagorno
Karabakh Autonomous Oblast’ …provides a case study in Soviet na-
tionalities policy in historical perspective.’ The danger with such a
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stance (although Altstadt herself is not guilty of this) is that it might
encourage reading back into history suppositions derived from the
current situation, in place of the more constructive exercise of ex-
amining the historical record independently in order to gain insights
into today’s problems. By doing so, we can improve our understand-
ing of the recent situation in Nagorno Karabakh and other ‘frozen
conﬂicts’, which in turn may open up new perspectives towards a so-
lution. This article does not advance any solutions, but in looking at
some of the twentieth century evidence that has become available to
scholars in the past two decades, it might at least dispel some myths
and inform more detailed investigations in the future.
The formation of the Nagorno Karabakh Soviet Autonomous Re-
gion (NKAO) in the 1920s needs to be seen in the context of a broad
policy of national autonomy implemented across the Soviet Union at
the time. Although the NKAO diﬀered in signiﬁcant respects from
other regions, it also followed in general lines an established model.
Among other things, this model was based on the ﬁrm conviction
among leading Bolsheviks that organising diﬀerent ethnic groups as
far as possible into distinct territorial entities would reduce ethnic
conﬂict (Smith 1997).
2.1 Armenian-Azerbaijani conﬂicts before
1921
Before examining the decisions behind the creation of the NKAO it
is necessary to look at the circumstances that informed those deci-
sions. A numerically substantial Armenian presence in the region
can only be dated back as far as the Russo-Persian Treaty of Turk-
menchay of 1828 and the subsequent colonising policies of Imperial
Russia (Alijarly 1996, 126). Even then, signiﬁcant conﬂict between
the Christian Armenians and Muslims does not seem to have fea-
tured up until 1905 inside the Russian Empire (although across the
border in the Ottoman Empire up to 300,000 Armenians were mas-
sacred between 1894 and 1896; see Walker 1991, 24). In February
of 1905, the ﬁrst serious blood-letting between Armenians and Azer-
baijanis broke out in Baku. These soon spread to Nakhchivan and, in
August, to Shusha, the main city of Karabakh, where 300 died. The
12
ﬁghting in Shusha in turn reignited the conﬂict in Baku. A second
conﬂict in Shusha and the surrounding area occurred in July 1906
as the Azerbaijani nomad herders took their ﬂocks up into the moun-
tains. Count I.I. Vorontsov-Dashkov, recently appointed Viceroy of
the Caucasus, apportioned the major part of the blame for the con-
ﬂicts to the Armenians, on the basis that they were better organised
(presumably around the Dashnak Party) and therefore more capable
of co-ordinated hostilities (Vorontsov-Dashkov 1907, 12). It is proba-
bly safer, however, to concur with Firuz Kazemzadeh (1951, 19) that
‘it is impossible to pin the blame for the massacres on either side’. It
seems that in some cases (Baku, Elizavetpol) the Azerbaijanis ﬁred
the ﬁrst shots, in other cases (Shusha, Tiﬂis), the Armenians. All
sides refer to the indiﬀerence or even complicity of the local author-
ities and the plenipotentiaries of the Russian Empire.
Between 1906 and the First World War, however, there were no
signs of a repeat, and Karabakh may rather have resembled the idyl-
lic, peaceful and amiably ethnically mixed land described by Kurban
Said in his novel Ali and Nino (2000). In spite of the killings of Ar-
menians in the Ottoman Empire in 1915, there appears to have been
no open animosity on the Russian side of the border. In other words,
up until the Russian Revolution, ethnic conﬂict between Azerbaijanis
and Armenians, at least in Karabakh, was the exception rather than
the norm.
All this changed in 1918. In Baku, the Bolshevik-led Commune of
1918 based itself largely on the Armenian population and found it-
self at key points in conﬂict with Muslims, who were subjected to
a massacre by the city’s Armenians in March (Suny 1972). With
the collapse of the Commune in September and the Ottoman cap-
ture of the city, the Muslim population took out its frustrations on
the Armenians, killing some 15,000. In Karabakh, meanwhile, an
Armenian dominated assembly had elected a People’s Government
of Karabakh in August, independent of Azerbaijan. On 3 October
an Ottoman Turkish army entered Shusha and killed numerous Ar-
menians. Although the Ottomans soon withdrew, another foreign
intervention caused a further deterioration in relations. In Decem-
ber, the British General W.M. Thomson persuaded the Armenian
General Andranik to withdraw and subsequently brokered the pass-
ing of Karabakh to the administration of independent Azerbaijan,
approving the appointment of the anti-Armenian Khosrov bey Sul-
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tanov as governor (Swietochowski 1985, 143). For the next year
and a half Nagorno Karabakh was a major battleﬁeld between Ar-
menian and Azerbaijani forces, as well as the scene of ethnic con-
ﬂict. In April 1919 both Karabakh and Nakhchivan were scenes of
bloody clashes. On 22 August 1919 the 7th Congress of Armenians
of Karabakh reached an agreement with the independent Musavat
government of Azerbaijan whereby Nagorno Karabakh would remain
part of Azerbaijan under a complicated set of provisions designed to
secure the position of the Armenian population.1 This agreement,
which ran to 26 paragraphs, combined an intricate system of power-
sharing with ‘cultural self-determination’ as exercised by an Arme-
nian National Soviet. The peace resulting from this agreement was
short-lived, however. In February 1920 the Azerbaijani governor-
general of Karabakh, Khosrov bey Sultanov, surrounded the region
with troops and demanded the Armenians accept full integration into
Azerbaijan. The events that followed culminated in a full-scale mas-
sacre in Shusha. In March 1920 an Armenian rising in Karabakh
against theMusavat government distracted the Azerbaijani army suf-
ﬁciently to ensure the Red Army an easy path to Baku, while in June
it was the scene of an Azerbaijani rising under Nuri Pasha against
Soviet power (Libardian 1988, 160, 189).
In March 1920, the Bolshevik agent in Transcaucasia,
B.Shakhtakhtinskii, wrote to Lenin providing details of nine
territories disputed at the time between the three Transcaucasian
governments.2 After the sovietisation of Transcaucasia, a series of
border commissions settled the status of six of these nine
territories, based in the most part on the ‘ethnographic principle’
whereby the borders of each Soviet republic would be drawn
according to the dominant population in each of the regions.
The three other territories were disputed between Azerbaijan
and Armenia: Karabakh, Nakhchivan and Zengezur. Zengezur,
lying between the two republics, was of mixed Azerbaijani and
Armenian population, as was Nakhchivan, lying to the south of
Armenia. Shakhtakhtinskii claimed, inaccurately, that Nakhchivan
had been entirely emptied of its Armenian population during the
1Rossiisky gosudarstvenny arkhiv sotsial’noi i politicheskoi istorii (RGASPI), f.5,
op.1, d.2797; Libaridian 1988, 20-22.
2RGASPI, f.5, op.1, d.2796, p.4.
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war. According to this report, Karabakh formed a single
administrative unit under the Russian Empire, but could be divided
between Lower Karabakh and Nagorno (Mountainous) Karabakh.
Lower Karabakh was inhabited by 415,000 Muslims and 170,000
Armenians. The settled population of Nagorno Karabakh was
overwhelmingly Armenian. However, the semi-nomadic
Azerbaijanis who dwelt on the lower slopes of Karabakh had
traditionally driven their ﬂocks into the Armenian inhabited
highlands for summer pasture. On this basis, Shakhtakhtinskii
argued against the splitting of Karabakh as this would directly
interfere with the livelihood of the nomads. To further complicate
matters, the Lachin strip which divided Nagorno Karabakh from
Armenia was inhabited largely by Kurds.
Prior to Sovietisation the Bolsheviks were divided on their
attitude to Nagorno Karabakh. While Shakhtakhtinskii and many
Bolsheviks in Azerbaijan were against the dismemberment of
Karabakh, the Caucasian Bureau of the Russian Communist Party
(Kavbiuro) and the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Aﬀairs
(Narkomindel) seemed to favor the Armenian claim on the basis of
national self-determination. On 3 June 1919 S.M. Kirov, then
attached to the Military Soviet of the Eleventh Red Army, wrote to
Lenin and Stalin summarising the situation on the ground:
‘Karabakh and Zengezur do not recognise the Azerbaijani
Government. The Dashnaks [the Armenian government] are hoping
to unite Karabakh to Armenia’ (Kirov 1936, 144).
But the situation changed on 27 April 1920, when the Red Army
marched into Baku, and the next day the Azerbaijan Soviet Social-
ist Republic was proclaimed. The Soviet state was entrusted to the
Azerbaijan Communist Party, recently formed from the left wing of
the socialist Muslim party ‘Hummet’ under N. Narimanov. The new
government rejected all the Armenian claims, inspired both by the
national interests of Azerbaijan and the fact that Armenia was not
yet Soviet. Narimanov was conﬁdent that ‘no-one in the world is in
a position to prevent us from using our inﬂuence over the popula-
tion of the given regions to declare in favour of unity with Azerbai-
jan’ (Nagorniy Karabakh 1988, 24). Stalin, then Soviet Commissar
of Nationality Aﬀairs, appears to have sided with Narimanov at this
time, prompted in part by the diplomatic situation with regard to
Turkey, which wanted to preserve a link between itself and Muslim
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Azerbaijan through Nakhchivan, Zengezur and Karabakh. Writing
to the head of the Kavbiuro, Sergo Ordzhonikidze, Stalin said: ‘My
opinion is that we need to give decisive backing to one of the sides
- in this case Azerbaijan and Turkey’ (Nagorniy Karabakh 1988, 23).
According to a later Armenian Soviet source backing the Armenian
claims a number of Armenian Bolsheviks also supported Azerbaijani
control of the disputed regions as a temporary measure until the so-
vietisation of Armenia (Nagorniy Karabakh 1988, 24).
Before this took place, the Azerbaijan Soviet Government issued
an ultimatum to Armenia demanding the withdrawal of its troops
from Karabakh and Zengezur. This led May Day demonstrators in
Armenia to call on Soviet Russia to work out a just solution to the
dispute (Libardian 1988, 28). The Russian Commissar for Foreign
Aﬀairs, Chicherin, favoured an even-handed solution. For the time
being at least, Zengezur, Nakhchivan and Karabakh should belong
to neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan, but the local soviets ought to
be strengthened and the territories should be occupied by Russian
troops until a permanent solution could be worked out.3 During May
and June, this proposal for the Russian occupation of the disputed
regions was carried out by the Eleventh Red Army. In June 1920,
Chicherin proposed that Zengezur and Nakhchivan should belong to
Armenia, and the status of Nagorno Karabakh should be determined
by a referendum (Walker 1991, 100).
This solution did not, however, meet with unanimous approval
among the Bolsheviks in Transcaucasia. On 18 June Narimanov, sup-
ported by the leading Georgian Bolshevik Budu Mdivani and the Ar-
menian Anastas Mikoyan, wrote to Chicherin protesting at Armenian
incursions into what they considered to be Azerbaijan:
The Armenian population of Nagorno Karabakh and
Zengezur, following the withdrawal of [the Armenian
general] Dro, proclaimed Soviet power under the
leadership of the Communist doctor Ambarpum’ian...We
categorically declare that it is indisputable that these two
areas should henceforward lie within the borders of
Azerbaijan...The districts of Dzhul’ﬁn and Nakhchivan
should be occupied by our forces and joined to
3RGASPI, f.64, op.1, d.17, l.18.
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Azerbaijan, both for military purposes and towards the
end of direct union with Turkey.4
A much stronger attitude was displayed by the head of the
Karabakh Guberniya Revkom Asad Karaev. This character’s
solution to the Karabakh and Zengezur problems was violent and
overtly racist. He wrote to the Gerusin Revkom:
Anyone who understands the psychology of
Armenians...[knows that] there is not a single Armenian
who will not betray everything for money...Your old policy
of occupying Karabakh and Zengezur with troops was
deeply mistaken. We know that our forces are broken and
have retreated, but today instead of armed forces our
money is working miracles. Again and again I repeat my
advice - do not spare any sum, increase salaries, give
them bonuses and anything they want. The government
has decided that to unite Karabakh and Zengezur to
Azerbaijan it will issue 200 million roubles.5
Faced with such opposition on the ground, the Politburo of the
Russian Communist Party lent its support to Chicherin and sought to
restore calm in an instruction of 7 July 1920:
Clarify to the population of the disputed territories, oc-
cupied by Russian forces, that these territories are occu-
pied by our forces temporarily with the aim of halting inter-
ethnic slaughter, and that the question of the status of
these territories will be decided by a joint commission un-
der a Russian representative, and that the joint commis-
sion will be guided by the ethnic composition of the popu-
lation and its will (Nagorniy Karabakh 1988, 27).
The Bolshevik leadership wanted to apply in Transcaucasia the
basic principles - ethnic homogeneity and self-determination – which
guided national policy in Russia at that time. But in Azerbaijan the
Politburo in Moscow did not have the same control over the newly
4RGASPI, f.64, op.1, d.17, l.106.
5RGASPI, f.64, op.1, d.19, l.9.
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formed Communist Party that it had, by insisting on Party discipline,
in Russia, let alone control over loose cannons like Karaev. As a
result they were unable to enforce their will. In August 1920 Kirov
wrote to Chicherin in exasperation:
I have done all I could to fulﬁll your directive. Regret-
tably, the results are disappointing, and the matter has not
gone one step forward. Recently, in connection with the
events in Zengezur and Nakhchivan, many opinions have
been forthcoming on the Armenian question. For a long
time the Commissar for Foreign Aﬀairs for Azerbaijan, Gu-
seinov, was here with several Party workers. I held a string
of meetings with him and with Armenian representatives
here. I also set up joint meetings. As a result of all this only
one point was secured from the Azerbaijanis - they were
ready to concede Sharuro-Daralageskii uezd to Armenia;
for the rest, i.e. Nakhchivan, Ordubad, Julfa, Zengezur and
Karabakh, the Azerbaijanis consider them unconditionally
theirs. In their turn the representatives of Armenia cate-
gorically claimed these regions. The chief argument of the
Azerbaijanis is that these regions belonged to Azerbaijan
under the Musavat government and to concede these re-
gions now would, in their opinion, discredit Soviet power
not only in Azerbaijan but also in Persia and Turkey...I have
already advised you, that the only way out of the situation
which has arisen is to be ﬁrm and resolve this question
in Moscow, only Moscow’s authority can resolve the aﬀair
(Kirov 1936, 231-232).
Delay in resolving the disputes was, according to Kirov, discred-
iting Russia’s policy as racial massacres continued to take place.
Chicherin, the Kavbiuro and the Politburo of the Russian Communist
Party were seeking a solution to the disputed territories along the
lines of the national policy being employed in Russia but were being
hampered primarily, in Kirov’s view, by the Azerbaijani communists.
Therefore the problem remained unsolved until the sovietisation of
Armenia.
On 29 November 1920 the Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia
was proclaimed. Immediately it became clear that those like Stalin
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who had opposed granting territory to Dashnak Armenia were only
too happy to oblige the new Soviet state. The Azerbaijani leadership
was also prevailed upon at this point. On 1 December, following a
session of the Baku Soviet, the Azerbaijani Revkom proclaimed:
The problems of the frontiers between Armenia and
Azerbaijan are declared resolved. Nagorno Karabakh,
Zengezur and Nakhchivan are considered parts of the
Republic of Armenia (Libardian 1988, 31).
Three days later, Stalin hailed this act in an article in Pravda
and concluded that ‘the age-old enmity between Armenia and the
surrounding peoples has been dispelled at one stroke by the estab-
lishment of fraternal solidarity between the working people of Ar-
menia, Turkey and Azerbaijan.’ (Stalin, IV, 414). The transfer of
the disputed territories to Armenia was enthusiastically welcomed
by Ordzhonikidze, the Armenian Revkom, and an Armenian delega-
tion which met with Lenin in the Moscow Kremlin on 12 December
(Nagorniy Karabakh 1988, 207).
Azerbaijan’s acceptance of the transfer did not last long, how-
ever. Shortly after the declaration of 1 December, Shakhtakhtin-
skii arrived in Nakhchivan and began to agitate against the declara-
tion, claiming that ‘the Azerbaijani Revkom has betrayed the inter-
ests of Nakhchivan by declaring its transfer to Armenia’ (Nagorniy
Karabakh 1988, 35). According to a Soviet source, a referendumheld
in Nakhchivan at the start of 1921 declared nine to one in favor of au-
tonomy within the Azerbaijan SSR (Mil’man 1971, 234). Turkey also
took an interest in Nakhchivan and, partly in the interests of good
relations with Turkey, the Bolsheviks agreed to Nakhchivan becom-
ing an autonomous region under the protection of Azerbaijan in the
Treaty of Moscow signed on 16 March 1921 (Walker 1991, 106).
Almost immediately, Narimanov started to agitate for the return
of Nagorno Karabakh to Azerbaijan, threatening that otherwise he
could not prevent the re-emergence of anti-Soviet groups in Azer-
baijan (Nagorniy Karabakh 1988, 31). The status of Karabakh as a
part of Armenia was nonetheless conﬁrmed by the Kavbiuro on 3 June
1921 (Walker 1991, 107), and in declarations of the Armenian gov-
ernment on 12 and 19 June (Libardian 1988, 23). The Kavbiuro was
having to ﬁght constantly with the Azerbaijani government. On 26
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June Ordzhonikidze and Kirov stated the most radical interpretation
yet of the ethnic principle in a telegram to Narimanov:
‘Not one Armenian village ought to be united to Azer-
baijan, equally not one Muslim village can be united to Ar-
menia’ (Nagorniy Karabakh 1988, 32).
The very next day, however, the Politburo of the Communist
Party of Azerbaijan ﬂouted this principle and declared that Nagorno
Karabakh would not be restored to Armenia on the grounds that it
was linked with Azerbaijan economically (Walker 1991, 107).
On 3 July 1921 the Kavbiuro met to resolve the question of the sta-
tus of Nagorno Karabakh. At its ﬁrst session the Kavbiuro conﬁrmed
the decision to transfer Nagorno Karabakh to Armenia, against Nari-
manov’s protests. Two days later, however, the same body resolved:
Considering the necessity of national peace between
Muslims and Armenians and the economic ties between
upper and lower Karabakh and its permanent ties with
Azerbaijan, to leave Nagorno Karabakh in the borders of
the Azerbaijan SSR, granting it broad regional autonomy
with an administrative centre in Shusha, coming into the
composition of an autonomous oblast (Nagorniy Karabakh
1988, 32).
The decision to implement autonomy was not carried out imme-
diately, most probably because of the need to maintain the goodwill
of Turkey. By July 1923 relations with Kemal had cooled and the
Autonomous Region of Karabakh was formed as a part of Azerbaijan
(Libardian 1988, 34).
The sudden turnabout of July 1921 has never been fully explained.
According to two pro-Armenian secondary sources the change was
made following the intervention of Stalin, but a third source indicates
that Stalin was himself present at the ﬁrst meeting, which had con-
ﬁrmed Nagorno Karabakh as part of Armenia (Libardian 1988, 34;
Nagorniy Karabakh 1988, 33; Walker 1991, 108). It is possible that
a third party intervened (such as Chicherin, or the Politburo of the
Russian Communist Party), but equally it could be that the members
of the Kavbiuro and Stalin were persuaded by Narimanov’s threats
of disorder or other factors to change their minds. What is clear is
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that the decision-makers in Moscow did not operate in isolation from
the pressures being exerted locally and internationally. As long as
Armenia remained independent, it would never get a look in. Once
Soviet power was established there, however, the pendulum swung
in Armenia’s favor. But the position of the Communist Party of Arme-
nia was never as strong as that of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan.
The latter was formed out of an established left-wing party,Hummet,
which was close enough to the communists for the alliance to work
but which also retained a strong national character and on which the
Bolsheviks depended to maintain power in the region. By contrast,
leading Armenian communists like Anastas Mikoyan were indiﬀerent
to Armenian national demands. Bolshevik ideologues saw Armenians
as the oppressor nation in parts of the South Caucasus, playing a role
analogous to the Russians elsewhere, while mostly Muslim Azerbai-
jan was a beacon for Eastern peoples which had an important part
in the Bolsheviks’ international revolutionary strategy. Turkey also
had a major part in that strategy, and as a substantial military power
in the region could ultimately bend the weak Soviet regime to its will
over local issues.
2.2 Azerbaijani-Armenian conﬂicts after
1921
Recent studies have indicated that national or ethnic conﬂict be-
tween diﬀerent groups was commonplace in the Soviet Union in the
1920s, especially in Central Asia and also, in a diﬀerent form, in
Ukraine (Smith 2001). In Central Asia, the delimitation of national
republics and regions in 1925 led to new forms of conﬂict between
the diﬀerent Muslim groups over land, borders and political control,
while older rivalries between locals and European settlers persisted
and intensiﬁed.
Newly declassiﬁed reports of the OGPU (secret police), which
were sent to leading party members on a monthly basis, provide an
overall picture of conﬂicts in the non-Russian regions. Regarding
national relations in the South Caucasus up until the middle of 1925,
the emphasis in the reports is on the activities of nationalist parties –
the remnants of the Musavats, Dashnaks, and Georgian Mensheviks,
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the Constantinople-based ‘Committee for the Liberation of Azerbai-
jan and the Mountaineers of the North Caucasus’, the Turkish ‘Is-
lam’ party and the Turkey-sponsored ‘Ittikhat’. Cross-border raids
by armed bands are assigned to purely criminal rather than national
motives. In contrast to the frequent reports of ethnic conﬂict in Cen-
tral Asia6 and the North Caucasus,7 there are no references to in-
ternal ethnic conﬂicts in the South Caucasus. Mentions of Nagorno
Karabakh itself are conﬁned to reports of the eﬀects of harvest fail-
ure there in 1924.8
When separate detailed reports on the Azerbaijan SSR began to
appear in September 1925, however, it is clear that processes sim-
ilar to those noted in Central Asia aﬀected the republic. As the
nation-building process proceeded in the union republics, the tit-
ular nationalities took advantage of their newfound status to fur-
ther the interests of their own nationality at the expense of inter-
nal minorities. Armenian populated villages faced general discrimi-
nation from the Azerbaijani authorities. But these complaints were
not to be heard from within Nagorno Karabakh itself. Rather, Ar-
menian communities outside of Nagorno Karabakh appealed to be
included inside the boundaries of the autonomous unit as a safe-
guard against Azerbaijani abuses of power. Thus, in the 9th district
of Gandzha uezd Armenian peasants declared: ‘the Azerbaijani gov-
ernment is not paying attention to the Armenian village. Unite us
to the autonomous region of Nagorno Karabakh’. From Karachinar
the Zakkraikom was handed decisions from 14 Armenian villages re-
questing to be joined to Nagorno Karabakh in response to perceived
abuses by local Azerbaijani oﬀicials.9 In November parallel cases oc-
curred of Muslim communities in Armenia complaining of Armenian
resettlement in their villages, and asking to be resettled in Azerbai-
jan or Nakhchivan.10
6e.g. ‘Obzor politicheskogo sostoianiia SSSR za oktiabr’ 1924 gg.’, see Sovershenno
2001, 247-252.
7e.g. ‘Obzor politicheskogo sostoianiia SSSR za iiun’ 1924 gg.’, Sovershenno 2001,
132.
8‘Obzor politicheskogo sostoianiia SSSR za iiul’ 1924 gg.’, Sovershenno 2001, 145,
148.
9‘Obzor politicheskogo sostoianiia SSSR za sentiabr’ 1925 gg., prilozheniia no.4’,
Sovershenno 2002, 552-553.
10‘Obzor politicheskogo sostoianiia SSSR za oktiabr’ 1925 gg., prilozheniia no.5’,
Sovershenno 2002, 639.
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While this evidence is limited, the reports of Armenian villages
submitting requests to be included in Nagorno Karabakh suggest
that, at least in the eyes of Armenians living outside the region, au-
tonomous status was eﬀective in defending the Karabakh Armenians
against the discriminatory practices that local oﬀicials were inﬂict-
ing elsewhere. Nagorno Karabakh as a safe haven for the rural Ar-
menians of Azerbaijan meant that regional autonomy was something
more than amere slogan, and Armenians were predominant in senior
positions locally and enjoyed being in a position to push forward the
national interest of local Armenians. At the higher levels of power,
Armenians continued to be over-represented in the leading bodies of
the Azerbaijan Republic.11 Although the region suﬀered from collec-
tivisation like the rest of the country, there is little to suggest that
ethnic hatred was a feature of life in Karabakh while Stalin remained
in power.
Discrimination against Armenians as well as other
non-Azerbaijanis in Azerbaijan became a prominent issue again
only after Khrushchev’s Secret Speech in 1956. Emboldened by the
apparent freedom which Khrushchev’s policies granted to leaders
in the Soviet republics, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of
Azerbaijan, M.A. Ibrahimov, succeeded in passing a law making
Azerbaijani the sole oﬀicial language of the Republic in August
1956. While this brought Azerbaijan into line constitutionally with
Armenia and Georgia, the Azerbaijani leaders were later charged
with using the new law to eﬀectively exclude non-Azerbaijanis from
public life (Arkhivy 2004, 364-366). The most frequent complaints
against these practices came from Russian oﬀicials and inhabitants
of Baku, but the new law also had a negative impact on the
Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh.12 The purge of ﬁrst secretary
I.Mustafayev and other leading communists in Azerbaijan in 1959
was partly in response to this turn. Mustafayev’s successors were
far more cautious and were able to advance the cause of Azerbaijan
by sticking closely to the demands of Moscow and pursuing a more
balanced national policy.
In Nagorno Karabakh this meant that Armenian became, in
11‘Iz dokladnoy zapiski Zakavkazskogo kraikoma v TsK VKP(b) o rabote i sostoyanii
Zakavkazskoi partiinoi organizatsii’ 19th October 1931, TsK RKP(b) 2005, 682.
12Gromov and Lebedev, ‘Report on Ibragimov’s language law’, 16th November 1956,
Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii (RGANI) f.5, op.31, d.60, ll.10-12.
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practice, the principal language of business and administration,
with many Armenians knowing no Russian at all. Economic and
social data for Nagorno Karabakh also show that on most indicators
Karabakh was developing at a similar, if not faster, rate than
Azerbaijan as a whole in the late Soviet period. According to data
recorded in the statistical yearbooks of Azerbaijan, while the
population of Nagorno Karabakh grew at a slower rate than that of
Azerbaijan as a whole, industrial output grew more rapidly.
Education levels were similar, and pupils in Nagorno Karabakh
enjoyed a higher teacher/student ratio. Azerbaijan had more
doctors per 1,000 population, but fewer hospital beds. The late
1970s and early 1980s did see capital investment stagnate in
Nagorno Karabakh while it continued to accelerate in the Republic
as a whole, so that by 1985 per-capita investment in Azerbaijan was
nearly double that of Nagorno Karabakh (see Kazandijan 1998).
This is one reason why the economic crisis that hit the USSR in the
later part of the 1980s was particularly acute in Nagorno Karabakh,
and scarcity of economic resources is one of the factors most
commonly associated with inter-ethnic violence (Horowitz 1985). In
other respects, however, there is little to indicate any speciﬁc
discrimination against the region or its Armenians at least until the
late 1970s. In 1963 Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh petitioned
Khrushchev, in 1967 an appeal was addressed to the Armenian
Communist Party and in 1977 the popular author Sero Khanzatian
wrote to Brezhnev, all demanding the transfer of Nagorno Karabakh
and surrounding regions to Armenia (Walker 1996, 103-104). Such
protests were, however, infrequent and it is unclear if they were
backed by any substantial popular support. Elsewhere in the Soviet
Union, Azerbaijanis and Armenians continued to coexist peacefully
even after the break-up of the Soviet Union, most notably in
Georgia, where the two nationalities continued to live side by side.
While it is not the place here to go into the immediate causes of the
Karabakh conﬂict, one of the major diﬀerences in Georgia appears
to have been the attitude of the republic’s leaders towards Armeni-
ans and Azerbaijanis, which in turn contrasted with their treatment
of the Abkhaz question (Kuhkianidze 1997, 182). It is also notable
that Moscow’s response to the growing dispute between Azerbaijan
and Armenia in early 1989 was to impose direct rule, just as it had
done in 1920. While the Red Army’s actions in the region, and later
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in Baku, did nothing to help and even inﬂamed the situation, the
resort to direct rule from Moscow as an extreme measure is indica-
tive of the way Soviet policy towards nationalities in the republics
worked: Azerbaijan, as with other Soviet republics, enjoyed consid-
erable authority in organizing the aﬀairs of its territory, including
its autonomous regions. The inherent danger in this policy was that
it encouraged republican leaders to act in the interest of a single
nationality, and at times this went so far as to make the republic’s
minorities feel threatened. This occurred in the early 1920s, the mid
1950s, and the late 1980s. On the ﬁrst and third of these occasions,
the leaders of Armenia also became involved. While in the 1950s a
bloodless purge was enough to rectify the situation and set a lesson
for the future, at the times when the Soviet Union was being put to-
gether and again when it was falling apart, this was not a viable or
suﬀicient option. The only ﬁnal resource Moscow had at its disposal
was military force. But these were exceptional times, and for the
rest of the Soviet period more subtle means could be employed to
ensure that autonomous subjects of the Union republics would enjoy
tightly limited, but real, autonomy. What this meant was that the
autonomous structures of the USSR were created by, and depended
on, the authorities in Moscow. This is the historical essence of the
post-Soviet ‘frozen conﬂicts’ – structures which were meant to gov-
ern the aﬀairs of national minorities in the USSR were simply not de-
signed to work in the smaller independent states that succeeded the
Soviet Union, as the system’s architects simply did not conceive of
this situation ever occurring. Kirov’s 1920 appeal that ‘only Moscow
can solve this aﬀair’ appears to have held true for the whole Soviet
period.
The political history of Nagorno Karabakh under Soviet rule is
only one of the many complex factors underlying the conﬂicts that
erupted in the late 1980s and the continuing impasse over the status
of the region. Although the decision to include Nagorno Karabakh
within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic in the 1920s was to
some extent arbitrary, it was a decision which could only be taken
in Moscow. As elsewhere in the Soviet Union, the structure of the
federative system continued to be dependent on Moscow. The cen-
tral decisions were, however, taken with due regard to the balance
of pressures locally, especially in the early years when Soviet rule
in the borderlands was weak. This only helped the implementation
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of a balanced national policy once central power was consolidated.
There is little in the history of Karabakh to suggest that, for most of
the Soviet period, Armenians in the region faced persecution and dis-
crimination, or that serious ethnic tensions existed. On the contrary,
Armenians could look to Karabakh as a beacon while their position
may have deteriorated elsewhere in the republic. The federal struc-
tures that had evolved depended, however, on central intervention
and, as Moscow’s power waned, just as it had in 1917, they proved
inadequate for maintaining balance between local regions and na-
tional groups, setting the region once more along the path of ethnic
conﬂict.
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Timeline of the formation of the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Republic
1905 February Ethnic conﬂict in Baku
August Conﬂicts in Shusha
1906 July Further ﬁghting in Shusha
1918 May Creation of Democratic republics of Ar-
menia and Azerbaijan
August People’s Government of Karabakh
elected
September Baku Commune collapses
October 3rd Turkish forces capture Shusha
December Khosrov Sultanov appointed governor of
Karabakh, backed by British
1919 April Conﬂict in Karabkh and Nakhchivan
August 22nd 7th Congress of Armenians of Karabakh
reaches agreement with government of
independent Azerbaijan
1920 February Khosrov Sultanov surrounds Nagorno
Karabakh with troops, demands full in-
tegration of the region into Azerbaijan
March Armenian rising in Karabakh
April 28 Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan
proclaimed
May 11th Red Army occupies Karabakh
June Azerbaijani rising against Soviet power
in Karabakh, Soviet Commissar for For-
eign Aﬀairs Georgii Chicherin proposes
referendum on the status of Karabakh
June 18 Narimanov protests against Armenian
incursions into Karabakh
November 29 Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia pro-
claimed
December 1 Azerbaijan Revkom cedes Nagorno
Karabakh, Zengezur and Nakhchivan to
Armenia
1921 March 16 Under Soviet-Turkish treaty of Moscow,
Nakhchivan becomes part of Azerbaijan
June 3 and July 3 Kavburo conﬁrms Nagorno Karabakh as
part of Armenia
June 26 Politburo of Communist Party of Azerbai-
jan declares Nagorno Karabakh would
not be restored to Armenia
July 5 Kavburo decides to transfer Nagorno
Karabakh to Azerbaijan
1923 July Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region
formed as part of Azerbaijani SSR
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Chapter 3
The Åland Autonomy –
an Alternative to
Secession and
Independence?
Elisabeth Nauclér
Why is the Åland autonomy so interesting? Why has so much atten-
tion been drawn to this solution? And why is the Åland solution so
often brought up in connection with the Nagorno Karabakh conﬂict?
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
Minsk Group took the lead in mediating the Nagorno Karabakh con-
ﬂict between the two parties Armenia and Azerbaijan in March 1992,
and the current cease-ﬁre agreement was reached in 1994. Finland
had the presidency in the Minsk group in 1993, and it was natural to
bring the two parties to the Åland Islands to study the solution that
Finland had once been part in ﬁnding and is still part of. The dispute
over Nagorno Karabakh has still not been resolved, and has become
a so called frozen conﬂict.
This ﬁrst contact to the Åland Islands was within the framework
of so called Track One diplomacy, or oﬀicial diplomacy eﬀorts, but
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manymore initiatives were to be taken, such as visits, seminars, talks
and research projects, or what would be labelled as Track Two, unof-
ﬁcial diplomacy eﬀorts, or citizen’s diplomacy. It became natural to
continue with multi-track diplomacy initiatives related to the Åland
Islands, some of them in cooperation with Finnish players and some
with others, putting the Nagorno Karabakh conﬂict in a broader re-
gional context (Pashayeva 2012, 107).Within the framework of multi-
track diplomacy or Track Three diplomacy, meetings have been held
in the Ålands Islands with journalists, researchers, youth, women,
and representatives from non-governmental organizations as partic-
ipants, making it possible for people from each side of the conﬂict
to meet, people who do not otherwise have the opportunity to dis-
cuss with each other, and to understand how the other side views
the situation. The atmosphere in the islands has proven to promote
a culture of peace and reconciliation, and a place where trust can be
built.
In 1995 the Center for International Development and Conﬂict
Management (CIDMC) at the University of Maryland at College Park
launched a project entitled “Partners in Conﬂict: Building bridges in
Transcaucasia” with the aim to bring together professionals from Ar-
menia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to examine theories for regional con-
ﬂict management. One of the follow-up workshops was held in the
Åland Islands in August 1997 (Pashayeva 2012, 115). In June 2010, a
study visit was organized by the Helsinki Citizens Assembly Network
in partnership with the Åland Island Peace Institute and with the sup-
port of the Ministry for Foreign Aﬀairs of Finland so that civil society
representatives from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno Karabakh
could familiarize themselves with the Åland experience (Pashayeva
2012, 111). Five organizations, among them the Crisis Management
Initiative (CMI) in Finland and Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation in Swe-
den, established a partnership in 2010 and launched a project called
“The European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the Con-
ﬂict over Nagorno Karabakh” (Pashayeva 2012, 117).
These initiatives are all important as a peace agreement brokered
through Track One diplomacy is only a piece of paper with no eﬀect
if there is no corresponding wish for peace by the civil society and
the population. The way to a successful peace agreement can only
be paved by relentless eﬀorts with the help of Track Two and Track
Three diplomacy. It is about preparing the ground for cross conﬂict
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encounters, individuals as well as societies reﬂecting on their atti-
tudes and being prepared to confront their own demons and preju-
dices that stand in the way of reconciliation.
The decision made by the League of Nations in Geneva solving
the Åland Island conﬂict in 1921 is just a piece of paper, very in-
teresting for international lawyers, but not for solving the conﬂict
(Åland Culture Foundation 2010, 8-18). It was against the will of the
people, and the groundwork for the decision had in no ways been
done beforehand. It took one generation to accept the decision and
to embark on the autonomy project. What are interesting are the
mechanisms that were developed by the Finnish state and the Åland
Islands over many decades to come. They proved to function. As the
ﬁne-tuned autonomy system that was created in 1921 was not ac-
cepted by the inhabitants, the ﬁrst parliament did not meet until one
year later, and some of the possibilities created were not explored
or used, such as the right to ﬁle complaints to the League of Na-
tions.The Åland Autonomy is a political and conceptual solution that
has proven to be both functional and resilient.
Finland was recognised as an independent state by Russia and
Sweden on the very same day January 4, 1918 followed by
recognitions from other European powers. Helsinki later on argued
that Sweden and the other powers had, by their unconditional
recognition, accepted the Åland Islands as part of the sovereign
Finnish state. According to the Commission of Jurists established
by the League of Nations, the recognitions by other states meant
that Finnish sovereignty over the Åland Islands was incontestable
and that legally the islands formed a part of the Finnish state.
Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and its right to the Nagorno
Karabakh region were recognised by the international community
in 1992, and four United Nations Security Council resolutions were
passed on the issue in 1993 (822, 853, 874 and 884; see Ziyadov
2007). Nagorno Karabakh has declared independence under the
name of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic, but so far it has not been
recognised even by Armenia. Preserving the country’s
internationally recognized borders resulted in the case of the Åland
Islands in the present autonomy, and this could also be an option
for Nagorno Karabakh.
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3.1 The Åland Islands and the autonomy
solution
One of the reasons why the Åland autonomy solution has attracted
such interest is that it is one of the few conﬂicts that have been set-
tled by an international organization in a sustainable way. It was one
of the very ﬁrst conﬂicts where this form of autonomy arrangement
was implemented, and many of the special features were created
speciﬁcally for the Åland case. It has therefore been natural to look
at the Åland autonomy and ask if it is do-able anywhere else. Could it
be copied as such, and applied in other conﬂicts? Is it a model? The
answer is NO, because all minority disputes and internal conﬂicts
are diﬀerent. There are diﬀerent needs, they have diﬀerent back-
grounds, diﬀerent history, diﬀerent possibilities etc. But conﬂict-
solving mechanisms that are part of our autonomy and have proven
successful could be copied, or function as an inspiration for other
solutions.
The Åland Islands consist of more than 6,500 islands and skerries,
situated in the northern Baltic Sea between Sweden and Finland.
The only town is Mariehamn. The population amounts to 28,500, of
whom 11,000 live in Mariehamn. Nine tenths of the Ålanders live
on the largest island, the “Main Island”. About 93% of the popula-
tion speak Swedish as their mother tongue. The Ålanders have been
Swedish-speaking since as far back as is known, and therefore share
the Swedish cultural heritage. The Åland autonomy is considered
as territorial autonomy but it would also ﬁt into the notion of cul-
tural autonomy, as the Swedish language and culture constitute the
foundation of the autonomy.
The Åland Islands, together with Finland, belonged to Sweden
until 1809 at which time Sweden, after losing a war with Russia, was
forced to relinquish Finland, together with Åland, to the victor. The
Åland Islands thereby became part of the Grand Duchy of Finland,
under the Czars of Russia, which enabled St. Petersburg to begin
building a large fortress on the islands.
The Åland Islands were viewed as an important outpost of the
Russian Empire, and as a Russian guardian of the Baltic Sea, Åland
became involved in the 1853-1856 Crimean War. The Bomarsund
fortress was destroyed and Russia was defeated, but it was allowed
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to keep the islands. The Peace Treaty was concluded in Paris in 1856,
and Russia had to undertake not to re-fortify the Islands. Demilita-
rization is one of the cornerstones in the status that the Islands enjoy
under international law today.
When the Russian Empire started to disintegrate, but before Fin-
land declared independence in December 1917, the Ålanders started
to struggle for reunion with Sweden. A mass petition in favour of re-
union was signed by an overwhelming majority of the Ålanders and
conveyed to the King of Sweden.
In April 1919, Sweden raised the Åland question at the peace con-
ference in Paris for a plebiscite in Åland which initiated the drafting
in Helsinki of an autonomy act for the Ålanders. Three ministers
from the Finnish government arrived in Mariehamn in May 1920. A
meeting was convened in the town and the autonomy act was pre-
sented to representatives of the Ålanders. The Ålanders’ aim was not
autonomy, but reuniﬁcation with Sweden. Accordingly, the Finnish
initiative was rejected. The meeting took a dramatic turn when two
of the Åland representatives were arrested. Sweden sent a diplo-
matic note protesting the arrests, an intervention that turned the
controversy into an international issue, which paved the way for in-
tervention by the League of Nations. Great Britain took the initiative
of referring the Åland Islands question to the League of Nations in
July 1920.
Many minorities turn to the Ålanders asking how they got the at-
tention of the international community. Minority questions are al-
ways internal questions, not until there is an element of violence
like in the case of Kosovo or Aceh is international involvement to be
found. Non-violent methods like in the case of Tibet do not get the
attention of the world. The answer is this little detail –the diplomatic
note from Sweden to Finland made it an international conﬂict.
Sovereignty over the Åland Islands was recognized as belonging
to Finland by the League of Nations in Geneva on June 24, 1921. Fur-
thermore, the Council of the League stated that “peace, future cor-
dial relations between Finland and Sweden and the prosperity and
happiness of the islands themselves can only be consolidated through
measures envisaging a) new guarantees for the population of the is-
lands; b) the neutralization and non-fortiﬁcation of the archipelago.”
The League of Nations called upon Finland and Sweden to negotiate
and come to agreement on the additional guarantees.
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Three days later, Finland and Sweden presented to the Council a
text, known as the Åland Agreement, whereby the two parties agreed
on the terms under which Finland undertook to preserve the Swedish
language, culture and local traditions. The Åland Agreement was not
signed, and is formally not a legally binding document, but Sweden
admits to being politically and morally bound by it.
The most important guarantee clause is the one stating that the
language of instruction in schools supported or subsidised by the
State, the Åland authorities or the municipalities should be Swedish.
The right to buy land in Åland should be reserved for people domi-
ciled in the Islands. The way of regulating this rule has changed over
the years. The right to vote in municipal elections, and elections to
the Åland Parliament should be reserved for the resident population.
The Governor, who is the representative of the Finnish state in the Is-
lands, should be nominated by the President of Finland in agreement
with the Speaker of the Åland Parliament.
The League of Nations assumed responsibility for supervising the
application of the guarantees. Finland was obliged to forward to the
Council of the League of Nations, with observations, any petitions or
claims of the Parliament of Åland in connection with the guarantees
in question, and the Council should in turn, in any case where the
question was of a juridical character, consult the Permanent Court
of International Justice. This provision was later (1951) abolished.
This was one of the most important features of course: the inter-
national guarantees. This made the Åland autonomy diﬀerent from
most other autonomy arrangements. There are many autonomy ar-
rangements created but most of them are a form of delegation of
power, or decentralization. Another word is used in the case of Scot-
land, namely devolution or transfer. But in the case of the Åland is-
lands it is a question of division of power. There are two parliaments
in Finland, and thereby two jurisdictions. The legislative power is on
an equal footing just in diﬀerent spheres. The Åland autonomy is not
entrenched in the Finnish Constitution, but has its basis in the deci-
sion by the League of Nations. The Finnish Constitution only makes
a reference to the Åland autonomy saying that Åland has autonomy
as laid down in the Act on the Autonomy of Åland.1
1The autonomy acts of Åland before 1 January 1991 are called “Autonomy Act for
Åland”, while the present act which came into force 1 January 1991 is called “Act on
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The Act on the Autonomy of Åland is a Law passed by the Finnish
Parliament in the same way as the Constitution, but it should also
be passed by the Åland Parliament with a qualiﬁed majority. The
division of legislative power between the two parliaments can only
be altered this way, and it could be seen as a bilateral agreement.
Rather than a federation, Finland has a so called asymmetrical sys-
tem.
The decision in Geneva did not meet the will of the people in the
Åland Islands to reunite with Sweden, it did not meet the Swedish
interests to have the sovereignty of the islands, and did not grant Fin-
land unrestricted sovereignty over the islands. On the other hand,
Sweden got military guarantees through demilitarization and neu-
tralization, the Åland Islands were compensated through the Auton-
omy statutes and the eternal guarantees for the preservation of the
Swedish language and culture, and Finland continued to have the is-
lands even if it was with sous-sovereignty (Åland Culture Foundation
2010, 8-11).
There are two such cases in international law where federacy has
been reinforced by “hard” international guarantees; the Åland Is-
lands and South Tyrol (Anderson 2013, 225). The relation Finland-
Åland is a federacy, but with no federal system to build on, therefore
mostly viewed as an asymmetric system. This has caused many prob-
lems since Finland, and the Åland Islands, accessed the European
Union. The European Union does not acknowledge any autonomous
territories as members, and Finland has no federal system within
which these issues could naturally be solved, and thereby constitute
an instrument of conﬂict reduction.
3.2 Right of domicile, language issue and
administration of Åland
The right of domicile emerged as a legal concept in 1951. Several
of the elements were already contained in the League of Nations’
decision of 1921. The right of domicile as it is currently constituted
covers the right to participate in elections for the Åland Parliament
and the right to stand in such elections, the right to acquire real
the Autonomy of Åland”.
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property without special permission, and the right to carry out busi-
ness activities without special permission. Whoever enjoys the right
of domicile and has moved to the Islands before the age of twelve is
exempted from military service.
The right of domicile is acquired by a child at birth if one of his or
her parents possesses the right of domicile. Immigrants who have
lived in the Islands for ﬁve years, have obtained Finnish citizenship
and have satisfactory knowledge of Swedish can obtain the right of
domicile upon application. A person who forfeits the citizenship of
Finland, or a person who moves his or her permanent residence from
Åland also forfeits the right of domicile.
It has been argued that the right of domicile should be considered
as a form of compensation for the disappearance of the international
guarantees. At that time, the Soviet Union put pressure on Finland
not to search to replace the role of the League of Nations by an-
other international guardian (Modéen 1973, 67). The right of domi-
cile does not constitute a form of citizenship, but is rather a form of
indigenous right accorded to the persons who have decided to settle
in the Islands.
Anyone can move to the Åland Islands, there are no restrictions.
You can get a job, rent an apartment from day one, but you cannot
buy an island. There are some special rights granted to the peo-
ple who really settle in the islands. But anyone is welcome to settle
there. We have over 90 diﬀerent nationalities, and over 40 languages
are spoken. It is a very open society.
The Åland autonomy is, as stated earlier, a cultural autonomy
based on language; the fact that the residents speak a language dif-
ferent from that of the majority of the country. The people of the
Islands therefore wanted to belong to another country where the lan-
guage is Swedish, or as they put it “be reunited” with Sweden. The
language provisions should be viewed in this perspective, and some
of them could not have been acquired, or not even implemented to-
day, had it not been for the light of history, and the decision of the
League of Nations in Geneva in 1921. Finland is a bilingual country,
while the only oﬀicial language in the Åland Islands is Swedish.
The language of education in schools maintained by public funds
or subsidised by them should be Swedish. Finnish is taught in Åland
schools as a foreign language. There has up till now not been enough
interest in setting up private schools with Finnish as the language
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of tuition. A pupil of an educational institution in Åland may be ad-
mitted to a state-maintained or state-subsidised Swedish or bilingual
educational institution and be graduated therefrom, even if he or she
does not have the required proﬁciency in Finnish.
Already in the League of Nations decision it was determined that
the Governor must “enjoy the conﬁdence of the population”. The
Governor shall be appointed by the President of Finland upon agree-
ment with the Speaker of the Åland Parliament. If agreement cannot
be reached, the President must appoint one out of ﬁve persons who
are suggested by the Speaker of the Åland Parliament. The fact that
the Ålanders can inﬂuence Finland’s choice of representative to the
Islands usually raises great interest in international forums.
The Åland Delegation can be described as an
arbitrating/mediating body for settling disagreements between
Finland and the Åland Islands. Two of its members are appointed
by the Finnish Government and two by the Åland Parliament. The
Governor acts as chairman and the fact that he or she is appointed
after agreement between the State and the Speaker of the
Parliament becomes important. The chairman represents the State
but is a person in whom the Åland authorities have conﬁdence.
The Åland Delegation should resolve controversies arising in cer-
tain situations referred to in the Act on the Autonomy of Åland, carry
out the economic equalization, including determining the tax retri-
bution and give extraordinary grants. The decision on the adoption
of an act of autonomy of Åland shall be delivered to the Åland Delega-
tion who shall give their opinion before the decision is presented to
the President of the Republic of Finland. Upon request, the Delega-
tion shall give opinions to the Council of State, the ministries thereof,
the Government of Åland and the courts of law.
The Åland Parliament represents the people of Åland in matters
relating to its autonomy, and has all the characteristic features of
a parliament. Its duties are to enact legislation for Åland - acts of
Åland - and to conﬁrm the annual budget. The members of the Par-
liament are elected by direct and secret ballot. The suﬀrage shall be
universal and equal. The right to vote and be eligible in the election
of the Åland Parliament is based on the Right of Domicile, not on
ethnic or linguistic grounds.
The sessions of the Parliament of Åland shall be opened and closed
by the President of the Republic of Finland or, on his or her behalf,
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by the Governor. The President of the Republic has the power to dis-
solve the Parliament and order an election, but only after consulta-
tion with the Speaker of the Parliament, and this has never occurred.
The fundamental principle of the Act on the Autonomy of Åland
is that administrative power is to accompany legislative power. In
the areas where the Åland Parliament has legislative competence,
administrative power is exercised by the Åland Government. The
Government is formed according to democratic principles; it has to
enjoy the conﬁdence of the Åland Parliament.
The Government may consist of ﬁve to seven members and the
Chairman/Premier has the title “Lantråd”. The Government exer-
cises administration in all the spheres, which, under the Act on the
Autonomy of Åland, devolve upon the Åland authorities instead of the
State of Finland. The administration is vested in the Government and
governmental organs, and oﬀicials subordinate to them.
3.3 Legislation and demilitarization
Among themost important sectors belonging to the Åland Parliament
are public order and security, ﬁre-ﬁghting and rescue services, build-
ing and planning, tenancy and rent regulation, leasing of land, pre-
historic remains, health care and medical treatment, social welfare,
education and culture, farming and forestry, hunting and ﬁshing, the
postal service, including the right to issue stamps, the right to broad-
cast by radio or cable in Åland, and the promotion of employment.
Finland’s powers of legislation, exercised by the Parliament of
Finland, include, among others: foreign relations, family and inher-
itance law, the judiciary, merchant shipping, most aspects of penal
law, citizenship, legislation on aliens, and passports, ﬁrearms and
ammunition, the armed forces and border guards, taxes and duties,
with the exception of municipal taxes, trade and amusement taxes.
Although Finnish authorities are responsible for the general con-
duct of foreign aﬀairs, the Act on the Autonomy of Åland provides
Åland authorities with a means of exerting inﬂuence. If the Republic
of Finland enters into a treaty with another state, which aﬀects mat-
ters falling within Åland’s jurisdiction, the Åland Parliament must
give its consent. This is why we could have remained outside the EU
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when Finland joined.
The division of legislative power between Finland and Åland is in
principle exclusive in the sense that a Finnish law is not in force in
the Islands if Åland has legislative power in the matter even if no act
has been enacted in the Islands, and hierarchically a law of Åland is
not subordinate to an ordinary law of the Parliament of Finland.
In the autumn of 1921, a conference was held to draft a new
convention on demilitarization and neutralization of the Åland Is-
lands. According to the Convention concluded on October 21, 1921
by Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy,
Latvia, Poland and Sweden, Finland was to conﬁrm the prohibition
against fortifying the Islands that Russia had accepted in 1856. No
military operations, air or naval bases would be allowed in the Is-
lands. The ten signatory states agreed to regard the Åland Islands
as a neutralized zone in wartime and not to use it for military oper-
ations. The Soviet Union was not a signatory to the Convention and
accordingly not invited to the conference, and thus did not recognize
the neutralization, but was bound by the 1856 agreement.
There are, however, examples of areas subjected to both demil-
itarization and neutralization (status mixtus), e.g. Åland and Spits-
bergen. A neutralized area does not need to be defended because
acts of war are not supposed to take place there. However, the state
possessing sovereignty over the territory is obliged to defend its neu-
tralization. If the area is also demilitarized, it may be diﬀicult to
meet this obligation. In spite of this complication, Åland is both de-
militarized and neutralized and the purpose of this combination is
probably to combine the conﬁdence-building eﬀects of demilitariza-
tion with the guarantee that the area shall not be used as a theatre
of war in the event of armed conﬂict.
The decision on the adoption of an act of Åland shall be delivered
to the Finnish Ministry of Justice and to the Åland Delegation. The
Delegation should give its opinion to the ministry before the decision
is presented to the President of Finland. Laws passed by the Parlia-
ment of Åland are submitted to the President of Finland, who may
impose a veto, after having obtained an opinion from the Supreme
Court. The President has a veto only in two cases, namely if the Par-
liament has exceeded its legislative competence, or if the law aﬀects
the external or internal security of the country, which has only oc-
curred once. If an annulment is not ordered within four months the
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law enters into force. The President was given this important role
because he constitutionally had a very strong position in the Finnish
legislation being the force commander, and directing the foreign af-
fairs.2
According to the decision in Geneva in 1921, the Åland authorities
had the right to use for their needs 50% of the revenues of the land
tax, besides the revenues from provisional extra income taxes ac-
cording to principles as decided by the State, plus trade and amuse-
ment taxes and a few other dues. The intention was that the Ålanders
should be given the right to govern the region as freely as is possible,
without being an independent state. However, the revenues proved
to be insuﬀicient for the administration, and the system was given up
in 1951 when the second autonomy act (the Autonomy Act for Åland)
introduced a new economic regime. This allowed fewer possibilities
to freely govern the region, but on the other hand was a system that
provided the means needed to administer the autonomous region in
accordance with the autonomy act. The State authorities collected
for State use all public taxes in Åland, direct and indirect, as any-
where else in the country. The budget of the region was primarily
ﬁnanced by State funds. The system was very complicated when it
came to determining the ﬁnal settlement of accounts between the
State and the region. This very limited budgetary power severely
restricted the autonomy and was abolished in 1993 in favour of the
system authorised by the present act of autonomy (Act on the Auton-
omy of Åland).
According to the present autonomy act, the State has the right
to levy taxes in Åland in the same way as in other parts of Finland,
while the Ålandic authorities only have the right to levy additional
tax on income for Åland and the provisional extra income tax, as
well as the trade and amusement taxes. The main source of income
in the budget for Åland is therefore the taxes levied by the state,
and returned to the region from State funds. The sum returned is
called “the amount of equalization” and is determined in a special
equalization procedure. This is probably the weakest element in the
Åland autonomy system. Most other autonomies have the right to
levy taxes, and some of them do so despite receiving economic con-
tributions from the state.
2The Constitution of Finland 11 June 1999, Section 93 & 128.
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Åland has one seat out of the 200 in the Finnish Parliament. He
or she is not a member of any of the political parties existing in Fin-
land. Traditionally the Åland Member of Parliament has had a seat
in the Constitutional Commission as the Autonomy is referred to this
Commission. A special seat is reserved in the Grand Commission
(the European Aﬀairs Commission) for the Åland representative. It
encompasses the right to participate in the discussions, but not to
vote. The Åland MP has the same duties as all other MPs, mainly fo-
cusing on issues under the competence of the Parliament in Helsinki,
but also acting as a link between the political structure in Åland and
in Helsinki.
The Åland Government maintains an information oﬀice in Helsinki
and one in Stockholm, assisting the Åland Government in its coop-
eration with the authorities in Finland and Sweden. These oﬀices
have no special status within the autonomy or state structures, nor
diplomatic status.
3.4 International Cooperation
3.4.1 The Nordic Council and Nordic Council of
Ministers
Only a few years after the Second World War, in 1952, the Nordic
Council was created as a forum where each nation’s representatives
could exchange opinions and experiences. The Nordic Council was
founded as a parliamentary forum for cooperation among the ﬁve
independent Nordic countries.
The Nordic Council has been a precursor for other international
organizations when it comes to autonomous areas. The autonomous
areas are not observers. Instead, their parliaments choose members
of the Council on the same conditions as the sovereign states.
The Nordic Council of Ministers was established in 1971, to
conduct cooperation at governmental level. In 1983, an important
change occurred when the autonomous areas were granted the
right to participate in the work of the Council of Ministers.
Decisions in the Nordic Council of Ministers are based on
consensus but only require the acceptance of those countries that
are covered by the decision. The consent of the autonomous areas
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is needed in cases where the decision belongs to their area of
legislative competence. The approach is usually labelled “the right
of consent” and is quite unique (Weller and Wolﬀ 2008).
3.4.2 The European Union
When Finland joined the European Union, Åland had the option of
remaining outside (as is the case with the Faeroe Islands, Greenland
and the Isle of Man) in accordance with the Act on the Autonomy of
Åland, by not giving its consent when the Accession Treaty was to
be passed. A solution with Åland on the outside would certainly not
have appeared attractive to Finland. The Islands had managed to
gain an advantageous negotiating position, and Finland chose to as-
sist the Islands in negotiating a solution that convinced the islanders
that membership was acceptable. The result was a separate Proto-
col for the Åland Islands making it a member of the customs union
but leaving it outside the tax union. The aim of this derogation was
to maintain a viable local economy in the islands.
The Åland Islands is the only jurisdiction that had the option of re-
maining outside the Union when the mother country became a mem-
ber and yet chose to join, thereby making its position unique. The
Åland autonomy has expanded over its 90 years of existence, but
through joining the European Union the Åland Islands surrendered
competence to Brussels, as did Finland. The EU only knows states
as full members, and has a way of compensating them for their loss
of power and inﬂuence; i.e. they obtain seats in the European Par-
liament and they can appoint one Commissioner each. In the case
of a jurisdiction such as the Åland Islands, not being an independent
state, there is no such mechanism. The Åland Islands received just
one seat in the Committee of Regions, a body consisting of a variety
of local authorities, some with and some without legislative power.
The Committee exercises purely advisory powers and does not con-
stitute an EU institution in the formal sense.
Authorities are therefore seeking to strengthen the position of the
regions or alternative ways of compensating for the leakage. The
result of these eﬀorts remains to be seen.
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3.5 National Symbols
National symbols are of great importance to small autonomous areas,
as well as to newly born independent states, and they have there-
fore tended to provoke unnecessary tension from time to time. The
President of Finland has the right of veto in connection with an act
of Åland if the act relates to the internal or external security of the
State. This provision has been used only once in the history of the Au-
tonomous period, namely when the ﬁrst ﬂag was being adopted. The
design chosen was judged to resemble too closely the national ﬂag of
Sweden and “would be likely to cause misunderstanding about the
status of the region of Åland under constitutional law.” A new design
was proposed and the law on an Åland ﬂag was passed in 1954. The
ﬂag is a blue-yellow-red Nordic ﬂag, which is used in Åland and on
Åland’s own oﬀicial buildings. The ﬂag may also be ﬂown on Åland
vessels, including merchant ships, ﬁshing boats and pleasure boats,
as well as comparable vessels whose home is in the Åland Islands
(Tudeer and Liljeström 1994).
The Åland Government attempted to obtain the right to introduce
Åland’s own postage stamps as early as the 1950s, but the ﬁrst Åland
postage stamps were not issued until 1984. The process required
lengthy negotiations. The postal administration was later - through
the present autonomy act - transferred to the Åland authorities.
The Ålanders hold Finnish passports, but since January 1993 the
word “Åland” has been inserted in passports issued in the Åland Is-
lands to persons with the Right of Domicile. The Åland Islands has
its’ own country code “AX” allocated by the International Standard-
isation Organisation Maintenance Organisation (ISO-MA) and used
for statistical purposes as well as postal matters, used as postal area
code.
3.6 A Model for Others or just a Source of
Inspiration?
The procedures adopted to permit changes and evolution has for
eighty years enabled the Ålanders to enjoy and to expand the Au-
tonomy. There have over the years been tensions and diﬀiculties,
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sometimes acute, but the system has functioned. The Finnish Gov-
ernment as well as the President of the Republic of Finland commit
themselves to further expanding the Autonomy step by step. The
Åland Autonomy is under permanent transition.
Finland was deﬁnitely not a rich and civilized country in 1917 at
its declaration of independence. The second city in Finland looked
like Vukovar, as it had been levelled during the bloody ﬁghting of the
civil war in the country. The civil war in Finland was not about the
Åland question, but the Finnish civil war took place at a same time, it
was fought by the same people, and from the Ålanders’ perspective
in the same spirit in which the solution should have been found and
the conﬁdence built on the Åland question.
There are many elements in the Åland autonomy solution that are
interesting for others to study. One of them is the fact that the deci-
sion that needed to be implemented was against the will of the people
and despite this, the new form of power sharing has lasted for more
than 90 years. The Åland autonomy is not a happy-end solution. I
would claim that the shortcomings, the mistakes, the disputes, the
unsolved problems are equally important when it comes to a learn-
ing process. How do we share power, what is good governance, how
do you create a system with rule of law in such a small society? The
Åland solution is considered as minority protection. You can even to-
day hear that the Ålanders have privileges, while it is in fact a form
of compensation for not being granted their wish to be part of Swe-
den. It is the question of a regional minority that forms part of a
national majority. It is never a privilege to be a minority; a privilege
is to belong to the majority in the country. We have accepted to have
autonomy and be a minority (Spiliopoulou Åkermark 1997, 172).
In this context it is important to mention the kin-state. The reac-
tion of the kin-state is of course crucial. I would claim that even if
the Åland solution could not be seen as a model, Sweden is maybe a
model in this respect. A kin-state which accepted the decision made
by the League of Nations, but continued to support the minority in
question in ﬁelds where cultural and linguistic factors are important,
such as media, education, and medical care, but never ever getting
involved in internal politics, or supporting any separation movement.
The question of army, security and policing is often one of the
core issues in such discussions, and it was present in the case of
Aceh with the existence of a guerrilla movement. Åland is one of the
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few autonomous territories that has its own police force. The Åland
police co-operates with the Finnish police, also carrying out tasks on
their behalf through a special legal arrangement. This I am sure was
studied in the case of Aceh. Thorvald Stoltenberg has used it in the
case of Palestine, and he used to say “you don’t shoot at your own
people.” The policeman in Åland is one of us.
The very strong guarantees, created in Geneva, were tailored to
function for two parties that had no trust in each other. It is an ex-
tremely legalistic system. The fact that it has continued to be this
way over the years is of course related to the tradition with Finland
being an autonomous part of Russia. It is very safe for a minority to
have a strict legalistic system, and the Åland autonomy has there-
fore been interesting for parties in armed conﬂict or war. The de-
militarization/neutralization regimes add to it. Many politicians in
the Åland Islands think that after 90 years of autonomy it is time to
move on to a less rigid system where we could negotiate and agree
in a less formal way, but still in agreement. But that is for the future.
3.7 Conclusions
The Åland system was restrictive, legalistic, and tailor-made for a
conﬂict that was to be implemented in an atmosphere of mistrust
and disappointment. Geography cannot be changed, the neighbors
are there, but the individuals are a resource that should be included
in the process. More often the internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in conﬂicts are used by politicians to keep up the hatred and dis-
trust, and not until the politicians decide that now is the time for
resolving the conﬂict are they accepted as parties to the conﬂict.
By including the IDPs and the inhabitants, the distrust can be over-
come in the peace-process. Cross-border cooperation and low level
initiatives could be conducive to the peace process, if allowed to de-
velop. The Ahtisaari plan for Kosovo has created a way for the Serbs
in Northern Kosovo to cooperate with Serbia in a transparent way,
but nothing has materialized. The positions are increasingly growing
further apart from each other.
Nordic cooperation has given the Åland Islands, but also other
areas in the Nordic countries, a natural base for engaging in cross-
border contacts. This cooperation involves parties from diﬀerent
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states, but it does not hamper the work, and has no political con-
notation as long as there is substantive cooperation with tangible
results. Nordic cooperation serves very well as a model for cross-
border cooperation, and a way to diﬀuse tension in conﬂict areas.
Globalization has led to a growing interest in regions, and ultimately
regionalization, which implies an appreciation of traditions and lo-
cal customs. This could easily be transformed to nationalism, and
little understanding for minorities, thus creating the need for minor-
ity protection and aﬀirmative actions.
Nationalism is not only oriented towards the construction of clas-
sical sovereign modern states, but nationalism is also the driving
force behind the constitution of quasi-states, which are political en-
tities of shared sovereignty (Sabanadze 2010, 43). It is important
with transparency to avoid mistrust, in an independent state as well
as in an autonomous territory. The rule of law should be respected,
and functioning power sharing systems should be created based on
democratic principles. An independent judiciary is a prerequisite if
the autonomy shall have trust in the state, and the state must always
follow the principles of good governance. This is diﬀicult for a small
new born state, and even more demanding for a smaller entity such
as an autonomy structure. It could be seen as challenging and de-
manding, but is absolutely crucial for the survival of the autonomy
solution.
3.8 Knowledge and experience
When trying to assist in other conﬂicts, the most important things
are not only to have experience of how the Åland autonomy func-
tions in practice. It is equally important to have deep knowledge of
the parties you address. Why has there been a war, how did they live
together before the violence broke out, is there anything that func-
tioned well and that could be developed, are there components to the
problem that must be avoided. Knowledge of the Copenhagen crite-
ria and the Oslo declaration are crucial, but it is not enough to have
theoretical insight. Practical experience of how the system functions
in reality is equally important for one to be successful.
It is necessary that the majority is ready to promote and defend
the solution in the long term. The majority must understand minor-
47
ity protection as part of the state system, something to promote, de-
velop, modernize, and be proud of. All too often is the knowledge of
the structure and the reasoning behind it unknown to the broader
public. The history of the minority is more often not part of the his-
tory of the majority, and thereby forgotten. This gives space for all
sort of misunderstandings, and should be avoided at any cost. This
is one of the mistakes others could learn from. Autonomy arrange-
ments are never static in our globalized world, but diﬀerences must
be respected despite the ongoing globalization. I believe that a coun-
teraction to globalization is the ongoing regionalization, but it must
be done in a cautious and skillful way.
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Chapter 4
Azerbaijan and Energy
Security in Europe:
balancing National
Priorities and
International
Commitments
Gulmira Rzayeva
4.1 Introduction
The EU’s Southern Gas Corridor is aimed at bringing gas from alter-
native sources and via alternative routes primarily from the Caspian
Region to the European markets, the largest gas market area in the
world. Eastern and Southeastern Europe are heavily reliant on Rus-
sian gas deliveries, to the detriment of sovereign and independent
policymaking of the states in question. Secure energy deliveries
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make up the economic lifeblood of those countries and the reliance
on Russia puts their national security and economic development at
risk. The EU-supported Southern Corridor is, most importantly, di-
rected to curtailing Russian energy leverage over those countries
and open up direct access to the European gas markets for the land-
locked Caspian states, primarily Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
After the signing of the Declaration on the Southern Gas Corri-
dor between the EU and Azerbaijan in 2011, the role of the latter
became pivotal as it is the only gas supplier and therefore an an-
chor for the opening of the Southern Corridor at this stage. Also, the
country is considered as the initiator of the transportation infrastruc-
ture along the gas value chain. After the planned expansion that will
make the total capacity 30 bcm, the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP)
will be able to transport both Shah Deniz Phase I and II (SDI and
SDII) gas, as well as gas volumes from so-called next generation gas
ﬁelds oﬀshore Azerbaijan1, but also possibly gas from Turkmenistan
and Kazakhstan in the long run.2
Shah Deniz Consortium (SD) made a ﬁnal decision on the pre-
ferred route on June 2013 and the consortium selected the Trans-
Adriatic Pipeline to supply Shah Deniz gas to Europe. Prior to the
ﬁnal selection, the Shah Deniz Phase II consortium ﬁnalized the on-
going Gas Sale and Purchase Agreement (GSPA) with the potential
buyers at the end of April 2013 and gas transit agreements (GTA) in
May 2013.3
Two agreements were signed between Shah Deniz Consortium
partners and Nabucco on 18 January, 2013: on equity funding and
on cooperation. These agreements enabled to co-ﬁnance and co-
manage the work of Nabucco International Company (NIC) before
the ﬁnal decision on the route was made. The NIC reported that
the signed agreements related to: close cooperation in adjustment
of schedules and works on projects Nabucco West and Shah Deniz
1Additional gas volumes up to 35bcm to be available for export by 2025.
2Editorial note: For instance in November 2014, Turkey and Turkmenistan signed
a framework agreement on Turkmen gas contributions to TANAP.
3Editorial note: After the ﬁnal selection was made in June, the Shah Deniz consor-
tium announced the ﬁnal investment decision (FID) on extracting gas from the Shah
Deniz II gas ﬁeld in Azerbaijan in December 2013. The FID was crucial for the project,
since all other agreements and intents were conditional and dependent on the FDI.
See, for example: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1271_en.htm
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Phase II and the co-funding of costs associatedwith the further devel-
opment of theNabuccoWest; provision of totally 50% equity stake for
SOCAR, BP4, Statoil and Total in the new structure of NIC sharehold-
ers after positive selection. For the Shah Deniz Consortium partners,
this was the second such package of agreements, as in the summer of
2012 a similar package was signed with the Trans Adriatic Pipeline.
4.2 Nabucco West vs. the Trans Adriatic
Pipeline
The overall strategic value of the Southern Gas Corridor was deter-
mined after the Shah Deniz consortium decided the ultimate desti-
nation of the Shah Deniz gas. The market destination and the tim-
ing were crucial. According to SOCAR, Azerbaijani gas deliveries to
Turkey are scheduled to start by mid-June 2018 and due to be fol-
lowed by gas deliveries to the EU in the beginning of January 2019.
Also, emerging new gas sources, including unconventional gas, e.g.
shale gas in United States, and shipping those liqueﬁed volumes to
Europe, will lead to the further tightening of gas price competition
in Europe.
By virtue of geography, the companies of West European coun-
tries, like Spain, Britain and France, have already signed a sale-
purchase agreement with the United States to import liqueﬁed nat-
ural gas (LNG) as much as 6bcm/a from 2016 onward. Italy has
been developing LNG infrastructure with the additional capacity of
85bcm of gas in Trieste, Molcanfone, Livorno, and Rosignano in the
north of Italy, and LNG projects with additional import capacity of
30bcm/a in Brindisi, Rovigo etc. All those projects and infrastruc-
ture, once realized, will increase the potential import capacity of
Italy up to 200bcm/a, whereas the country’s current gas demand is
about 85bcm/a.
Despite the fact that the Italian market can be oversupplied in
the midterm perspective, there is no doubt that the Trans Adriatic
Pipeline has advantages and strengths. With an initial capacity of
10bcm/a and a 48” diameter pipeline, it will be less costly than
Nabucco West. Also, in comparison to Nabucco West, the Trans
4BP to acquire 12%.
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Adriatic Pipeline has a less complex and cumbersome management
structure.
The question was raised whether Shah Deniz partners were ready
to depend on merely a few country markets –namely Italy, Greece
and Albania –if they had an option to market their gas in multiple
country markets with a further potential to cover Balkan countries
that were heavily in need of diversiﬁcation as Nabucco West sug-
gested. Technically the Trans Adriatic Pipeline is capable to oﬀer an
opportunity to access the Balkans with the Ionian Adriatic Pipeline
and Greece-Bulgaria interconnector and even to the countries bor-
dering with Italy to the North. However, these additional regional
connections were not part of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline’s proposal
in 2013, when it was selected as transit route for Shah Deniz gas,
and therefore these regional connections had no ready sources of
ﬁnancing. The Balkan market is of strategic interest to Azerbaijan,
given the higher gas price and great diversiﬁcation potential of the
market.
The TAP pipeline itself can be ﬁnancially attractive to Shah Deniz
partners. However, the market that it is targeting is risky and has
no strategic value in comparison to Nabucco West that oﬀered more
value in terms of diversiﬁcation of the market, almost completely re-
liant on one supplier. For this reason alone, NabuccoWest beneﬁtted
from accumulation of political support from Brussels and Washing-
ton. For the latter, most critically, diversifying the Central European
market with the help of already existing and planned interconnec-
tors, linking the countries along the NabuccoWest route, would have
given those states an ability to strengthen their negotiation position
with Russia as a result of introducing international competition in
the region, “reduce supply disruption threats, and bolster internal
stability of NATO allies.”5
In December 2012, US congress even went further in its support
for Nabucco West when publishing its report “Energy and Security
from the Caspian to Europe.” The report was prepared for the use
of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, it warned
Shah Deniz partners and recommended to the State Department that
if the project of U.S. preference that “must substantially contribute
5“Energy and Security from the Caspian to Europe”, http://www.foreign.senate.
gov/publications/download/energy-and-security-from-the-caspian-to-europe
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to Europe’s energy security” was not selected by the Shah Deniz
consortium, Shah Deniz Phase II might not enjoy the same sanction
exception that Shah Deniz Phase I did. This was due to the 10% stake
of Iranian NIOC in the project. Shah Deniz Phase II and ancillary
projects sanctions exception “will be based on compelling beneﬁts
for U.S. national security interests.”6
According to the paper, “Nabucco West oﬀers the most meaning-
ful advance in two key objectives: prompt delivery of gas to multiple
allies in desperate need of diversiﬁcation and scalability to accom-
modate larger gas supplies to the region in the future.” Putting to
an end the “coercive pressure brought by Russia against its allies in
Central and South Eastern Europe are of an order of greater magni-
tude.”
The rivalry between the U.S. and Russia dividing and controlling
the energy rich countries, transportation routes and lucrative energy
markets as during the ColdWar, is still continuing in the 21st century,
but in another shape as in the “Great Game” theory. For Russia,
as an energy producing country it is extremely important to sell its
hydrocarbon resources to countries it has the ability to inﬂuence.
Having those countries’ energy security almost entirely reliant on
Russia gives Moscow a leverage to make them fall into its sphere
of inﬂuence by strengthening its negotiation position with the help
of the energy dependency bargaining chip. This is perceived by the
U.S. as a threat to its national interests in the South East European
region.
The U.S., as a hydrocarbon producer and consumer state, is
mainly interested in that its energy-dependent allies would import
hydrocarbons from U.S. controlled sources, such as the Middle East
and North Africa (MENA), the Caspian, Europe, trying to leave no
chance for Iran (under sanctions) and Russia (with alternative
supply routes) to be able to make those allied importer countries
vulnerable.
Azerbaijan is the best positioned to ensure energy security of U.S.
allies, such as Turkey and nations in Eastern and Southeastern Eu-
rope and the Balkans, which are all either U.S./NATO allies or enter
into the spectrum of U.S. sphere of inﬂuence, and to be a part of a
6http://www.foreign.senate.gov/publications/download/energy-and-security-from-
the-caspian-to-europe
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Figure 4.1: Caspian Poker (Source: Die Welt)
broader Euro-Atlantic Energy Security concept. It has been playing a
crucial role in implementing U.S.-EU energy strategy by realizing the
BTC oil project and is continuing to do so with the Southern Gas Cor-
ridor project. However, it is quite logical to assume that Baku would
expect more political support in return from the U.S./EU to solve its
number one foreign policy priority issue of Nagorno Karabakh and
to restore its territorial integrity from the occupation.
4.3 Nabucco West and its shareholders
In December 2012, the German energy company RWE –one of the
main drivers of the Nabucco West project –withdrew from the
project. This fact once more demonstrated that the management
structure of the consortium was extremely unwieldy and the
partners, speciﬁcally the initiator of the project, the Austrian oil
and gas company OMV, must had realized that such cumbersome
management was putting the realization of the project at serious
risk. As it had not been possible to sign the Cooperation Agreement
(CoA) and Equity funding Agreement (EFA) between Nabucco West
and Shah Deniz members between June 2012 and 18 January 2013,
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the date when the Agreements were ﬁnally signed, one can
conclude that there were also signiﬁcant issues and diﬀerences of
opinion on share allocation between Nabucco West and the Shah
Deniz consortium among Nabucco shareholders.
According to publicly available information, Shah Deniz was de-
manding a 51% stake in the Nabucco West consortium to be able
to make and conclude corresponding decisions in case the Nabucco
West consortium had failed to deliver necessary progress in timely
fashion. The reason that Shah Deniz wanted to get a majority share
might have been that it was not conﬁdent that Nabucco West share-
holders would have been capable to make the project happen, to
invest the capital required and to make the necessary commercial
and strategic decisions.
Although almost all Nabucco West consortium partners were in
agreement on such a share allocation, OMV was reluctant to lose the
opportunity to control and make decisions. The position of OMV was
understandable, since once the CoA and EFA had entered into force
under a 51% –49% proportion, the views of Nabucco West share-
holders at the time could have been over voted. However, the lack
of the NW project progress resulted in share dilution by the Hungar-
ian partner FGSZ, starting summer 2012. Also, some other Nabucco
West partners would have been happy to sell a certain portion of their
shares either to Shah Deniz members or a third party.
According to the publicly available reason of why RWE decided
to withdraw, it was not possible for the company to meet its com-
mercial objectives.7 However, there were apparently also other rea-
sons, such as diﬀerent views and a long lasting dispute with OMV
over a number of issues on how to advance the project, but also the
link from Baumgartner to Landzhot to connect Baumgarten into the
RWE owned transport system Net4Gas. Further reasons might in-
deed have been of ﬁnancial nature, forced by the nuclear phase-out
in Germany. Moreover, because of the above mentioned ﬁnancial
diﬀiculties, RWE sold its assets and did headcount reduction.
This is another reason why Net4Gas, a gas transport system in the
Czech Republic fully owned by RWE, was sold in 2013. Earlier, RWE
was aiming via the Baumgarten-Landzhot link to connect its Net4Gas
7“Nabucco says Check-Austrian Transit Survey Completed”, Bloomberg, http://
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aZSykMGpEc80
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system to bring the Caspian, e.g. Azerbaijani gas to Germany, in line
with the German government strategy to diversify gas sources.8
4.4 South Stream vs. Nabucco West: Mar-
ket share or volume substitution?
Despite the fact that Russia’s top gas producer Gazprom’s export
to Europe signiﬁcantly increased in 2011 after the reduction during
the ﬁnancial downturn, the company could not repeat this success
in 2012. According to the Energy Ministry of Russia, gas export to
Europe decreased by 8.7% in 2012 to 186bcm.9 Earlier, Gazprom
reported that in the ﬁrst half of 2012, gas sales to Europe dropped
by 10% and to CIS countries by 29%.10 This corresponded with a
decline in production in 2012 to 655bcm (from 662bcm in 2011),
whereas Gazprom’s own production dropped by 5.1% to 483bcm.
The export and production forecasts for the year 2013 were not
very optimistic. According to the CEO of Gazprom Mr. Miller, the
company hoped to keep the level of 500bcm of gas production in 2013
and pledged to refrain from any increase of investment programs
for that year.11 Earlier, Gazprom had cut gas production targets for
2013 and 2014, due to dwindling demand. According to the head of
Gazprom’s production department, the company was about to pro-
duce 541bcm in 2013, rising to 548bcm in 2014.12 This was down
from previous forecasts of 549bcm for 2013 and 570bcm in 2014.
Business Monitor International’s projections showed the overall
gas output of Russia rising to 724bcm by 2016 –dependent on growth
in European gas demand and opportunities arising in Asian mar-
8“Nabucco says Check-Austrian Transit Survey Completed”, Bloomberg, http://
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aZSykMGpEc80
9“Gazprom reports weakening European gas sales amid economic slowdown”, http:
//www.mrcplast.com/news-news_open-229012.html
10“Gazprom reports weakening European gas sales amid economic slowdown”, http:
//www.mrcplast.com/news-news_open-229012.html
11“Russia’s Gazprom sees 2013 gas output at 500 Bcm, roughly ﬂat on year”: report,
Platts, http://www.platts.com/RSSFeedDetailedNews/RSSFeed/NaturalGas/8997445
12“Ukrainian equipment producer dashes Gazprom production plans last winter”,
Kyiv Post, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/business/ukrainian-equipment-producer-
dashes-gazprom-produc-1-128108.html
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kets.13 The EU imports 25% of its total gas demand from Russia.
Management of the Russian monopoly confessed that the reason for
the decrease in choosing Russian gas by the European gas consumer
companies and in export capacity to the European market was com-
petition. During last few years, the number of the companies that
were ready to transport gas based on the price ﬁxed to gas indexa-
tion and spot market price was increasing.
The decline has been caused by not only the ﬁnancial crisis in Eu-
rope and the Euro zone, but also as Europeans used cheaper alterna-
tives, such as liqueﬁed natural gas (LNG) and spot market gas sup-
plies. For the years 2009–2011, the number of re-gasiﬁcation plants
as well as liquefaction plants in Europe had been rapidly increasing
and it is expected that by 2014 majority of the coastal states across
Europe will be covered by some LNG infrastructure. Currently a few
are under implementation, others are planned: The EU’s current re-
gasiﬁcation capacity of 150bcm looks set to double by 2020.
This is one of the most important goals for the EU to develop LNG
infrastructure and build a terminal in each costal state (Italy, Nether-
lands, France, Ireland, Germany, Poland, Spain, Croatia, Cyprus,
Turkey, Finland, Estonia and Lithuania).14 This has been also in-
cluded into the Trans European Energy Network Policy (TEN-E) to
cover Europe’s increasing demand for natural gas. In fact, some
of those terminals are being built to ensure energy security of Cen-
tral Europe and lessen the vulnerability and reduce dependence on
Gazprom by transporting already re-gasiﬁed gas from coastal states
to the land locked states. For that, an ambitious TEN-E policy of the
EU to connect all the European states with gas pipeline interconnec-
tors by 2014 is being implemented.
Poland, which is also exploring for shale gas, hopes to open a
5bcm/a LNG import terminal in mid-2015. The LNG terminal at
Świnoujście, near the German border in the northwest, should im-
prove diversity of supply and reduce dependence on Russian imports.
Needless to say that increasing LNG capacity in receiving termi-
nals across Europe oﬀers a number of security-of-supply beneﬁts for
13Russia Oil & Gas Report, Business Monitor, http://store.businessmonitor.com/em/
oilgas/russia.html
14T E N - ENERGY Priority Corridors for Energy Transmission, Prepared for the
European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/studies/doc/2008_
priority_corridors_for_energy_transmission-natural_gas.pdf
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Figure 4.2:
the Union, notably lower natural gas prices, having gas more read-
ily available on the European gas markets, and adding diversity of
sources to the EU’s gas supplies.
During the period of 2009–2010, increasing LNG capacity in re-
ceiving terminals in North-West Europe and strengthening the link
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Figure 4.3: LNG dependency map 2012 (74 Bcma). Source: Streams
interpretation of Waterborne data.
between US and EU gas hub prices gave European consumers a
chance to beneﬁt from the cheap spot traded gas. During the same
period, a sharp fall in spot prices occurred and spot gas prices were
some 25% lower than oil-indexed gas. This trend and correlation
between EU and US gas prices was terminated in April 2010, be-
cause of unforeseen high demand in the US. However, beginning
from 2011, the price diﬀerence became a major trigger for price re-
visions throughout Europe, the core market for Russian gas exports.
Many European gas consumers have already been urged to
move away from 100% of oil indexations price, i.e. a certain
gas-indexed component in long term contracts, including at least
10–20% of spot prices into the contracts with Gazprom. The spot
prices in the overall European market are increasing very fast
–30–40% per annum. As this was unacceptable for Gazprom, the
disputed cases were taken to arbitration by the European gas buyer
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companies with positive outcomes for those companies in most of
the cases. That resulted in some companies being granted
discounts for gas price from Gazprom. According to MorganStanley
Press, Italian Eni and Edison, German E.ON (RWE is still in
arbitration process with Gazprom), French GdF Suez, Austrian
Ecogas and a number of others were granted between 10% and
20% spot market price included into their contract in 2011.15
However, in a discussion paper entitled “Pricing the ‘Invisible’
Commodity”, Sergey Komlev, Contract Structuring and Pricing Di-
rector of Gazprom Export, argued that the modiﬁed price model,
which envisions long term contracts linked to gas indexes and hub
pricing, is not reliable for buyers and workable for suppliers if they
must maintain ﬂexibility in uninterruptible contracts. This means
that traders of spot gas, mainly LNG, at hubs have a certain vol-
ume of gas on a certain price trading, based on short term contracts
signed for the period of no more than 1-3 months ahead and can-
not guarantee additional volume of gas for mid-term if needed. This
makes buyers uncertain and vulnerable for the decisions of suppliers
in the future. For example, Qatar, that has been exporting to the Eu-
ropean market 17.4% (37bcm) of LNG per annum, announced that
it will decrease the export volume of LNG to the European direction
by 40% and re-direct those volumes to the Japanese market due to
the lucrative price for LNG in Asia.16
The growth dynamics of LNG supplies oﬀers new opportunities,
such as access to the global market. The advantage of exporting gas
as LNG is receiving access to the world market. According to BP,
LNG trade will gain a larger role in the long-term perspective. LNG
production will grow by 4.3% per annum, accounting for 15.5% of
global gas consumption by 2030, BP Energy Outlook 2030 says.17
Also, according to the U.S. bank JP Morgan analysts, global LNG
growth averaged approximately 15 percent in 2011. According to
15“Pricing the ‘Invisible’ Commodity” Sergey Komlev, Gazprom Export,
http://www.gazpromexport.ru/files/Gas_Pricing_Discussion_Paper_Komlev_GPE_
Jan_11_2013_FINAL127.pdf
16LNG export destinations are being diversiﬁed, Arab News, http://www.arabnews.
com/lng-export-destinations-are-being-diversified-says-qnb
17BP Energy Outlook 2030, January 2013, International Energy Agency,
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_
and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2011/STAGING/local_assets/pdf/BP_
World_Energy_Outlook_booklet_2013.pdf
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some analysts, in a bull case scenario, LNG demand in Europe will
grow from 68mln tons per annum in 2013 to 72mln tons in 2014,
78mln tons in 2015, 86mln tons in 2016, 94mln tons in 2017 and
99mln tons per annum in 2018.18
The strong pressure from the customer side will continue the
further eclipse of the gas glut on the European gas market in the
medium term, and narrow the gap between oil-indexed and spot
prices. This will make Gazprom’s position quite dire from a commer-
cial view point, lowering the net back margin for gas. This would
be even more painful for Gazprom from now on, as production from
the newly developed ﬁelds such as Bovanenkovskoye, Far East F.D.,
Urals F.D, Siberian F.D etc. is forecasted to be growing in long term
perspective and this gas will not be cheap.
For example, according to the Gazprom Export report for 2012,
gas production from the Bovanenkovskoye ﬁeld that will be trans-
ported to the European markets via the South Stream pipeline, will
cost Gazprom $150/1000cm.19 Add to this the transportation cost of
the gas from the Far East to the Black Sea coast with the distance
of more than 3000km, the construction of and transportation it via
South Stream further to the European inland, taxes etc. The most
expensive gas for Gazprom will be the re-export of Central Asian gas
that Gazprom buys for the price of $260/1000cm.20
According to the Russian Central Dispatching Department of Fuel
Energy Complex (CDU TEK), starting from 2009, Russia produced
less gas than the U.S. for 3 years in a row. This is mainly because
the U.S. has been increasing its shale gas production from year to
year starting from 2000. One of the main options of diversiﬁcation
of supply sources for the European Union apart from the Southern
Corridor is the import of relatively cheaper LNG from the U.S. Those
countries that by virtue of geography have the opportunity to import
greater volumes of LNG, will be better oﬀ in terms of assuring their
supply and overall energy security and less vulnerable in terms of na-
tional security than the land-locked states. However, here the rules
of commerciality and economics will be at work more than politics.
On the other hand, the “war between Asia and Europe for LNG”
18OilCapital analytical daily news portal
19Gazprom Annual Report 2011, http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/55/477129/
annual-report-2011-eng.pdf
20Skolkovo Moscow School of Management
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which started in 2011 is continuing, and results are not the best for
Europe, as the most volume of LNG is actively ﬂowing toward Asian
markets. Just to compare: Japan – the biggest LNG importer in the
world, has signed a LNG import contract for the volume of 11.5mln
ton/a, other Asia-Paciﬁc states have contracted 20mln ton, whereas
the EU –just 3.1mln ton. The Asian energy market is the most lucra-
tive LNG market in the world as it guarantees high netback margins
to the suppliers. The average price for LNG at the European trad-
ing hubs is $310-350/1000cm, whereas in Japan, Korea and China
the price is $500/1000cm.21 The rapidly growing economies of the
Asian countries and the nuclear disaster in Japan opened a new niche
for the LNG imports. The more Europe is trying to decrease the price
for energy in the internal market, the more the market is becoming
less attractive to the LNG suppliers.
The situation with the U.S. LNG exports to Europe is no more
consolatory. It is expected that the export of the U.S. LNG to Europe
and elsewhere will start in 2016. Spanish NGFenosa and French
Total have already signed sale and purchase agreements with the
U.S. company ChaniereEnergy and will import 5bcm/a starting from
2016.22 However, by mid-2013, among nearly 20 submitted propos-
als on LNG terminal construction to the Federal Energy regulatory
Commission (FERC) regulator of the Energy Department, only the
project of Sabine Pass of Chaniere Energy has received approval.
And all its future capacity has been already contracted. The buyers
are Korean Kogas, Indian Gail, Spanish NGFenosa, French Total and
British BG Group. Given the price diﬀerence of LNG in the Asian
and European market, U.S. proﬁt for exporting LNG to Asia will be
$200, whereas to Europe –$150. Furthermore, the most proﬁtable
export market for the U.S. would be Latin America, where net back
margins for LNG would be $280 because of short distances and high
gas prices.
As such, given the price diﬀerences in the diﬀerent regional mar-
kets, one can conclude that if even the Energy Department will ap-
prove other proposals for LNG export facility construction with the
total capacity of 110mln ton per annum, this gas will ﬂow to the Asian
21Platts LNG Daily Publication. Available on subscription
22“Cheniere and Total Sign 20-Year LNG Sale and Purchase Agreement for LNG
Exports from Sabine Pass”, Press Release: Cheniere Energy Partners, http://finance.
yahoo.com/news/cheniere-total-sign-20-lng-133000762.html
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or neighboring South American direction rather than the European
(with small amounts shipped to Europe). The rationale here is that
the rules of economics would be prevailing rather than anything else.
Just to strengthen the argument above: According to the esti-
mates of WoodMckenzie published in May 2012, the rapidly growing
Asian LNG market is able to import not only all the non-contracted
gas volumes but also can import all the U.S. LNG export potential.23
Figure 4.4: Source: Woodmac; Excludes US proposed LNG.
The European gas demand will not grow as rapidly as the Asian.
According to the World Energy Outlook 2012 of the IEA, the com-
pound average annual growth rate of the EU gas demand from 2010
to 2035 will be 0.7% from 569 to 669 bcm respectively. Moreover, ac-
cording to estimates, the average annual natural gas demand growth
rate in Europe will be declining for the period of 2010–2015 by 19
bcm, from 569 bcm to 550 bcm respectively.
The South East European gas markets and the Balkans, that both
Nabucco West and South Stream were targeting, are not big enough
23Platts LNG Daily and Monthly Publication. Available on subscription.
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Figure 4.5: Source: CERA (Chart: The demand outlook has been
reduced because of the weak economy, the European Union’s 2020
targets, and low coal prices)
and it is expected that the average annual gas demand growth rate
will be very slow for the period of 2018–2035.
It is widely believed among experts that the South Stream will not
increase the Russian gas import volume to the region, but re-route
the same volume of gas ﬂowing currently through Ukraine and partly
via Belarus. At the summit in Brussels in December 2013, Moscow
asked that Brussels grant the South Stream the Trans-European Net-
work status and declare it as a “Project of Common Interest (PCI)”,
which would have exempted it from key limitations imposed by the
European Union’s Third Energy Package, which took eﬀect in March
2013.24 The EU legislative framework could require Russia to allow
other producing nations, such as Azerbaijan, access to its pipeline
network to export natural gas to European customers. It could also
legally require Gazprom to divest itself of the majority share of the
24“EU readies ‘pragmatic’ answer to Putin’s energy agenda”, Euractiv, http://www.
euractiv.com/energy/eu-readies-pragmatic-answer-puti-news-516727
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pipelines.25 The European Union refused to alter the legal status of
the South Stream pipeline, and instead tried to spur the development
of an alternative pipeline infrastructure – namely Nabucco – that
would have allowed the continent to diversify away from Russian nat-
ural gas. However, both Nord Stream and South Stream combined
will increase the Russian export capacity to Europe from approxi-
mately 140bcm/a to more than 300bcm/a, making Russia ﬁll the ca-
pacity, as operating half empty pipelines is not commercially viable.
The European gas market will not be able to absorb 40-60bcm/a.
Consequently, in order to keep the market and to safeguard exist-
ing gas sales and purchase contracts with potential transit countries
in the Balkans, Russia oﬀered gas price discounts and development
aid in its eﬀort to edge out the Nabucco West project. Bulgaria got a
11.1% discount for gas from Gazprom from April till December 2012
and a 22% discount for the year 2013. It is obvious that in return,
Russia was expected to get a go-ahead with the Front End Engineer-
ing Design (FEED) in Bulgaria. Turkey ﬁrst refused to sign an agree-
ment to permit the South Stream to pass its territorial waters, how-
ever after Russia made a 15% discount ($400/1000cm)26 for the gas
price for Turkey, permission was given the following day. Serbia
signed a sale and purchase agreement for 5bcm with Gazprom for
a period of 10 years (Gazprom delivered 1.4bcm to Serbia in 2011).
However, according to the Serbian Energy Minister, the price was
high and she requested the price to be reduced from the planned
$470/1000cm to $420/1000cm in 2013.27 In 2013, Serbia got a 12%
discount from Gazprom.
Bulgaria, the prospective South Stream pipeline transit country
that received the most signiﬁcant incentives from Russia, was also
one of the shareholders of the competing pipeline. However, during
25Editorial note: The European Commission is demanding Gazprom to allow access
for other producers to the South Stream pipeline, as the project would be potentially
violating EU’s “third energy package” as Gazprom would be both producer of the gas
and would also at the same time be owning 50% of the shares of the pipeline. Russia
has refused the demands to give access to other producers, and the European Union
has been unwilling make an exemption for Gazprom and the South Stream project.
26“UPDATE 2-Turkey, Russia reach South Stream gas deal”, Reuters,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/28/turkey-russia-southstream-
idAFL6E7NS0LU20111228
27“Srbijagas agrees 10-yr gas import deal with Gazprom”, Reuters, http://www.
reuters.com/article/2011/12/21/serbia-gazprom-gas-idUSL6E7NL4H320111221
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the Nabucco Political Committee meeting in Bulgaria’s capital Soﬁa,
the executive director of Bulgarian Energy Holding stated that Bul-
garia will set up a project company to build the ﬁrst section of the
Nabucco gas pipeline. The plan consisted of a pipeline that would
connect Turkey’s national gas grid with Bulgaria’s: a 225km pipeline
section to link Marmara in Turkey with Lozenets in Bulgaria.28 The
estimated cost of this pipeline section was e300mln, of which the EU
pledged to pay e200mln.
Russia has reacted to concerns that it was using its natural gas
leverage over Europe to further its political ambitions in the region
– especially in Central Europe. Gazprom knew that diversiﬁcation
eﬀorts in its main consumer markets could damage it, so it oﬀered
discounts and further cooperation throughout the gas value chain to
consumer countries. The Gazprom management and Moscow per-
fectly understood the recent developments in the market, and had
to adjust their energy strategy towards the European Union accord-
ingly. Otherwise the monopoly’s outdated energy policy towards the
market could have been fraught with the threat of gradually losing
market share to new suppliers. As mentioned above, as a part of
such a strategy, Gazprom made a signiﬁcant discount for almost all
its customers in Europe from 5% (to Romania) to 27% (to Poland) for
the year of 2013. This will cause a signiﬁcant drop in prices for long
term contracted gas with oil indexation in Europe that paradoxically
can lead to the raise of spot hub price of LNG. In its eﬀort to retain
its market share in Europe, Gazprom also began to move away from
its practice of indexing natural gas prices to the price of oil.
Gazprom understands that the South Stream project has
weaknesses, such as the lack of political support of the EU, which is
repeatedly saying that the project is not a “strategic priority” of the
block, and Gazprom faces pressure from the European
anti-monopoly policy of the third energy package. Furthermore,
Gazprom’s gas price in almost all its markets is the highest for
those countries which pay for gas according to long term contracts
ﬁxed to oil indexation. This practice has become unacceptable for
these gas consumer countries, especially after the ﬁnancial crisis
aﬀected almost all the European economies.
28“Srbijagas agrees 10-yr gas import deal with Gazprom”, Reuters, http://www.
reuters.com/article/2011/12/21/serbia-gazprom-gas-idUSL6E7NL4H320111221
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On the other hand, Gazprom absolutely understands that if it con-
tinues to sell gas based on the oil indexation long-term contracts, it
would mean losing its dominant position in the South East and Cen-
tral European markets in the competition with the gas coming from
alternative sources, in this case the Caspian, i.e. Shah Deniz gas.
The net cost of the Shah Deniz Phase II gas production and trans-
portation is much lower than those of South Stream gas, due to the
location of the ﬁeld and transportation distance.29
The strength of Gazprom is that unlike the Shah Deniz consor-
tium, it is already present on the market and has gas sale and pur-
chase agreements in place with respective national majors on hand.
Some of them have already agreed to prolong the expiring/expired
contracts. If some European countries are reluctant to sign a sup-
ply contract with the South Stream consortium, or have an agree-
ment but delay the go-ahead with feasibility studies and FEED of
South Stream, they are getting good incentives from Russia to give
the green light. Russia uses its traditional style of solving the issue,
using gas price leverage.
Consequently, the strength of Azerbaijan and the Shah Deniz con-
sortium was the political support of the EU which considered the
Southern Corridor as its “strategic priority” and Nabucco West “a
project of common interest”. Azerbaijan is doing its utmost best to
implement that Corridor and is a real contributor to the diversiﬁca-
tion of gas sources providing the energy security of Europe. Addi-
tionally, the country is bearing in wider understanding the bill at an
amount of $40–45bln (up to $30bln the upstream CAPEX and by fur-
ther $10–15bln for transport infrastructure) to implement the whole
value chain from the wellhead up to the consumer.
However, as of summer 2013, the Shah Deniz consortium lacked
signed gas sales and purchase agreements with potential
customers.30 Furthermore, the gas volume with which the Shah
Deniz consortium is going to penetrate the market is just symbolic
(10 bcm/a for Europe and another 6bcm/a committed for the
Turkish market) in comparison with Gazprom gas (130bcm/a). Even
by adding volumes of next generation gas ﬁelds in Azerbaijan,
29The gas transportation costs vary depending on the gas pipeline diameter and
transit capacity.
30Editorial note: By the end of September 2013, nine companies in Italy, Greece and
Bulgaria had agreed to buy Shah Deniz gas.
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SOCAR understands that it would be extremely diﬀicult to
penetrate the Eastern and Southeast European gas market due to
Gazprom’s strong presence there.
4.5 Conclusion
Each of the stakeholders in the Southern Corridor is acting according
to their respective strategic interests in the project and what is most
beneﬁcial for them. For Brussels and Washington “to focus the Al-
liance to address energy security, that is most likely to spur conﬂict
and threaten the well-being of alliance members”31 is the priority
issue in the project. This mega and multi-billion project gives both
of them the historic opportunity to change the geopolitical map in
Europe.
The position of the stakeholders on two major market destina-
tions and the midstream projects that were set to transport the gas
to the market was split, and commercial attractiveness and strategic
value of the market was set to be the main criteria by the stakehold-
ers. Both projects had to be commercially attractive to the Shah
Deniz consortium to gain ﬁnancing, and both projects could have
certainly met this requirement. Some Shah Deniz partners were fa-
voring more the Trans Adriatic Pipeline, mainly referring to the com-
merciality of the project. Other Shah Deniz partners were favoring
Nabucco West, referring to the strategic value of the market.
The gas demand is expected to recover beyond Baumgarten, e.g.
Germany and France. Also there are swap options for the Benelux
countries and even to reach the fully liberalized UK market, where
new gas could be absorbed. However, as RWE withdrew from the
project, Azerbaijan missed the opportunity of physical delivery of its
gas directly to the German market; with all kinds of advantages, in-
cluding securing Germany’s greater involvement and support in po-
litical matters. In mid-2013, none of the potential gas buyers, not
only for Azerbaijani gas, but also for Caspian gas, was interested
in bringing that new gas beyond Baumgarten. Furthermore, earlier
another German company Bayerngas announced that it was ceas-
31“Energy and Security from the Caspian to Europe”, http://www.foreign.senate.
gov/publications/download/energy-and-security-from-the-caspian-to-europe.
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ing negotiations with Nabucco West in joining the consortium due to
progress in its negotiations with Gazprom.
Taking into consideration the reasons mentioned above, the
market that Nabucco West was targeting (i.e. the countries along
the route of Nabucco) was considered to be the most reliable, as
these countries were most eager for the diversiﬁcation of the gas
supply sources. However, the other similar project, the Russian
South Stream, is targeting the same market and it remains to be
seen whether it will be volume substitution or market share. In the
country markets where gas demand is estimated to grow rapidly, a
market share for Shah Deniz gas is possible by supplying additional
gas volumes to meet the increasing demand. In the country
markets where gas demand is estimated to have a little growth,
such as the Italian gas market, volume substitution is possible, i.e.
those countries will decrease their gas imports from Russia and
substitute it with Shah Deniz gas.
The European Union, despite its concerns over Russia’s domi-
nance of its energy sector, has not implemented a meaningful di-
versiﬁcation scheme to supply piped natural gas from the Caspian
Sea to Southern and Central Europe. The Southern Gas Corridor
and the development of multiple projects for the import of liqueﬁed
natural gas means that the European Union can still strengthen its
negotiation position with Moscow.
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Chapter 5
Azerbaijan, the EU and
Migration Policy
Sergey Rumyantsev and Tiina Sotkasiira
5.1 Introduction
Two decades have passed since the independent Azerbaijani Repub-
lic appeared on the world map, and among other developments, this
period has signiﬁed the establishment and expansion of Azerbaijan’s
relations with the European Union (EU).1 Over the years, a range
of questions and tasks have been addressed as part of the coopera-
tion undertaken with the EU. In this article, focus is placed on the
positions of the EU and Azerbaijan Republic in regard to migration
policy.
Despite the number of major agreements concluded and the es-
tablishment of key institutions to manage and control migration, co-
operation in the ﬁeld of migration and mobility policy has been rel-
atively modest. This becomes noticeable when the situation is com-
1This paper was written in the project Borders, Migration and Regional Stability by
University of Eastern Finland. The project belongs with the Security and Development
Research’ within the Wider Europe Initiative (WEI) Security Cluster. The project is
carried out with the ﬁnancial contribution of the Ministry for Foreign Aﬀairs of Fin-
land.
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pared to the cooperation between the European Union and for exam-
ple, Azerbaijan’s South Caucasian neighbour Georgia. In our view,
the reason for this can be found in the fact that although the re-
spective goals of EU-Azerbaijan cooperation appear to be in line with
each other, the two parties quite often attach diﬀerent meanings and
agendas to these objectives. As such, a number of issues of a more
structural character need to be resolved before real development can
be expected.
This article looks to review the development of EU-Azerbaijan
cooperation in the ﬁeld of migration policy in conjunction with the
transformation of Azerbaijan’s position towards migration in and out
of the country and its ‘diaspora’ over the last two decades. This ap-
proach is taken in order to understand why such cooperation has
advanced relatively slowly regardless of the striving by both parties
towards an achievement of rapprochement on a host of commonly
identiﬁed issues.
We suggest that the EU-Azerbaijan relations in the ﬁeld of migra-
tion policy are to be considered as being determined by a number
of political processes, not directly linked with the goals of migration
policy. Political and economic developments in Azerbaijan, combined
with the actualities of the conﬂict over Nagorno Karabakh and in the
country’s immediate neighbourhood are amongst the factors which
inﬂuence the direction of the country’s migration policy towards the
EU. Azerbaijan’s attempts to present its countrymen living overseas
as a diaspora or a ‘political arm’ which can be used to convey its
message internationally is examined in more detail as an example of
such development. We will oﬀer our view as to explain why the suc-
cessful implementation of certain tasks and programmes has gone
hand in hand with failures in the implementation of others.
5.2 Azerbaijan in the EU’s eastern neigh-
bourhood
The enlargement of the European Union in 2004 and 2007 led to
the incorporation of twelve new member states and the creation of
a new borderland with resurgent ﬂows of goods, people and capital
(Wallace and Vincent 2009, 144). Until this time, the EU’s institu-
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tional involvement in the South Caucasus had been modest in com-
parison to other international, European and Euro-Atlantic organi-
sations. However, in the early 21st Century the European Council
(2003) recognised a need to take a stronger and more active inter-
est in the region. To bring the new neighbours closer, in 2004 the
European Union launched a European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP),
which alongside the southernMediterranean countries together with
Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, included the three states of the South
Caucasus.
The role of Azerbaijan in the Caucasus is pivotal, not least because
of its potential in bringing energy supplies to Europe. Its geographic
location between the Russian Federation and Iran makes it one of
the key actors in terms of security and stability in the region. On the
other hand, the continuation of the conﬂict over Nagorno Karabakh
between Armenia and Azerbaijan poses a threat to the over-all sta-
bility of the region. Azerbaijan is also a key economic player in the
region. The European Union (DG ECFIN 2011, 88) estimates that
even though the global crisis has negatively inﬂuenced Azerbaijan’s
economy, the country has fared better than many of its neighbours
and managed to maintain a macroeconomic stability. According to
the EU (European Commission 2012), Azerbaijan has managed to
reduce poverty and advance towards the diversiﬁcation of its econ-
omy, which makes it a lucrative partner for international coopera-
tion. Furthermore, as a renowned researcher on EU-Azerbaijan re-
lations, Leila Alieva (2006) argues, all three Caucasus states have
strong European aspirations and identity, which could work towards
Azerbaijan’s increased integration into the EU.
The legal framework for EU-Azerbaijan bilateral relations was
ﬁrst outlined in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA),
which was signed in April 1996. It entered into force at the
beginning of July 1999 and covered the areas of political dialogue,
trade, investment, economic, legislative and cultural cooperation.
As a ﬁrst step in the direction of incorporating Azerbaijan into the
framework of the ENP, a Country Report on Azerbaijan was
published in 2005. The ﬁve-year ENP Action Plan (ENP AP) for
Azerbaijan was adopted a year later and focused especially on
democratisation, human rights, socio-economic reform, poverty
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alleviation, energy, conﬂicts and certain sectorial issues.2
According to Elkhan Nuriyev (2008), there have been three key
areas in which Azerbaijan has aﬀected the EU’s interests, which are
cooperation in the energy sector, democratisation and conﬂict reso-
lution. Nuriyev estimates that cooperation has advanced quite well
in the ﬁeld of the regional energy strategy, but less so on democratic
reforms. He also argues that the EU’s coordinated eﬀort on conﬂict
settlement is modest. The EU has mainly tried to inﬂuence the nego-
tiations over Nagorno Karabakh by promoting regional co-operation
and increasing its overall inﬂuence in political institution building
and democratisation, however it has not acquired a strong indepen-
dent role as a moderator in the conﬂict. From the EU’s point of view,
the current status quo is insupportable and reaching a resolution in
this respect remains a top priority in EU-Azerbaijan relations. How-
ever, instead of taking an independent role in negotiations, the EU
has supported the endeavours of the OSCE Minsk Group.
In the reports evaluating the overall progress made on the imple-
mentation of the EU-Azerbaijan ENP Action Plan, the European Com-
mission seems to largely agree with Nuriyev’s opinion. The evalua-
tion report of 2011 (European Commission 2012) points out that the
EU and Azerbaijan havemade good progress in enhancing energy co-
operation, including work to develop the Southern Gas Corridor, but
the negotiations on the Nagorno Karabakh conﬂict within the Minsk
Group have produced few tangible results. The EU also urges Azer-
2The Action Plan identiﬁed ten priority areas for EU-Azerbaijan relations. These
were: 1) Contribute to a peaceful solution of the Nagorno Karabakh conﬂict, 2)
Strengthen democracy in the country, including a fair and transparent electoral pro-
cess, in line with international requirements, 3) Strengthen the protection of human
rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, in compliance with the interna-
tional commitments of Azerbaijan (PCA, CoE, OSCE, UN), 4) Improve the business
and investment climate, particularly by strengthening the ﬁght against corruption,
5) Improve the functioning of customs, 6) Support balanced and sustained economic
development, with a particular focus on the diversiﬁcation of economic activities, de-
velopment of rural areas, poverty reduction and social/territorial cohesion; promote
sustainable development including the protection of the environment, 7) Further con-
vergence of economic legislation and administrative practices, 8) Strengthening EU-
Azerbaijan energy and transport cooperation, in order to achieve the objectives of the
November 2004 Baku Ministerial Conferences, in particular with a view to developing
regional transport networks and energy markets in the region and integrating them
with EU networks and markets, 9) Enhancement of cooperation in the ﬁeld of Justice,
Freedom and Security, including the ﬁeld of border management and 10) Strengthen
regional cooperation.
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baijan to increase its eﬀorts to meet the Action Plan commitments
regarding democracy, including electoral processes, the protection
of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the independence
of the judicial system. Overall however, the development of the co-
operation between the EU and Azerbaijan is evaluated as being a
‘phased process’, during which advancements have been followed
by frequent set-backs and vice versa.
5.3 Co-operation on migration and border
management
In the early 1990’s, the collapse of Soviet Union created a new envi-
ronment of rather porous national borders in Eastern Europe. Dur-
ing the course of the 1990’s, international migration rates for the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries demonstrated
an increase which came to a peak in the middle of the decade, fol-
lowed by a decline which continues to the present (Heleniak 2008,
41). Over the years, particular countries and regions belonging to
the CIS have established a tradition of migration to the countries of
European Union. The Russian Federation has clearly been the main
target country for migrants from Azerbaijan, but there has been a
growing concern in the EU about the role of Azerbaijan as a transit
country for illegal and transit migrants, drug traﬀicking and the traf-
ﬁcking of human beings. Despite this however, the EU has showed
interest in increasing the mobility between Azerbaijan and the EU.
Economic relations have been a priority but the EU has also recog-
nised a need to improve the education system of Azerbaijan by in-
vesting in international exchanges as well as by establishing con-
tacts between public and civic actors for training and informational
purposes. The key aim in this respect has been to support the devel-
opment of civil society in Azerbaijan.
The objectives of the EU policy on borders and migration in re-
lation to Azerbaijan were deﬁned ﬁrstly in the jointly agreed EU-
Azerbaijan ENP Action Plan adopted in 2006. The objectives, which
related to border and migration management, were placed under the
heading ‘Cooperation in the Field of Justice, Freedom and Security’.
They were divided into three sub-categories, which were: 1) Coop-
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eration on border management 2) Migration issues (legal, illegal,
readmission, visa, and asylum) and 3) Fight against organised crime,
traﬀicking in human beings, drugs and money-laundering. The de-
tailed objectives of the migration policy concerned the development
of cooperation onmigration issues, particularly in relation to the pre-
vention and control of illegal migration, and the readmission and fa-
cilitation of the movement of persons, (for example by simplifying the
visa procedure), and ﬁnally, an aim has been to further develop Azer-
baijan’s national asylum/protection system in line with international
standards.
To begin with, eﬀorts were put into the management of borders
in the framework of the new Southern Caucasus Integrated Border
Management Programme (SCIBM), which supports the governments
of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the production of ‘open but
controlled and secure borders’3. The model was adapted to the Cau-
casus from the EU’s direct neighbourhood. The governments of the
region participated in the programme with varying interest. In the
South Caucasus, the regional aspect of the programme has advanced
modestly, while more focus has been placed on bi-lateral eﬀorts (be-
tween Armenia-Georgia and Azerbaijan-Georgia). Azerbaijan has re-
fused to cooperate with Armenia on border management, but it has
worked together with Georgia, participated in various training ini-
tiatives and in putting new technical equipment into operation.
Another signiﬁcant project in the ﬁeld of migration policy is the
attempt by the EU to get Azerbaijan to sign a readmission agree-
ment, which would compel Azerbaijan to readmit not only its own
nationals expelled from the EU member states but the nationals of
other countries who have passed through its territory on their way
to the EU. In the long run, the objective of the European Partnership
Program is the lifting of the EU visa requirement for the citizens of
partner states travelling to the EU, but the practical objective has
been to work towards visa facilitation and readmission agreements
and will continue to remain so for the foreseeable future. The EU has
already signed the agreements with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.
3The concept of integrated border management was ﬁrst introduced in the conclu-
sions of the Tampere European Council in 1999, and later by the Laeken European
Council of December 2001, the goal being more eﬀective border control and better
risk analysis and anticipation of personnel and resource needs (European Parliament
2005, 2).
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Azerbaijan and the EU have not yet signed the visa facilitation and
readmission agreement but the ﬁrst round of oﬀicial negotiations
on the matter was held in March 2012. According to Ambassador
Roland Kobio who headed the EU delegation to Azerbaijan following
the negotiations, during the talks Azerbaijan demonstrated commit-
ment towards reaching an agreement (Delegation of the European
Union to Azerbaijan 2012). Yet, the negotiations between EU and
Azerbaijan have in principle, advanced slower than those with, for
example, Georgia. The EU’s visa facilitation and readmission agree-
ments with Georgia have already been concluded and they entered
into force on the 1st March 2011 (Council of the European Union
2011). The negotiations on visa facilitation and readmission between
EU and Armenia were launched in February 2012 (Delegation of the
European Union to Armenia 2012).
According to critics, the readmission agreements place the re-
sponsibility on third countries to control movements of their own and
other countries’ nationals towards the EU, yet they are not granted
suﬀicient means with which to conduct the work (for the debate
on visa facilitation vs. tightened control see Boniface, Wesseling,
O’Connell and Ripoll Servent 2008). In order to advance the negoti-
ations on readmission, the EU has coupled them with the agreement
on visa facilitation (Trauner and Kruse 2008). This makes the agree-
ment more lucrative for many countries in the EU neighbourhood but
this is not necessarily the case for Azerbaijan, whose migration pol-
icy, in our view, seems to be largely inﬂuenced by concerns relating
to its domestic and regional politics.
5.4 From a donor-country to a country of
immigration
In the light of migration statistics, post-Soviet Azerbaijan is primarily
a donor country as the number of emigrants from Azerbaijan has
been many times higher than the number of immigrants. During the
early post-independence years of economic hardship, a signiﬁcant
number of Azerbaijanis emigrated to other countries, mainly to the
Russian Federation. There is no exact data on migration available
but according to diﬀerent estimates, the number of labour migrants
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that have left the country varies between 500,000-600,000 and one
million (IOM 2008, 17), and even reaching 1.3 million (World Bank
2011, 25).
The conﬂict in and around the Nagorno Karabakh region led to
the emergence of approximately one million refugees and internally
displaced persons (IDPs). In addition, the conﬂicts in the Russian
Federation have increased the number of refugees and IDPs from
Chechnya to Azerbaijan. Yunusov (2009, 221) refers to the esti-
mates given by Chechen diaspora in Azerbaijan, which claim that
more than 12,000 Chechen refugees have settled in Azerbaijan. Ac-
cording to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2011), al-
most 600,000 people were still internally displaced in Azerbaijan at
the end of 2011. Recently however, Azerbaijan has started to be-
come host to an increasing number of foreign citizens and stateless
persons. Conﬂicts and instability in the neighbouring regions have
increased the transit through Azerbaijan and the recent economic
boom has started to attract immigrants to the country. According to
oﬀicial data, since 2007 the net migration of Azerbaijan has in fact
been positive4 (IOM 2008).
Although Azerbaijan has faced many challenges associated with
international migration, managing this process has not been a key
priority for the Azerbaijani authorities. The ﬁrst steps towards the
formation of an oﬀicial migration policy were taken in the late 1990’s.
The programme ‘Creation the potential to manage migration’, which
was developed in cooperation with the International Organization for
Migration (IOM), was started in 1997. However, it was only in Octo-
ber 1999, a decade after an intensive emigration from the Republic,
that Azerbaijan adopted the law ‘On labour migration’. Under this
law, every citizen of Azerbaijan, who is 18 years of age or over, has
a right to work abroad. Within a month of arrival to their destination
country, emigrants must register at a diplomatic mission of the Azer-
baijan Republic which, in turn, must then notify the relevant body of
4According to oﬀicial data alone, which is very doubtful in terms of reliability, in the
period from 1990 to 2007 net migration remained negative and was 183.3. This means
that during those years, 183000 people more migrated from the country for perma-
nent residence than arrived there. Starting from 2008, oﬀicial statistics recorded a
positive net migration. But in the period from 2008 to 2010, positive net was only 3.4
(that is, 3400 people). (The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan
2010).
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the executive authority in the country of origin. As for labour immi-
grants arriving in Azerbaijan, in order to work in the country they
need to establish a contract with a local employer. All immigrants
and emigrants failing to abide by these rules become classiﬁed as
illegal work migrants.5
Amore recent addition to the body of oﬀicial migration documents
is the ‘Blueprint of the Azerbaijani Republic on Migration Manage-
ment Policy’, which was adopted in July 2004. It envisaged inter-
national cooperation to prevent illegal migration and discussed the
implementation of an international agreement on readmission. In
addition, the authorities conﬁrmed their aspiration to conclude inter-
national agreements that would make it possible to render help, such
as legal advice, to citizens of Azerbaijan who are living and working
abroad. The ‘Blueprint’ also expressed the aim of the Azerbaijani
authorities to get highly-qualiﬁed specialists to move back into the
country. This said, until now only a limited number of these policies
have been implemented eﬀectively. As an example, no substantial
eﬀorts have been made to either prevent highly-qualiﬁed special-
ists from leaving the country and/or getting back those who have
already emigrated. There are no programmes which have been eﬀec-
tively implemented that would, for example, provide highly-qualiﬁed
specialists who emigrated from the country with temporary work in
Azerbaijan.
Considering that Azerbaijan has a long history of migration to
Russia and that even today the largest emigrant group from Azerbai-
jan heads to Russia both for a permanent place of residence and for
seasonal and temporary employment (circular migration)6, it is not
surprising that most eﬀorts have focused on establishing closer co-
operation with the Russian Federation. Since Heydar Aliyev came to
5For details, see the Law of the Azerbaijani Republic on Labour Migration.
6In the middle of 1990s Russia was keeping land frontiers with Azerbaijan closed
for a long period of time, which created obstacles for free movement of migrants.
In 2007 Russia enacted migrations quota system, which stirred particular concern in
Azerbaijan. As a rule, the Azerbaijan authorities have reacted swiftly to such actions
by conducting negotiations, concluding new agreements with Russia etc. The ﬁrst
intergovernmental (Azerbaijani-Russian) agreement aiming to adjust work migration
was signed in 1994. This agreement was conﬁrmed by ‘Friendship Agreement’ (1997).
The latest such agreement in 2012 was ‘Agreement between the government of the
Russian Federation and the government of the Azerbaijani Republic on cooperation
in the ﬁeld of work migration’ (2012).
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power in 1993, Azerbaijan has worked to simplify themobility regime
with the Russian Federation (Seyidbayli 2009, 103-111). From this
perspective, the management of migration between Azerbaijan and
the EU is not considered as highly topical either by the authorities
or among academics in the Azerbaijan Republic.
The relative indiﬀerence towards the cooperation with the Eu-
ropean Union is also reﬂected in the Azerbaijan’s general position
towards migration. In recent years, the image of Azerbaijan as a
country of immigration has been strongly promoted by the country’s
leadership. They uphold the argument that Azerbaijan is no longer
a country whose residents want to leave and travel overseas, but in-
creasingly Azerbaijan is viewed as a target country of international
immigration. Consequently, attention is directed away from the eco-
nomic disparity that still prevails in the country and forces people
to move, ﬁrstly to urban locations (mainly Baku), and then overseas.
The current policy is therefore constructed around the needs of Azer-
baijan to secure its borders and regulate the quotas of immigrants
that are allowed to enter the capital and the country’s labour market
in general.
Although immigration into Azerbaijan is generally perceived as
a positive sign of the attractiveness of the country, the leadership
has also voiced concerns in this respect. In President Ilham Aliyev’s
words: ‘The number of foreigners intending to visit the Republic of
Azerbaijan will increase while Azerbaijan is developing. This can be
considered as a positive factor for our country. However in any case
we must prefer the interests of our state, people, citizens and this
must be the priority direction of our migration policy.’7
This means that the majority of the existing cooperation with
international partners, including the EU, has focused on developing
special programmes and institutions to control and manage
migration ﬂows on Azerbaijan’s borders. Along these lines, an area
in which mutual cooperation between Azerbaijan and foreign law
enforcement agencies has been working is the prevention of human
traﬀicking. For example, the ‘National Action Plan on Struggle
against Human Traﬀicking in Azerbaijan Republic’ was aﬀirmed by
the Decree of the President of the Azerbaijan Republic Ilham Aliyev
7Available at: http://www.migration.gov.az/index.php?section=000&subsection=
000&lang=en
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in 2004. In February 2009 this Action Plan was extended until
2013.8 The Action Plan is implemented in cooperation with the IOM
and OSCE. All in all, Azerbaijan has recently stepped up and
developed its structures for controlling migration. The State
Migration Service, which is meant to forecast and monitor
migration and regulate immigration into Azerbaijan, was
established by presidential degree in March 2007. It was preceded
by migration departments in several ministries, including the
Ministry of Labour and Social Security, the Interior Ministry and
the State Border Guard Service.
Arguably, the only initiatives to increase mobility between Azer-
baijan and the EU that the Azerbaijan government has consistently
worked for are the study abroad programs. Usually students are en-
couraged to study either in the EU countries (particularly in Great
Britain), or in the USA, Japan, Russia or Turkey. The Azerbaijani au-
thorities have publicly declared their adherence to developing these
ties, especially with the EU. The government has, as an example,
adopted an ambitious plan to send 5000 students to take part in ed-
ucation programmes in EU countries between 2007-15.9 However,
state-run programmes are only ‘the tip of the iceberg’ when it comes
to student mobility. A considerable number of young people from
Azerbaijan who study in EU countries, take advantage of the oppor-
tunities provided by diﬀerent grants from foundations and European
institutions.10 On the other hand, many specialists, especially those
who possess diplomas from European or US universities strive to
stay in EU countries, in order to live and work there.
From the EU’s perspective, intermingled with the aims of the EU
to simultaneously control immigration from Azerbaijan and to pro-
mote student mobility, is the objective of implementing democratic
reforms in the post-Soviet countries. The EU drives towards greater
transparency and eﬀective activities of the state-run institutions that
8Downloaded from: http://iaqmi.gov.az/?/en/ on 30.8.2012.
9According to the Azerbaijani Education Ministry, about 5,000 students are to study
in EU countries, the UK, the USA, Japan, etc. under the ‘State Programme on educa-
tion of Azerbaijani youth in foreign countries in 2007-15’.
10According to the Education Ministry, the number of students studying under the
state programme will be about 1,200 in 2013. A total of 10,700 Azerbaijani citizens
are studying abroad (State Programme on education of Azerbaijani youth in foreign
countries in 2007-15).
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control the borders, migration and population mobility. Yet it would
like to allow the mobility of individuals, especially young people, to
contribute to the acquisition of intercultural and democratic com-
petencies. In principle, the participation of Azerbaijan in the work
of European Union agencies would imply the democratisation of the
political regime in the country and the formation of a transparent
management structure that complies with European standards.
The authorities in Azerbaijan have oﬀicially declared their adher-
ence to democratisation and European values. They also demon-
strate an aspiration to create modern management institutions, in-
cluding institutions to better regulate the migration processes. How-
ever, the authoritarian management style of the country has not only
remained throughout the post-soviet period but according to schol-
arly estimates it has even strengthened over the past few years.11
Many of the initiatives of the government in the ﬁeld of migration
policy can also be considered as attempts to gain better control over
Azerbaijani citizens and those country-men who currently live over-
seas. In practise, this has, for example, been indicated in putting
emphasis on so called diaspora-building. The ﬁrst structural devel-
opment in this direction was the setting up of the ‘State Committee
on Work with Azeris Living Abroad’ (a presidential decree dated 5
July 2002). In 2008, this agency was renamed ‘The State Committee
on Work with the Azerbaijani Diaspora.’ This process is studied in
more detail in the following discussion.
5.5 Azerbaijani politics of diaspora
There is an aspect of Azerbaijan’s migration policy that has been
largely ignored on the EU’s part, and that is the role of Azeri dias-
pora in Europe. During the last two decades, the ethnic Azeris living
11Representatives of the expert community do not have one common opinion about
speciﬁcs of political power in Azerbaijan. Marina Ottaway believes that hybrid man-
agement style has taken shape in Azerbaijan, which combines features of democracy
and authoritarianism. She suggests describing these kinds of political systems as
‘semi-authoritarian’ (See: Ottaway 2003, 51-70). In the meantime, many domestic in-
dependent observers and experts describe the political regime that has taken shape in
Azerbaijan in the post-soviet period as authoritarian or note serious shortcomings and
errors in development of democratic institutions in the country (see: Yunusov 2007,
165-174; Abdulaev 2011, 9-18; Guliev 2011, 83-90; Abbasov 2011, 108).
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in France, England, Germany and other EU countries have started to
organize into a united ethno-national community, in other words a di-
aspora. To use Rogers Brubaker’s (2000) terminology; from the per-
spective of the authorities, the ideal has been to strengthen the ties
of émigrés with the Republic of Azerbaijan so that the state would
become ‘an external national homeland’ for all ethnic Azeris living
outside the country’s geographic borders.
The process of diaspora construction has its roots in the political
upheavals of the 1990’s, such as the Karabakh conﬂict, the disinte-
gration of the Soviet Block and the establishment of the independent
Azerbaijani Republic. At that time, the position of émigré Azerbaija-
nis was politicized rapidly and the leadership of Azerbaijan started to
look for ways to institutionalize the ethnic networks overseas.12 As
the number of emigrants from independent Azerbaijan grew, the au-
thorities of the ‘political homeland’ began showing an ever-growing
interest in the ‘compatriots abroad’.
A major component of the diaspora construction has been the
setting up of numerous new diaspora organisations by ethnic ac-
tivists in various EU countries.13 This development has become a
major element of the diasporic discourse, which aims to construct the
ethno-national ‘Diaspora’ as having the features of a real, homoge-
nous group and interests that expand across the world (on groupism
and diaspora, see Brubaker 2002, 163-167). In the words of Nazim
Ibrahimov, the chairman of the ‘State Committee of Azerbaijan Re-
public on Work with Diaspora’: ‘more than 300 Azeri communities
are operating in most of the countries of the world, and the process
of establishment of diaspora organisations is continuing presently
too’.14 The current and ever-increasing number of diasporic organ-
12This situation might be a good illustration of Valeri Tishkov’s thesis: ‘The so-
called nation state and not the ethnic community is the key to the diaspora formation’
(Tishkov 2003, 451). In the case of the Azerbaijani diaspora, the independent Azer-
baijani Republic becomes a common symbolic nation state for Iranian, Turkish and
‘Soviet’ Azerbaijanis.
13For example: Association Azerbaijan House, (Paris); Strasburg Azerbaijan House
(Strasbourg); Azeri – Turk Centre (Strasbourg), the Society Meinz – Azerbaijan, Azer-
baijan Home in Berlin, etc. It should also be noted that the Congress of European
Azeris (CEA) was founded in Berlin in April, 2004.
14Fifth anniversary of the establishment of the State Committee on Relations with
Azeris Living Abroad. Available at: http://www.azinba.az/news/_detail.php?news/_id=
5397 [Accessed 05 July 2012]
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isations is becoming a symbol of the strengthening of the position
of an independent Azerbaijan in the wider world. The process of
diaspora building was related not only to the European Union, and
Iranian and Turkish Azerbaijanis were also considered as relevant
groups of people in this respect.15
The diaspora policy attaches special importance to ‘Azerbaijani
diasporas’ in those countries which, in the opinion of the Azerbaijan
authorities, play a leading role in the world political arena. Among
the EU countries, special signiﬁcance is given to Germany and Great
Britain, where the oﬀicial statistic of the Azerbaijani authorities cur-
rently record a diaspora of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Azer-
baijanis. These people are constructed as ‘compatriots’ or as ‘the
members of a single trans-border nation’ (see Brubaker 1996, 5).
The categories are understood to be comprised of all ethnic Azeris
who either permanently or temporarily reside in EU countries, re-
gardless of whether they were previously (or currently are) citizens
of the Azerbaijani Republic itself, Georgia, Iran, or Turkey.16
The political regime of Azerbaijan pursues various goals in its as-
piration to inﬂuence the activity of diaspora organisations and net-
works. For example, the regime tries to use the diaspora to promote
the Azerbaijani version of the causes and eﬀects of the Karabakh con-
ﬂict. The conﬂict has also contributed to the mobilisation of many
ethnic Azeris, who live in EU countries and who seek, as their own
initiative, to support the eﬀorts of their political homeland (Dem-
mers 2005, 11-12; King & Melvin 1999-2000, 137). As an example,
ethnic activists and diaspora organisations have been mobilized to
inform the public as widely as possible about ethnic cleansings (and
especially the Khodjali massacre) that were carried out against Azer-
baijani civilians during the course of the warfare. Various collective
events, such as rallies, pickets and discussion forums have been held
in Europe to this end. Particularly in France, the government of Azer-
15These priorities are reﬂected for example, in the themes of academic monographs
which aremainly devoted to issues related to the formation of the Azerbaijani diaspora
(Aliyev (Əliyev) 2005; Aliyev (Əliyev) 2007; Aliyev (Əliyev) 2009; Həbiboglu 1999;
Həbiboglu 2006; İsmayilov 1997; Arzumanlı 2001; Məmmədov 2004; Seyidbayli 2009;
Yunusov 2009; Abdullayev 2009).
16There are not precise data on ethnic Azeris in Turkey. Most of the ethnic Azeris
of Iran (“approximately 20 million of Iran’s population”) are citizens of Iran (Shaﬀer
2002, p. 1-2). There is also a big enclave of ethnic Azeris in neighbouring Georgia -
288 400 in 2002 (Nodia 2003).
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baijan has tried to exert its inﬂuence over diaspora organisations in
order to involve them in the movement against recognition by the
governments of diﬀerent countries of the events of the early 20th
century in Ottoman Empire as the Armenian genocide. By doing this,
the government supports the oﬀicial position of the Turkish authori-
ties, who are Azerbaijan’s key political and military ally. To achieve
these aims, the Azerbaijani authorities support the organisations in
organising a range of events. They also provide direct, including ﬁ-
nancial, support to ethnic organisations of Azeris in France, Germany
and other EU countries.
Special attention in the diaspora policy is given to the holding of
collective events held on various memorable dates. In diaspora pol-
itics, these events are perceived as factors that conﬁrm the unity of
the large community of Azeris in the world. The events organized by
the diaspora are those of interest to the Azerbaijani regime, and for
example mark the events of the Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation
and celebrate the establishment of an independent Azerbaijan. Some
events are also organized to propagate the activities of the former
president, and the father of the incumbent, Heydar Aliyev.
The government of Azerbaijan also connects diaspora politics with
foreign policy priorities, such as its orientation towards participa-
tion in European and Euro-Atlantic structures. The idea of reaching
Azerbaijanis in Germany, the USA, Russia, or in any other country
that has a weight in world politics has gained increasing popularity.
Within this discourse, the diaspora is construed as a signiﬁcant po-
litical resource which the authorities in the country of origin (home-
land) can and should use to promote their political aspirations. At
the level of declarations, this primarily means advertising the ‘demo-
cratic transformations’ carried out by the ruling regime in Azerbaijan
and representing the ‘young’ Azerbaijani community abroad.
The representatives of the authority in the country of origin and
the ethnic groups in host countries share the ideal, which represents
Azerbaijanis abroad as a successful, developed, united and consoli-
dated ethno-national diaspora. With both parties, much of the eﬀort
focuses on the resolving of the Karabakh conﬂict, which also assumes
a ‘struggle with world Armenians’. In the opinion of President Ilham
Aliyev: ‘we [i.e. the Azerbaijanis of the world] should oppose with
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unity and force’.17 The construction and success of the diasporic
community is a core component of country’s position and discourse
on international migration.
Earlier it was argued that, at the level of political discourse, Azer-
baijan’s political regime shares many of the EU’s interests regarding
migration. It has also taken many steps in the direction envisaged
by the European Union by reforming its migration legislation and re-
structuring the migration service. However, the implementation of
programmes and the formation of modern institutions to control and
manage migration have been impeded by the politicisation of certain
migration-related phenomena. It also appears that the authoritarian
style of rule in the country has played a role in the process. Consid-
ering the diﬀerences between the political regimes and administra-
tive systems in Azerbaijan and the EU countries, divergences in the
process of implementation of joint programmes are somewhat to be
expected.
It appears that the EU’s migration policy is conventionally based
on the idea of attractive and rich European countries negotiating
with poor neighbours, hinting that the EU is the ultimate destination
of migrants across the region. As Wallace and Vincent (2009, 158)
point out, not all or even the main migration of the Post-Soviet space
is directed towards the European Union. In Azerbaijan for example,
the main target countries are Russia and Turkey. This has meant
that in the ﬁeld of migration policy, the priority of cooperation has
been given to negotiations with these two countries, and Russia in
particular. Secondly, as was pointed out above, the oﬀicial migration
policy of Azerbaijan has been signiﬁcantly modiﬁed over the years.
The leaders of the country no longer perceive Azerbaijan as a coun-
try of origin for migrants but follow the argument that due to its
blooming economy, Azerbaijan has now become an attractive target
country for migrants. Although notoriously unreliable, the oﬀicial
migration statistics seem to support the conclusion of a moderate in-
crease in immigration to Azerbaijan. This change of perception has
17These words were said in the speech on the occasion of the opening of ‘The XI
Congress of Friendship and Brotherhood of Turkic States and Communities’, which
was held in Baku in November 2007. Concerning the oﬀicial view of the Azerbai-
jani authorities on the need ‘to form a Lobby’ see, for example: The new histori-
cal opportunity. Downloaded from: http://www.diaspora.az/qurultay/index-en.htm,
on 23.1.2009.
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been accompanied with more nationalistic migration policies. This
has meant that between the EU and Azerbaijan, common positions
have been found when it comes to protecting the borders of Azerbai-
jan. Simultaneously, the initiative of readmission has been met with
less enthusiasm by the Azerbaijani authorities.
Traditionally, visa facilitation has been understood as an instru-
ment to convince otherwise reluctant countries to sign the readmis-
sion agreement (Trauner and Kruse 2008). The leadership of Azer-
baijan holds on to the belief that Azerbaijan is no longer a coun-
try whose residents want to leave it and travel overseas, but rather
that its problems are more related to the management of migration
ﬂows from neighbouring regions. Azerbaijan has oil money, which al-
lows it more leverage in negotiations, however Azerbaijan also needs
qualiﬁed people to work in the oil-related industry and is thus will-
ing to support the education of young Azerbaijani citizens overseas.
Equally important to the leadership however, is to ensure that these
processes remain under the control of the state authority.
This also poses the question as to how eﬀective the EU’s attempts
will be to get the Azerbaijan government to sign the readmission
agreement by the promises of visa facilitation. Writing in 2006, Laila
Aliyeva (2006) concluded that unlike the general public, the ruling
elite in the South Caucasus did not feel the consequences of limited
visa regimes and other disadvantages of being outside Europe. As
such, they therefore had less incentive to risk their rule by reform-
ing and drawing closer to the European Union. In our opinion, this
largely applies to the current situation in Azerbaijan, too.
5.6 Conclusions
In the EU’s assessment (European 2007), Azerbaijan’s reforms strat-
egy to develop democracy and a market economy and to bring the
country closer to the EU has been slow, not always coherent, yet ‘evo-
lutionary’. Development in the ﬁeld of border and migration policy
in comparison to Georgia has also been relatively slow, although sig-
niﬁcant steps have been taken in some ﬁelds. We claim that is partly
due to the politicisation of migration policy in Azerbaijan and the
fact that the Azerbaijani domestic and foreign policy agenda is dom-
inated by the ongoing conﬂict with Armenia over Nagorno Karabakh.
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As an example, the public debate on migration has been very much
concerned with the situation of IDPs, and until recently little atten-
tion has been paid to the management of international migration and
even then, the focus has been on cooperation with the Russian Fed-
eration.
This said, cooperation has advanced particularly in those areas
where the two partners, the EU and Azerbaijan, have shared simi-
lar interests. This is the case, for example, in relation to improving
Azerbaijan’s border control. On Azerbaijan’s part this is partly mo-
tivated by the geographic location of Azerbaijan in an unstable re-
gion with many potential sources of conﬂict in its neighbourhood, al-
though the conﬂict over Nagorno Karabakh has a speciﬁc role here,
too. All in all, Azerbaijan seeks to cooperate with actors who can
further its aims with regard to the conﬂict. This general situation
has inﬂuenced the development of the co-operation with regard to
border management and among other things it is reﬂected in Azer-
baijan’s position on the South Caucasian Border Management Ini-
tiative. Azerbaijan has taken a positive stand on international coop-
eration under the South Caucasus Integrated Border Management
Initiative, as long as such cooperation does not compromise its inter-
ests on the issue of Nagorno Karabakh. Especially, in relation to the
cooperation on border management; Azerbaijan has consistently re-
fused to cooperate with Armenia, which has meant for example, that
the implementation of SCIBM has been delayed because Azerbaijan
chose to pursue cooperation only through its bi-lateral component
with Georgia, regardless of the programme’s regional character.
Furthermore, the issue of diaspora construction has been at the
top of Azerbaijan’s agenda in relation to migration. However, de-
spite the eﬀort put into the construction of the ethno-national Azeri
diaspora as a collective political entity, the results have been mod-
est (Anderson 1998, 44-45). In the oﬀicial diasporic discourse, the
increase in the number of registered ethnic organisations (as an ex-
ample) is praised as being a signiﬁcant achievement but in reality,
the work of these organisations is conducted by a limited circle of
ethnic activists.
Often, the delegates of diﬀerent congresses, forums and other
collective events mainly represent themselves, their personal
interests and/or the interests of closest people to them, and these
are often connected with setting up transnational business
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networks. However, as these people have an established
partnership with the authorities of their political homeland, they
are given the status and recognition to represent the ethno-national
community of their particular places of residence. In this two-way
process, simultaneously the president of the political homeland
comes to represent the interests of all ‘compatriots’. Since 2000,
when the symbolic 1st Congress of Azerbaijanis of the World took
place, the political project of diaspora-building has acquired the
features of an institutionalized long-term arrangement. Therefore,
it cannot be ruled out that in the years to come the process may
succeed in constructing a transnational community of Azerbaijanis
or an ethno-political lobby in one or another EU country.
We argue that in the ﬁeld of migration policy, the single most im-
portant factor, which drives the interest of the Azerbaijani political
regime, is the need for more international recognition. This has ma-
terialised, for example, in the form of diaspora building in the EU
countries. The Azerbaijani political regime acutely needs interna-
tional platforms and actors that work outside its borders to repre-
sent the Azerbaijani version of the Nagorno Karabakh conﬂict in EU
countries. As such, the construction of diaspora is complemented by
several other initiatives, such as attempts to publicize the history,
culture and economic achievements of Azerbaijan to a world-wide
audience. The discourse which concerns the strengthening of the
position of post-Soviet Azerbaijan in the international community is
inextricable from the concerted eﬀorts to reinforce the position of
the ruling regime inside the country. It is also a key factor inﬂuenc-
ing Azerbaijan’s interests in cooperation with the EU in the ﬁeld of
migration policy.
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Chapter 6
The Situation of Young
People in Armenia
Arseniy Svynarenko
6.1 Introduction
Armenia has had a troubled and often traumatic history and still
faces signiﬁcant social, political and economic challenges. This his-
torical heritage is clearly visible in many policy papers issued by gov-
ernment, as well as in the programs of many political parties and
youth organizations. Traumatic experience of military conﬂict with
neighbouring Azerbaijan (and its long-term consequences such as
closed borders and displaced people) and confrontation with Turkey
regarding its acknowledgement of events in the early 20th century1
are two topics that often appear in youth-related papers, discussions
and political rallies. Understanding the circumstances of young peo-
ple and making sense of youth policy requires special attention to
the delicate and diﬀicult circumstances faced by the country.
Young people are involved in transition between childhood and
1The relations between Armenia and Turkey are also complicated because of long
historical dispute regarding the recognition of the Genocide of Armenian people com-
mitted by the Ottoman Empire in 1915.
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adulthood. This transition has both public and private trajectories.
The public trajectory includes transitions from schooling to contin-
gent work and later to permanent work. The private trajectory con-
cerns the aspects of transition from living with parents to living alone
and later living as a couple (see Galland 1991). The key life stage
transitions in youth are those from education into employment, and
from families of childhood to child-rearing families, and from living
in dwellings headed by seniors to ones in which young adults are
the seniors. Youth is a transition from dependant childhood to in-
dependent citizenship because all the transitions mentioned above
are made vis-à-vis politics, the justice system and the state welfare
system.
6.2 Young Armenians and the world
Armenia is situated between Georgia, Turkey, Iran and Azerbaijan.
With two of them, Armenia is in the state of unresolved conﬂicts: one
is a historical dispute with Turkey over the recognition of the Geno-
cide of Armenian people in 1915 and another is a military confronta-
tion with Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh. Armenia has good re-
lations with Russia which provides military support to Armenia. The
border between Armenia and Turkey is guarded by Russian troops.
At the end of 2012, intensiﬁed discussions were held about bringing
the Russian army with a peacekeeping mission to the border region
between Armenia and Azerbaijan.2 Since declaring its independence
in 1991, Armenia has been developing cooperation with international
organizations and the European Union. In 2001 the country became
a member of the Council of Europe and during the last ﬁve years it
has actively been cooperating with the European Union in the frame-
work of the European Neighbourhood Policy Initiative.
For seven long years between 1988 and 1994, Armenia was in the
state of conﬂict with neighbouring Azerbaijan because of the dispute
over the territories of Nagorno Karabakh. This conﬂict still awaits
political resolution. In this conﬂict, Turkey provided the Azeri side
with political support which eventually resulted in the interruption
2Russia deploys peacekeepers in Nagorno Karabakh? (2013) Azerbaijan News Net-
work http://ann.az/en/?p=111740 [Accessed January 30, 2013]
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of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey.
During the ceaseﬁre with Azerbaijan, the Armenian government
started to work on the formulation of a youth policy program. As a
reaction to these complicated political circumstances of unresolved
conﬂicts, Armenian policy makers regard patriotic upbringing and
military training as important elements of the national youth policy.
The report by the Armenian government clearly articulates that pri-
oritization of patriotic education and military training of young Ar-
menians is done in response to the military propaganda produced by
the Azerbaijani state (Council of Europe 2011, 34).
Armenia is one of a few countries where the population is very
interested in international politics and in learning about the outside
world. As many as 84 per cent of Armenians say that they are very in-
terested in following the news about relations between Armenia and
other countries. The World Public Opinion report by the Chicago
Council on Global Aﬀairs reveals that from the selected countries,
Armenians demonstrate similarly high interest in international re-
lations as for instance respondents in the US or Mexico. That is
signiﬁcantly higher compared to Russians (66 per cent follow news
on international relations) or Ukrainians (74 per cent) (World Public
Opinion 2007). Other studies demonstrate that only 15 per cent of
young Armenians in Yerevan and 17 – in Vanadzor are interested in
domestic politics. That is signiﬁcantly lower in comparison to young
people in Ukraine where 45 per cent of young residents of the west-
ern Ukrainian town of Lviv and 37 per cent in Khmelnitsky said that
they were “very interested” or “quite interested” in politics (Roberts
2006). This peculiar fact that Armenia’s population is more inter-
ested in following the international political situation rather than do-
mestic politics can be explained by two major factors:
(a) Political factor - unresolved conﬂicts with foreign states (ter-
ritorial conﬂict with Azerbaijan and historical dispute with Turkey)
and search for international support for Armenia (currently Russia
is closest ally);
(b) Diaspora factor - economic and cultural ties with other coun-
tries on grassroots level of Armenian diaspora population.
For a century, Armenia has had a very signiﬁcant outﬂow of migra-
tion resulting in the formation of a large Armenian diaspora around
the world. The ﬁrst signiﬁcant wave was at the end of the First World
War as a result of the Armenian Genocide. The second wave was
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after gaining independence in 1991. According to the publication
by the International Labour Organization and the Ministry for Dias-
pora:3 “There are about ten million Armenians all over the world:
seven million of them live in the Diaspora and three million in Arme-
nia. The Armenian Diaspora and Diaspora-related organisations are
important factors for the country’s development and ﬂow of migra-
tion.”(ILO 2012). The number of emigrants from Armenia between
1991 and 1998 is estimated at 760,000 and dropping to 460,000 be-
tween 2002 and 2007. The majority of recent labour migrants work
in Russia.
A very large Armenian diaspora abroad deﬁnes both cultural links
(maintaining national identity) and economic dependence (labourmi-
grants who support their families in home country) for a large part
of Armenia’s population. Therefore Armenians pay great attention
to Armenia’s relations with other countries as well as to policies in
other countries (for instance the political and economic situation in
Russia). The situation in countries with large Armenian diasporas
has important direct or indirect impact on the lives of many Armeni-
ans in Armenia.
The International Republican Institute (IRI) report published in
2008 shows that in Armenian public opinion, three most important
problems are unemployment (40 per cent of respondents mentioned
it as the most important problem), the socio-economic situation (32
per cent) and the problem of Nagorno Karabakh (20 per cent)(IRI
2008). According to the most recent opinion poll carried out by the
Caucasus Research Resource Centers in 2011, as many as 62 per
cent of young Armenians regard Azerbaijan as the greatest enemy for
Armenia. Another enemy in the perceptions of Armenians is Turkey.
It is important to note that there are some cross-generational shifts
in Armenian’s perceptions of the nations’s main enemies. The older
population is somewhat less likely to consider Azerbaijan as a threat
(this opinion is shared by 62 percent of 18-35 year olds and 54 per-
cent of respondents aged 56 and more years). At the same time, hos-
3Ministry of Diaspora was established within the Armenian Government in 2008 for
the purposes of regulating state policy on development of relations between Armenia
and Armenian diaspora abroad for “strengthening of Armenian statehood and preser-
vation of Armenian identity based on the pillars of human, cultural and social capital,
as well as full social integration and competitiveness”. http://www.mindiaspora.am/
en/About_us
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tility towards Turkey is more common among older generations than
the young (Picture 1). In comparison, the most important friends for
Armenia are the Russian Federation (84 per cent among 18-35 year
olds), France (6 per cent), Georgia (4 per cent) (CRRC 2011). The IRI
report published in 2008 covers a longer period of time and authors
draw a conclusion that overall, Armenians’ attitude towards Turkey
is slowly improving. Between 2006 and 2008, there was gradual in-
crease from 40 to 48 per cent of support to the idea of opening the
border with Turkey even if the Turkish government does not recog-
nize the Genocide (IRI 2008).
Figure 6.1: Perceived enemies and friends of Armenia (in per cent
and across age cohorts). (CRRC 2011)
Young people in Armenia stand to gain a great deal from engage-
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ment with the youth programs of the European Union and other in-
ternational organizations. Participation in youth activities run by the
Council of Europe and other international institutes may help to open
up Armenia’s intellectual and conceptual, if not (yet) its political and
geographical borders. It will certainly encourage a positive experi-
ence of mobility and internationalism, which is currently often not
the case for some young Armenians.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union (where travelling abroad
meant travelling outside of the borders of Soviet Union and was
not easy), Armenian young people just like youth of most post-soviet
countries have a wider ‘world’ to practice international mobility in,
yet they have very limited possibilities to do so. About 77 per cent
of the respondents of the survey conducted for the purposes of the
National Youth Report expressed their wish to travel abroad: while
a decade earlier, very few of the respondents would have mentioned
vacations and tourism as the purposes of such travel, 33 per cent of
the respondents mentioned vacations and tourism, while 39 per cent
cited economic motivations. The survey also showed that 71 per cent
of the respondents had been unable to travel abroad since turning
16, despite their desire to do so (Council of Europe 2011, 34).
Young people willing to travel to other countries from Armenia
are challenged with a closed border with one great gateway to the
world - Turkey, which means crossing by land and reaching Turkey
in 30 minutes now takes 2 full days going all the way through Geor-
gia to reach Turkey. Going close to the border of Azerbaijan is also
complicated because of the dispute around the Nagorno Karabakh
region. An alternative to land travelling is travelling by air which is,
ﬁrst, quite expensive for Armenian youth because there are no di-
rect ﬂights from Yerevan to Istanbul or to Baku (all ﬂights to these
destinations are taken through third countries which makes tickets
more expensive)4 and second, it is often complicated due to the visa
regimes with most of the countries where young people would be
interested to travel to.
4Direct ﬂights between Istanbul and Yerevan were discontinued on 1 April 2013.
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6.3 Employment
The Armenian education system is not capable to respond to the
changes in the situation on local and global labour markets. The
ILO research shows that, in spite of plans to further develop and re-
form Armenia’s professional education system in such a way as to
align it as closely as possible with international standards, both pub-
lic and private vocational and tertiary education institutions have
still not adequately responded to the needs of not only the inter-
national, but even the local labor market in terms of quantitative
criteria, structure, or qualitative features (including the teaching of
foreign languages and the delivery of IT skills). A reform of the edu-
cation system is stagnating because of the lack of ﬁnancial resources,
problems in the legal framework, faculty shortages and qualiﬁcation
issues (ILO 2009).
Young people are the most vulnerable to the economic crisis and
unemployment risks, especially if they have poor education or their
professions are not in demand and they have little opportunity to get
new training. According to the national statistical bulletin of Arme-
nia, young people aged between 15 and 30 years compose 32 per
cent of all labour sources of Armenia (NSSA 2012). In the past years
after the 2008-9 crises, the Armenian Government has had a hard
time implementing its youth policy declarations: creating the condi-
tions (socio-economic, legal, political, spiritual, cultural and organi-
zational) under which young people may realise their potential and
thereby contribute to their society.
Comparing to other Eastern Neighbourhood Policy countries
(Modova, Belarus, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Georgia), Armenia has
the highest unemployment rates of 20 per cent of total population
(EC 2013) in 2010 and 18 per cent in 2011. Average youth
unemployment in 2010 in Armenia was particularly high, staying at
39 per cent. Young women were hit harder by the crisis: the female
unemployment rate for 16 to 24 years of age was 48 per cent, while
unemployment among young men was 24 per cent (ILO 2012b).
According to the Caucasus Barometer, some 58 percent of all
surveyed 18-35 year-olds said that they are not employed (CRRC
2011). This tells about the scale of the problem of gender
inequalities on the labour market.
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Importantly, the economic crisis has had impact on the structure
of employment and on labour emigration ﬂows. Prior to the crisis,
the construction and service sectors contributed most to economic
growth, and as a consequence of the crisis employment declined in
the construction and service sectors and increased substantially in
agriculture. Subsequently there is a great likelihood that changes on
the labour market have an impact on the quality of statistical infor-
mation about youth employment in the sector where informal or grey
economy plays a signiﬁcant role (ILO 2013). The widespread and
growing presence of informal employment in this region has a dete-
riorating impact on the quality of employment. In Armeniamore than
49 per cent of total employment has been estimated to be informal in
2010 with large diﬀerences between rural and urban employment.
The ILO report estimates that in rural areas of Armenia, informal em-
ployment constitutes 82 per cent of total rural employment and 99
per cent of agricultural employment. In contrast, in urban areas only
24 per cent of employees were in informal employment (ILO 2013).
This means that there are thousands of young people employed with
no formal contracts nor control over their working conditions and
having to rely on informal networks and family support instead of
state social security.
Lack of employment opportunities in Armenia, regardless of
whether we speak about stable jobs, well-paid jobs or any jobs,
deservingly takes the spotlight in the discussion about the reasons
for labour migration. However, there are important cultural factors
that have impact on the Armenian migration activity. One of them
is the tradition of “khopan” (Armenian folk term for leaving to work
abroad). The ILO surveys showed that in some villages, from which
many men have been continuously leaving to work abroad over a
long period of time, labour migration has become a traditional way
of providing for families (ILO 2009). Many young men from these
villages leave to work abroad after they have completed their
military service. At this point in time, they have to think about how
to earn money for their future family. These young men do not
make serious eﬀorts to ﬁnd a job in Armenia; they just leave, as
their fathers or uncles did before them.
Besides the tradition of “khopan,” there is also a cultural reason
for labour migration, which is regarded as important predominantly
by young men who wish to leave their home village and live in a more
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cultural and socially vibrant environment (such as a town). They
often try to settle in provincial centers or Yerevan. There are many
active people amongst them, who put their skills and abilities, in
diﬀerent ﬁelds, to the test. A number of them, at a later date, come
to the conclusion that neither in Yerevan nor provincial centers will
they be able to ﬁnd a job that would enable them to make ends meet,
and hence leaving for Russia becomes an alternative.
Another important factor inﬂuencing the decision to leave Arme-
nia and work abroad is the need to cover additional expenses and
thereby increase the quality of life of families in Armenia. These ex-
penses are: repairing or improving family accommodation, educat-
ing children by hiring a tutor, supporting children who have moved
to another town within Armenia, covering wedding expenses, the
purchasing durable products such as furniture and household appli-
ances.
Around 15% of Armenian households were involved in labour mi-
gration – one or more family members has left to work abroad. There
is no reliable data about the absolute number of labour emigrants.
According to a study of the International Labour Organisation, total
labour emigration may be estimated as between 96,000 and 122,000
persons in 2006 (ILO 2009). According to Armenian oﬀicial statis-
tics, the registered number or emigrants is small and continues to
decline from 9,500 in 2003 to 8,000 in 2006 and 2,600 in 2011 (Statis-
tics Armenia 2008, 2012).
The State Migration Service of Armenia collects statistics on the
number of border crossings and this data sheds more light on the
migration ﬂaws (Figure 6.2). According to registered net migration,
there were more people returning to Armenia in 2006 (983,000 per-
sons arrived to the country and 962,000 persons left Armenia), and
emigration signiﬁcantly increased in 2010: 1,754,200 border cross-
ings by people returning to the country and 1,800,900 times persons
left the country (SMS 2013). Between 2000 and 2012, the overall
number of persons who crossed Armenian border continued to grow
with no interruptions.
Russia is a primary destination for labour emigration from Arme-
nia. Over 90 per cent of all Armenian labour migrants go to Rus-
sia, only 2 per cent choose Ukraine. Perhaps the global economic
crisis has had a moderate impact on those sectors of Russia’s econ-
omy where Armenian emigrants ﬁnd work: construction (two thirds
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Figure 6.2: Net migration rate from 2000 to 2012 (in thousands of
persons, diﬀerence between number of people coming to Armenia
and leaving it). State migration service of Armenia
of migrants), trade and services (ILO 2008). Although these oﬀi-
cial statistics do not tell much speciﬁcs about labour emigrants, they
demonstrate that during the recent crisis there was a signiﬁcant de-
crease in the number of persons who moved out of country perma-
nently (this is most likely a main category that oﬀicial statistics reg-
istered). Uncertainty on the labour market in Russia is probably the
main reason for the falling numbers of people who move and want
to move their families to Russia permanently. The border crossings
and passenger ﬂow statistics demonstrate a more ﬂexible response
of the labour force to growing uncertainties on labour markets. Ar-
menians travel to Russia and abroad more and more often. Large
construction projects (in large cities and in Sochi ahead of Olympic
Games in 2014) as well as services and the catering industry that
employ many Armenian migrants have suﬀered less from the crisis
compared to similar industries elsewhere in Europe.
6.4 Changing values
Globalisation brings changes to Armenian culture. Despite a weak
social welfare system, problems in economy and high unemployment
rates of Armenian youth strengthen the trend of extending the tran-
sition from education to employment and postponing the formation
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of own families. But this tendency varies between urban and rural
communities. The overall tendency is towards increasing the aver-
age age of ﬁrst marriage (from 22 to 25 years for women and from 26
to 28 years for men in the period of time 1989 and 2010 correspond-
ingly). After the collapse of the totalitarian system, a very signiﬁcant
increase of the share of non-marital births tells about a rapid cultural
change caused by the weakening of social control over family life and
sexuality.5 The share of non-marital births to young mothers under
age 20 increased from 18 per cent of total live births in 1989 to 55
per cent in 2010 (Picture 3), while the average age (23 years) of ﬁrst
childbirth for young mothers did not change at all during the same
period of time. In a country comparison, Armenia follows Georgia in
a similar trend of modernisation (post-modernisation) of young peo-
ple’s values, which diﬀers from the situation in Azerbaijan (a country
withMuslim traditions). These cross-country diﬀerences in moderni-
sation (post-modernisation) of youth cultures is likely to have an im-
pact on the cultural interactions between the young people of Arme-
nia and Azerbaijan through increasing the cultural gap between the
young people in both countries. Therefore it requires special pro-
grams for joint youth projects that address common problems (for
instance community activism, employment and entrepreneurship) in-
stead of cultural diﬀerences.
Over three quarters of Armenian young adults aged 25-29 live in
the same household with their parents (Roberts 2006). It is likely
that close interaction with older generations (parents and grand-
parents) contributes to the transmission of traditional values to suc-
ceeding generations. At the same time, it is important to take into
consideration the fact that in many cases, extended families provide
young people with certain security (sometimes partially replacing
state social security) in the circumstances of economic downturn by
providing housing (for co-habitation or succession), providing care
for small children, etc. It is especially common for single parents (in
Ken Roberts’s study, single parents were exclusively young women
with a child, see Roberts 2006).
There are very signiﬁcant regional diﬀerences in youth transitions
5The oﬀicial statistics reﬂect the number of marriages registered by state oﬀicials
and do not include marriages by the Armenian Apostolic Church tradition which were
not registered by state oﬀicials.
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Figure 6.3: Non-marital births in per cent of live births to mothers
under age 20 years. UNICEF. Database: Moneeinfo 2012_r4.mdb,
http://www.transmonee.org/moneeinfo/en/
between the urban centers and poor rural communities, but small
diﬀerence in comparison to Azerbaidzhan and Georgia. This means
that welfare and the economic situation have a great impact on youth
transition and youth experiences of cultural change in their society.
Harsh economic conditions force young people to live with their par-
ents even if they already have their own families. This tendency is
more common in rural areas of Armenia particularly heavily hit by
the 2008 crisis.
6.5 Key players in the youth sector in Ar-
menia
There are three major players that make the largest contribution to
the development of youth policies and the youth situation in Armenia:
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government, nongovernmental organizations (domestic and interna-
tional), and youth organizations within political parties.
6.5.1 Government
Youth policy in Armenia is formally deﬁned as ‘serving the needs of
young people aged between 16 and 30.’ The Ministry for Sport and
Youth Aﬀairs and its representations in regional administrations (of-
ﬁce of a Youth Aﬀairs Specialist in each regional government center
– ‘Marzpetaran’) are governmental institutions that are responsible
for youth policy in Armenia. The strongest structures for the deliv-
ery of youth policy and considerable activity are at the center of gov-
ernance and in the capital city of Yerevan (Williamson and Brandt-
ner 2010). Nonetheless, government regards establishing oﬀices of
Youth Aﬀairs Specialists in regions as one of the major accomplish-
ments in the sphere of regional youth policy in recent years (Council
of Europe 2011, 8). Furthermore, the Armenian government pro-
vides modest support to youth organizations and joint youth pro-
grams on disputed territories of Artsakh region controlled by the
Nagorno Karabakh Republic (Armenian youth 2013).
Armenian policy makers consider that the Armenian army is the
largest youth organization in the country after the demise of the
Komsomol and Young Pioneer organizations. Only men can serve
in the Armenian Armed forces, meaning that women cannot belong
to this largest organization. Unlike in some other former Soviet re-
publics, the army is greatly respected by young people, opinion polls
suggesting that 60 per cent of 18-35 year olds trust the army as an
institute of the state (CRRC 2011). Any alternatives to military ser-
vice for young men are only a recent development, and they are con-
sidered by external international commentators to be exceptionally
punitive.6 Concern has also been expressed about the ill-treatment
of conscripts: consideration should be given to improving the condi-
tions of young men in the army, including training for future occu-
pations. Nevertheless, the overwhelming trust in the army can be
seen as one component of the traditional values and belief structure
of young Armenians, which also includes their attachment to the Ar-
6Unlike in many Western countries where females are accepted in the army, only
men can serve in the Armenian armed forces.
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menian Apostolic Church (though the state is concerned about a pos-
sible weakening of these traditional values)(Council of Europe 2011,
34). On the other hand, despite considerable public rhetoric about
youth participation, there remains a signiﬁcant lack of trust in formal
institutions, which has impeded the promotion of youth involvement.
It is arguably a legacy of communism, an outcome of the spread of
corruption and poverty.
The Armenian government ﬁnances a range of youth and youth-
related projects. Perhaps one of the major problems is not only
the lack of funding, which certainly is not suﬀicient. Instead it is
outdated structures and principles of functioning of governmental
agencies and weakness of consolidated national youth policy. Youth
issues are mentioned in policy papers of various ministries. Since
2008 the main priorities for national youth policies in Armenia re-
main mostly unchanged and focused on education (including patri-
otic upbringing and learning traditional values), youth transitions
from education to work, and supporting young families. In the Youth
Policy Strategy for the years 2008-12, four priority spheres were set
as follows; a) to provide quality education possibilities for young peo-
ple according to their aspirations and abilities, b) to improve employ-
ment and assist the creation of new job possibilities, c) to improve the
social-economic situation of young people, and d) to promote healthy
lifestyles amongst youth and to promote their spiritual-cultural and
patriotic education (Council of Europe 2011). These themes received
further elaboration and concretization in the Youth Policy Strategy
for the years 2013-2017. Now the aims of the National youth policy
include the increase of the birthrate and creating a favorable busi-
ness environment. Increasing the birth rate in Armenia is planned
to be achieved through subsidizing young families and improving the
social-economic situation of young people. The Government has de-
clared plans for making housing programs more accessible and af-
fordable for young families with several children, as well as plans
for partial or complete compensation of tuition for mothers under
the age of 20 or those who are getting ready to be mothers (Arme-
nian youth 2013). It is expected that the program will be launched in
2014. Another part of the program is about creating a favorable en-
vironment for youth to do business in Armenia through the provision
of aﬀordable loans, particularly to youth in the provinces.
There are ongoing attempts of cross-sectoral dialogue which pre-
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sumes planning and implementation of cooperation between diﬀer-
ent state and nongovernmental actors. For example a state program
called ‘Accessible Flats to Youth Families’ was launched as a cooper-
ation of multiple state agencies. There are other cross-sectoral pro-
grams as well with the Ministry of Science and Education, Ministry
of Defense, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labor and Social Issues
etc (Council of Europe 2011).
The Armenian government’s youth policy suﬀers from strong po-
litical inﬂuences particularly at the time of actualized political com-
petition, for instance at the time of election campaigns, when raising
youth issues becomes part of the ruling party’s election campaign.
The publication and broad public discussion of the main youth pol-
icy documents such as the Youth Policy Strategy for the years 2008-
12 and 2013-2017 coincided with presidential election campaigns in
2008 and 2013. The ﬁrst programme was developed by the govern-
ment, chaired by the then-Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan and the
latest program was adopted when he was running for re-election as
president in 2013. In Armenianmass media, these youth policy docu-
ments were presented as action plans for the government promising
the improvement of young people’s situation: cheap loans for young
families, aﬀordable education, more jobs for young people, and so
forth.
6.5.2 Non-governmental youth organizations
There is a broad range of activities run by nongovernmental youth
organizations, branches of international organizations, also youth re-
lated projects by other NGOs. It is remarkable that foreign donors
are the most active in ﬁnancing youth-related projects in Armenia.
The Armenian diaspora plays an important role contributing to the
development of youth projects. Through providing funding for spe-
ciﬁc projects and themes, foreign governments and international or-
ganizations have some degree of inﬂuence on internal aﬀairs in Ar-
menia. It is important to note that the Ministry of Diaspora runs a
number of projects particularly focused on diaspora youth or where
youth activities make up a considerable part (“My Armenia” Festival,
Program “Ari tun”, “Armenians today”, “Artsakh today” –project on
the territory of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic). By prioritizing par-
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ticular issues in the sector of human rights through educational and
training campaigns, youth organizations have a great potential of in-
ﬂuence on problematic issues in Armenia’s relations with its neigh-
bours. Perhaps themost important direction for further development
of youth programs is people’s diplomacy and grassroots activities on
concrete non-political topics that are common for young people in Ar-
menia, Turkey and Azerbaijan that can make a positive contribution
to the resolution of existing tensions between these nations.
It is international organizations operating in Armenia that are
making the most substantial contribution to the community develop-
ment processes though a creation of youth centers and youth clubs
which serve as empowering agents in regional youth work develop-
ment. In particular the Council of Europe, World Bank, various UN
Agencies, OSCE, Eurasia Foundation, World Vision and many other
agencies are active in promoting community development in various
regions of Armenia. Many international NGOs in Armenia with a fo-
cus on youth are US-based: Junior Achievement of Armenia, FHI
360 (former Family Health International and Academy for Educa-
tional Development), American Councils for International Education,
Counterpart International. The main umbrella organization for the
youth NGOs, student organizations and youth wings of political par-
ties in Armenia is the National Youth Council of Armenia (NYCA). The
NYCA cooperates with major European youth initiatives and organi-
zations including the European Youth Forum, European Youth Fund,
SALTO-YOUTH network of Resource Centers within the Youth in Ac-
tion Programme. The main functions of this NYCA are (a) to serve
as a mediator between the youth NGO sector and state bodies of
Armenia, (b) to serve as a mediator between the youth sector and in-
ternational youth structures and represent Armenian youth in those
structures, and (c) to contribute to the empowerment of young peo-
ple in Armenia (Council of Europe 2011). Despite functioning youth
councils, there are persisting problems of coordination in youth poli-
cies and youth work between the ministries, between government
and youth NGOs (predominantly international youth NGOs). Youth
councils have high-level contacts in government, but the National
Youth Council of Armenia is perceived as a closed ‘club.’ Therefore
youth participation in decision-making processes varies very sharply
(Williamson and Brandtner 2009).
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6.5.3 Youth organizations in political parties
Many Armenian political parties have youth branches and moreover
some political parties have been successful in attracting also student
unions and other youth organizations on their side. The very well
organized youth branches of the largest political parties, the Repub-
lican Party of Armenia and Prosperous Armenia Party, organize nu-
merous youth-related activities across Armenia. One of the largest
youth political organizations is the Armenian Youth Federation of the
opposition Dashnaktsutiun party (see the next section). This youth
organization has thousands of members, and many of them are Ar-
menians in other countries (including countries outside the Caucasus
region). On one hand, participation in these activities may provide
young activists with opportunities of climbing upwards on the so-
cial and political ladder, they empower young people and pass the
youth voices to the political elites. On the other hand, these politi-
cal youth organizations are often used for the mobilization of voters
and the organization of protest rallies. These protest actions are
rather frequent in the capital city of Yerevan. Usually youth orga-
nizations at the protest rallies demand state support for young peo-
ple and students (discounts for public transportation fares, lower tu-
ition fees and higher scholarships) (ARF-D 2012). Often these youth
protests also have political demands, for instance “Create equal cir-
cumstances for the political activism of the students” or the improve-
ment of security of Armenians in Turkey. One of the recent actions
was organized by Dashnaktsutiun party’s youth branch, ‘Nikol Agh-
balyan’ Student Association along with the Young Diplomats Club
and the Young Getashen Youth Charity Foundation whose members
marched to the UN oﬀice in Yerevan with anti-Turkish banners de-
manding international organizations “to respond to the Turkish au-
thorities‘ inertia and take the appropriate measures for the suspen-
sion of nationalistic persecutions and for the protection of the inno-
cent.” (Students protesting 2013). News about crimes committed
against several Armenian women in Turkey served as a pretext for
this rally.
This particular composition of the youth sector (aﬀiliation of youth
organizations with particular political parties) is not dissimilar from
the situation in Russia and Ukraine. As in Armenia, also Russian po-
litical parties have their youth branches and these branches are most
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often used as tools in the hands of the party leaders. One of the main
dissimilarities is that Russia has many political youth organizations
not formally related to any party. Another great dissimilarity is that
for many years, the Russian government paid great attention to the
youth sector and the development of youth policy. Investing in youth
organizations of various kinds was accompanied with greater restric-
tions on foreign funding for NGOs. On the contrary, the lack of the
government’s attention towards the youth sector in Armenia partly
coincides with the situation in Ukraine. For a long time similarly
to Ukraine, the government of Armenia did not have a consolidated
document on youth policy and paid little or limited attention to youth
participation andmovements. For the government, young people are
either recipients of help (cheap loans for housing or business) or a
source of social problems (delinquency, health risks and so forth).
On the contrary, most funding for youth projects and youth NGOs
came from foreign agencies, and many of these projects were em-
powering young people as active participants. In Ukraine this was
combined with spread of moderate nationalism among many youth
organizations and widespread activation of apolitical student unions.
Well-developed networks of youth organizations in Ukraine created
speciﬁc circumstances prior to the Orange revolution. In Armenia
themain channels for youth empowerment are youth political organi-
zations and youth projects sponsored by international organizations.
6.6 Political parties that have representa-
tion in Armenian National Assembly
have their youth branches
The Republican Party of Armenia (RPA)
Organization
Youth branch: The Youth Organization of RPA. Established in 1991.
RPA Largest party of the centre-right in Armenia that declares
its position as conservative. The party controls most government
bodies in Armenia. It is somewhat similar to the United Russia party
in the Russian Federation and the Party of Regions in Ukraine and it
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consolidates both old nomenclature cadres and large business elites
The youth wing has inﬂuence in the party: impact is expressed
in promotion of its leaders to government positions (see Armenia’s
2012).
Party performance in elections
Result in parliament elections in 2007: 33.91% of votes. Result in
parliament elections in 2012: 44,05% of votes on party lists and 71%
of votes in constituencies, 69 of 131 seats in parliament.
Declared aims of youth organization
International activity
RPA Youth Organization cooperates with United Russia “Young
Guards” (Molodaja gavardiya) youth organization, with the youth
organization of the European Peoples Party, and with the Chinese
Communist Party Youth Organization.
Prosperous Armenia Party (PAP)
Organization
Youth branch: PAP Youth Union.
PAP was established by wealthy Armenian entrepreneur Gagik
Tsarukian. Party positions itself as center-right political party.
Member of coalition.
Party performance in elections
in 2007: 15.13% of votes in 2012: 30,20% of votes on party lists and
22
Declared aims of youth organization
PAP Youth Union attracts several NGOs and student unions. Organi-
zation has a broad network of regional representations.
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International activity
PAP Youth Union co-operates with ”Young Guard” (Molodaja
gavardiya) the youth organization of “United Russia.”
Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Armenian So-
cialist party Hay Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsutiun)
Organization
Youth branch: The Armenian Youth Federation (AYF).
Opposition party.
Party performance in elections
Result in parliament elections in 2012: 5,73% of votes and 5 of 131
seats in parliament.
Declared aims of youth organization
The AYF Youth branch aims to:
1. develop interest among Armenian youth towards politics
2. struggle for the just resolution of the Armenian Cause (interna-
tional recognition of the Armenian Genocide, Armenian rights
and restitution claims)
3. develop socialist and democratic values among the youth
4. participate in the struggle against injustice and for the achieve-
ment of social justice
5. promotion of human rights
6. actively participate in the formation and promotion of civil so-
ciety
7. struggle against all kinds of discrimination
8. participate in international movements working for justice and
cooperate with international progressive youth organizations
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9. participate in activities aimed at preserving the Armenian iden-
tity in the Diaspora
10. develop the consciousness and responsibility of the youth in
serving the Armenian nation wherever they are and however
possible (AYF 2012).
International activity
AYF has branches in Armenia, Lebanon, United States, Canada, Ar-
gentina, France, Greece, Russia, Cyprus, and other countries. AYF
regions work as decentralized structures, and the AYF’s membership
exceeds 10,000 internationally.
The PanArmenian or regional activities of various ARF youth and
student organizations are coordinated by the Youth Oﬀice of the ARF
Bureau. It has been located in Yerevan, Armenia, since 2001.
ARF is one of oldest Armenian political youth organizations. Dur-
ing the Soviet period it functioned in exile.
Rule of Law Orinats Erkir
Organization
Centrist political party.
Member of coalition.
Party performance in elections
Result in parliament elections in 2012: 5,5% of votes on party lists
and 2,4% of votes in constituencies, 6 of 131 seats in parliament
Declared aims of youth organization
No information about youth branch.
Heritage
Organization
Liberal and centrist political party. Opposition party.
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Party performance in elections
Result in parliament elections in 2012: 5,79% of votes on party lists,
5 of 131 seats in parliament.
Declared aims of youth organization
No information about youth branch.
Armenian National Congress
Organization
Block of parties.
Opposition party.
Party performance in elections
Result in parliament elections in 2012: 7,1
Declared aims of youth organization
No information about youth branch. It is a block of 13 opposition
parties.
6.7 Conclusions
Young people in Armenia are in a very diﬀicult situation facing high
unemployment and the grey economy. State policies towards youth
are largely outdated which is a common situation for many post-
soviet states. The state treats young people as recipients of aid and
promotes formal programs on ‘patriotic upbringing’ and ‘traditional
values.’ Oﬀicial documents by governmental structures demonstrate
that there are competing deﬁnitions of ‘youth policy,’ with diﬀerent
aspirations attached to each. Nevertheless, Armenia is moving to-
wards the establishment of a youth law through a gradual reﬁne-
ment of the principles and framework of youth policy (Williamson
and Brandtner 2009). Currently there is a ministry for Sport and
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Youth Aﬀairs responsible for the development of youth policy and co-
operation between ministries in the youth sector. The government
works on strengthening the structures for the delivery of youth pol-
icy despite of a lack of suﬀicient funds. The ministry for Diaspora
plays an important role in engaging diaspora organizations in work
with youth both in Armenia and abroad. The government has had
some success in establishing regional and local oﬀices for youth af-
fairs. The National Youth Council of Armenia (an NGO and large
umbrella organization) has high-level contacts in government and
takes the role of mediator between the state and youth organizations.
However, Government-sponsored youth councils are perceived as a
closed ‘club,’ and therefore youth participation in decision-making
processes varies very sharply.
Various foreign agencies, international and local NGOs are
considerably more active in developing youth programs in the
regions and across borders, which is especially important in the
context of Armenia’s complicated relations with its two large
neighbours: Turkey and Azerbaijan. Cooperation between youth
organizations across the region has signiﬁcant potential for
contributing to a normalisation of Armenia’s relations with these
neighbours. In contrast to governmental youth programs, the work
of international organizations (sponsored for instance by the EU,
UN, USAID, for instance through the Eurasia Foundation) in this
ﬁeld is mostly directed at empowering young people, developing
active citizenship and tackling young people’s problems.
A majority of over 90 per cent of young Armenians do not belong
to any political party or, indeed, to any NGO. Nonetheless young
people play an important role in Armenian politics through voting,
participation in political protests and in youth and student organi-
zations. Political parties have well-established youth branches. It is
very common that organizers and main participants of mass political
rallies in Yerevan or in regions are young people from various polit-
ical and student or youth organizations aﬀiliated with a particular
political party. Youth unemployment and the great involvement of
young people in the grey economy (in the form of informal employ-
ment) accompanied by very low incomes serve as additional stimulus
for making youth more visible in mass protests and political cam-
paigns.
There are very signiﬁcant regional diﬀerences in youth transitions
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between the urban centers and poor rural communities. Both the tra-
dition of “khopan” (working abroad and supporting families at home
in Armenia) and harsh economic conditions (low wages, problems in
the state social protection system) are underlying reasons for many
young people to continue living under the same roof with their par-
ents even if they already have their own families. It makes the young
dependent on older generations and on the security provided by fam-
ily members.
There are several important issues that require further develop-
ment in Armenian youth policy:
1. Bringing the education system closer to international standards
and making it more responsive to the labour market situation.
The Armenian diaspora may become an important resource for
further educational reform and ﬁnding needed specialists.
2. Development of youth policy with orientation on the best Eu-
ropean experiences, particularly from the northern European
countries such as Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. Ac-
cents should be shifted from patriotic upbringing (disguised na-
tionalism) to the promotion of youth empowerment and partic-
ipation (for instance to hear youth voices on important local is-
sues, youth parliaments in regional and municipal administra-
tions)
3. Government policies should support “people’s diplomacy,”
youth NGO projects that work in both directions:
Armenian-Azeri and Armenia-Turkey, and promote
communication between young people, NGOs and government
organizations in these countries.
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Chapter 7
The 2008 War in
Georgia: Lessons from
the Caucasus
Heikki Talvitie
War broke out in Georgia late at night on August 7, 2008.1 The news
did not reach Finland until the next morning, and even then the infor-
mation was vague. The onset of the war was dramatic even for out-
siders. We were enjoying our summer holiday thousands of kilome-
tres away, when suddenly we had to form an opinion. Assessments
were not always accurate, but the inaccurate ones are preferably for-
gotten. Therefore it is important to look back and examine what it
was really all about. In order to understand the Georgia-Russia war
of 2008 we must take a look at the historical context of the conﬂict.
The Caucasus is a mosaic of languages, peoples, nations, states and
separatist regions that seems quite confusing. External forces have
also sought to intervene in the course of events in the region and to
promote their own interests.
Azerbaijan and Armenia’s shared problem is the situation in
Nagorno Karabakh and the determination of its future status.
1Translation Laura Kauppila.
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South Ossetia and Abkhazia, in turn, have attempted to secede
from Georgia. Russia recognised their independence in the autumn
of 2008, which means that the deﬁnition of their legal status has
been put on hold for the time being. On the other hand, Russia’s
North Caucasus is very turbulent. Chechnya may have been
brought under control to some extent, but Ingushetia and Dagestan
have increasingly been subject to unrest. The South Caucasus and
Central Asia, in particular, have plentiful energy reserves, oil and
gas, which draws these areas into the sphere of great power
competition. Who ultimately controls the transfer of these energy
resources to world markets? This is a fundamental question that
determines oil and gas pipeline routes. The South Caucasus is of
strategic importance in another way as well. It is bordered by the
Black Sea, and it is a route to the Caspian Sea and Central Asia.
This geographical location means that power relations of a much
wider region are reﬂected in the situation in the South Caucasus.
The great powers have engaged in the so-called Great Game in the
South Caucasus and Central Asia since the days of Peter the Great at
least. It was in Russia’s interest to gain access to the seas, so Peter
was initially active in the Baltic Sea and the Sea of Azov. He also had
the idea to reach the Indian border through the South Caucasus and
Central Asia. This posed such a serious threat to the British that the
“Great Game” was played out at the expense of local khanates. In
addition to Imperial Russia and the British Empire, eventually the Ot-
tomans, Napoleon’s France, the Bolsheviks, Imperial Germany and
Persia joined in the game. And neither China nor the United States
were far behind.
I will ﬁrst examine the historical background of the conﬂicts in
Georgia and then the activities of the European Union relating to
these conﬂicts as well as the recent history of the country after
Saakashvili’s rise to power. Next I will analyse the 2008 war and
Finland’s role as the OSCE Chairman-in-Oﬀice in more detail.2 A
primary purpose of this article is to analyse how Finland acted.
What was done and what impact did that have on the developments
on the ground? And what can be learned from all this? My
2Terhi Hakala was a prominent member of the Finnish team. She later had signiﬁ-
cant inﬂuence on Finland’s policy towards the Caucasus and during the diﬀicult year
of 2008 headed the OSCE mission in Georgia.
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viewpoint is not only a Finnish one, but also very personal. I will
describe situations primarily through experiences from my
assignments in the Finnish Foreign Service and as the European
Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus.
7.1 Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia -
a brief background to protracted con-
ﬂicts
When the break-up of the Soviet Union began, Georgia was quick to
declare independence. This happened already in April 1991 when
the Soviet Union still existed. In May, the nationalistic writer Zviad
Gamsakhurdia was elected president with the more than 90% of the
vote. However, he soon lost his popularity and resigned in January
1992. After a short military regime, the former Communist party
leader of Georgia and Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union Eduard
Shevardnadze became president. He also won over 90% of the vote.
South Ossetia, in turn, tried to secede from Georgia as early as 1990
during Soviet rule. When Georgia became an independent country,
relations with South Ossetia worsened and an armed conﬂict began.
President Zviad Gamsakhurdia tried to prevent the secession of the
break-away regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia with harsh mea-
sures. However, he was unable to control the internal situation of
the country and fell soon from power.
During the year 1992 agreement was reached about a South Os-
setian ceaseﬁre, which was monitored by Russian, Georgian, South
Ossetian andNorth Ossetian peacekeeping forces. As a consequence
of military operations, the territory of South Ossetia had been di-
vided into areas under Ossetian control and Georgian villages under
Georgian control. South Ossetia arranged a referendum on indepen-
dence the same year. More than half of those who visited the ballot
box voted for independence, but this had no international ramiﬁca-
tions. The four parties set to monitor the ceaseﬁre established a Joint
Control Commission, which was chaired by the Head of the OSCE
Mission in Tbilisi. Later, the EU Commission, which had ﬁnancial
assistance programs in South Ossetia, was approved as an observer
to the Joint Control Commission.
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In Abkhazia independence aspirations came to the fore already
in 1989. Violent riots broke out in July in Sukhumi, which were put
down by Soviet troops. In July Abkhazia declared its independence.
In Abkhazia too, the aspirations for independence led to armed
clashes during 1992. Georgians attempted to block Abkhazia’s
secession, while the Abkhazians were supported by volunteers from
the North Caucasus and Russia. The proportion of Chechens in
these volunteer forces was considerable, and later Chechen
separatists used Abkhazia as a base in their own independence
struggle. The Georgian government had about 3,000 soldiers in
Abkhazia, and these troops quickly took control over most of
Abkhazia. The local parliament was abolished. Nevertheless, in
September 1992, Abkhazians along with North Caucasian and
Russian volunteers launched a counter-attack forcing the
Georgians to abandon their positions. Sukhumi was still held by
Georgians. In the summer of 1993 the Abkhazians attacked
Sukhumi, which capitulated in September. President Shevardnadze
was forced to ﬂee from Sukhumi with the help of the Russian navy.
The ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia were forced to leave, and the
number of internally displaced persons was estimated at around
250,000. As a result of the war, relations between Shevardnadze
and Russia became more tense: Shevardnadze blamed Russia for
providing direct military assistance to Abkhazia. The United
Nations established an oﬀice in Tbilisi for the Abkhaz conﬂict. UN
representatives worked to promote reconciliation and to ensure
that residents and refugees managed in their everyday life. In
addition, an international group named the UN Secretary-General’s
Friends was set up for Abkhazia, which comprised of Russia and
several Western countries active in the region. This group sought
to organise various opportunities for Abkhazians to express their
views to the outside world.
7.2 European Union Special Representa-
tive for the South Caucasus
I had retired in October 2002 as Finland’s Ambassador in Stockholm,
but in the summer of 2003 I was appointed as the European Union
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Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus. Within the
EU it was assumed that the task would be relatively “light”, in other
words, I would visit the region only when the need arose, keeping my
“headquarters” in Helsinki. Before my appointment, I had met the
EU High Representative Javier Solana. He was the EU’s unoﬀicial
foreign minister and represented the Council of the European Union.
The Commission had its Commissioner for External Relations, who
shared the task with Solana. More recently this dichotomy has been
removed with the launch of the European External Action Service.
My discussions with Solana revealed that he valued my work as co-
chair of the Minsk process3 and my diplomatic experience in the So-
viet Union and Russia. The idea was that I could represent the EU in
the South Caucasus in such a way that would include successful co-
operation with the Russians – at least to some extent. Harri Kämäräi-
nen from the Ministry for Foreign Aﬀairs of Finland joined me in my
work as a very competent aide. He came to the task directly from
the Mission of Finland to NATO in Brussels, and was well-informed
about South Caucasian culture, language and history already since
his school days. His strengths included an excellent command of
Russian language. The third member of our group was William Boe,
a Danish diplomat. In Finland, Terhi Hakala formed the bedrock of
our activities. At ﬁrst, she was the Head of Unit for the South Cau-
casus and Central Asia at the Ministry for Foreign Aﬀairs and later
Finland’s Roving Ambassador for the South Caucasus. The EU Com-
mission had a big delegation in Tbilisi, which took care of aﬀairs
in the broader region. I got along well with Commission oﬀicials
–helped by the Nordic factor: two Finns and two Danes.
The premise I built my work on was that the South Caucasus is a
unique area where each country has its own particular political cul-
ture. On the other hand, all of the South Caucasus countries were
interested in close relations with the European Union. A lot was ex-
pected of the EU, because European values and the stability of its so-
cieties were attractive. On the other hand, it was clear that the South
Caucasian countries were not only in a state-building but also in a
nation-building process. State institutions that would bring stability
and the preconditions for well-being had to be created. At the same
3The Minsk Group was set up by the OSCE to resolve the Nagorno Karabakh con-
ﬂict.
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time, national unity had to be generated among diverse segments
of the population. Although Europe had a lot to oﬀer, it was clear
that my starting point for any activities had to be knowledge of the
region’s history and respect for prevailing values. In clan societies
with a tradition of rather authoritarian governance, it was inconceiv-
able that European values could be introduced overnight – if at all, in
some respects. And one cannot claim that European countries have
a single set of values either. Values have been put into practice in
diﬀerent EU countries in very diﬀerent ways, depending on the his-
tory and traditions of each society. It was also important to ensure
that the South Caucasus states would not view “Europeanism” as an
export item, seeking to replace their own traditions and values. In
the South Caucasus, the pivotal question is whether societies will
be built on stable institutions. At the moment all the states in the
region have developed strong presidential institutions, but other po-
litical actors remain rather weak.
Georgia was new to me, but it was in the hands of President Ed-
uard Shevardnadze, whom I knew from my period in Moscow. At
ﬁrst he had been the Soviet Union’s foreign minister, and later he
headed an institute in Russia. I had gone to visit him a few times at
the Moscow institute, and was left with the impression that he fol-
lowed the events in Georgia closely. That is why I was not surprised
when Shevardnadze decided to return to Georgia and was elected
president soon after Gamsakhurdia. A bit of a surprise, however,
was my ﬁrst visit to Moscow. I met Russian oﬀicials dealing with
the South Caucasus in the Russian Foreign Ministry. I was told that
Russia has a long relationship with the South Caucasus and that this
history should be known. The Russians, of course, were concerned
about what the EU’s aims in the South Caucasus were. Similarly,
they had to consider whether the EU’s stronger presence in the re-
gion would lead to a decline in Russia’s inﬂuence. The rapid enlarge-
ment of the European Union and NATO up to Russia’s borders had
come as a surprise, and now Moscow was wary that the same might
take place in the South Caucasus. Russia had historical, economic,
political and cultural interests in the region. In short, the South Cau-
casus was an important strategic object for Russia. In Washington
the reception was positive. I was told that the United States had no
military power in the region nor had its use there been considered at
any stage. The American side expressed a wish that the EU should
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be the Western engine promoting stability in the South Caucasus.
The US did have increasing economic interests to watch out for in
the energy sector. US commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan also be-
gan to be reﬂected in an unwillingness to take on new duties in the
ﬁeld of security policy. Not to mention Iran, which remained an open
question.
7.3 The role of the EU in regional conﬂicts
When I began the mission as the EUSR for the South Caucasus, my
ﬁrst major question was how the EU might be able to contribute to
crisis management in the region. Each of the regional conﬂicts had
its own mechanism by 2003 and the EU Special Representative was
regarded with great suspicion. France was perhaps the EU coun-
try that stood to win or lose the most in the game. In Paris, I was
given to understand that visiting conﬂict regions in my role as the
EUSR would not be very wise, because crisis management mech-
anisms were already established in each region. Similarly, Russia
carefully guarded the existing mechanisms, and it was clear that the
EUSR would not have the possibility for new policy initiatives with-
out Russia’s consent.
Crisis management relating to Nagorno Karabakh was familiar to
me from the co- chairmanship of the Minsk Process in 1995-1996.
The countries co-chairing it now were Russia, the United States and
France. It was very easy for me to state that as the EUSR, I would
support the Co-Chairs’ eﬀorts in reaching a settlement to the con-
ﬂict. The EU required reporting on conﬂicts even though I did not
directly participate in crisis management. France had a very active
role in the Minsk Group. The French position was that one chairman
could not substantially inform outsiders because negotiations were
in progress. However, the French Co-chair began to visit the EU’s
Political and Security Committee and to give a general assessment
of the Nagorno Karabakh crisis. This was a good development. It
strengthened the French position as the EU representative in the
co-chairmanship and brought the whole EU into the Minsk process,
without hampering conﬁdentiality. The situation between the mili-
tary forces remained unchanged. Incidents occurred, some of them
serious, but none were considered to breach the cease-ﬁre, which
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was therefore still in force.
7.4 From Shevarnadze to Saakashvili
Themost important political event in Georgia duringmymission with
the EU was the so-called Rose Revolution, which ousted President
Shevarnadze and brought to power the troika of Mikheil Saakashvili,
Zurab Zhvania and Nino Burjanadze. It has been said that Nino Bur-
janadze was the face, Zurab Zhvania the brain and Mikheil (Misha)
Saakashvili the ﬁery soul of the revolution. It was clear from the very
outset that Saakashvili was the real leader of the troika.
I met president Shevardnadze a few times during the autumn of
2003. He was very jovial towards me even though I had very few con-
crete proposals to present to him. The European Union was about to
launch its neighbourhood policy for the South Caucasus states, but
these ideas could not yet be discussed at a concrete level. The Com-
mission’s delegation was managing EU assistance programmes, and
the European Union was Georgia’s major supporter. President She-
vardnadze, who like Gorbachev was greatly respected in the West,
had drifted deep into corruption in his power politics. This decreased
the conﬁdence of the West in him. He wanted more support from
the West in particular for his security policy, but this was not forth-
coming from the EU and the US attitude was cooling oﬀ too. The
president seemed tired and a kind of powerlessness could be sensed
in his statements. Although the West was still politically supporting
him, relations with Russia were developing in a bad direction. With
the Abkhazia question Shevardnadze had run into opposition with
Russia’s interests, and he accused Russians of militarily supporting
Abkhazia. Shevardnadze had been forced to conclude the so-called
Sochi agreement regarding Abkhazia, which at the time had saved
him from total military defeat.
Shevardnadze was stuck between a rock and a hard place. When I
met him for the last time as president, he told me that former US Sec-
retary of State James Baker had visited Tbilisi. Shevardnadze said
that he thought Baker had come as a friend, but that was not the case.
From other sources I found out that Americans were outraged at the
corruption of Shevardnadze’s regime. To my knowledge, Baker saw
Shevardnadze’s time as president as drawing to a close. In this situ-
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ation, Shevardnadze’s mood was a bit sarcastic and he played down
the EU’s ability to provide real assistance, by which he meant mili-
tary support. Shevardnadze fell when parliamentary elections that
were held in Georgia on November 2, 2003 were considered to have
been anything but free and fair. The opposition forces and mainly
Mikheil Saakashvili’s United National Movement party claimed to
have won the elections, only to lose them because of electoral fraud.
The next episode was shown by Georgian television to the whole
world. Surrounded by his security guards, Shevardnadze left the
parliament building by the back door, as the makers of the Rose rev-
olution rushed in to take over the parliament and gather the shreds
of power into their own hands. Shevardnadze resigned as president
on November 23, 2003. Saakashvili’s coup was bloodless, and it cer-
tainly attracted wide sympathy among the Georgians. Nonetheless,
a coup can never be fundamentally legal. It also lacks democratic
credentials, although it can be said that Saakashvili’s party was pop-
ular and no doubt would have attained a better election result, had
the elections been free and fair.
Georgia’s change of power had external connections as well. The
Great Game was underway regarding Georgia’s future. The United
States had rejected Shevardnadze, but not Georgia. Questions arose
as to the extent to which the Americans were supporting the regime
change. It is likely that the United States had already been shift-
ing towards Saakashvili, but had not gotten that far, when the coup
presented outsiders with a fait accompli. In the days of the coup,
Saakashvili was on the phone to the White House in Washington sev-
eral times a day. This contact was on the level of civil servants, and
no wider conclusions can be drawn. A peaceful transfer of power
was in the interests of the US. Western non-governmental organisa-
tions were active in Georgia, supporting and assisting Saakashvili
and his team. This in turn caused Russians to draw the conclusion
that Western intelligence agencies were present and operating. Rus-
sia also had a lot at stake. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov ar-
rived in Tbilisi after the unrest began. He, too, was too late in the
sense that regime change in Tbilisi took place while he was there,
and the Russians had no alternative but to accept the facts. The new
troika was there, and everyone else had to make the best of it. Ivanov
held discussions with the new rulers, and gave a speech in Georgian
language on the steps of the Parliament. This gesture was undoubt-
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edly intended to build bridges with the new administration and also
to aﬀect public opinion.
The change of power was largely supported by Georgians, the
United States seemed to accept it and even Russia appeared to bite
the bullet. What about the European Union? Within the EU there
had been dissatisfaction with Shevardnadze’s corruption, but on the
other hand, he had continued to enjoy ample recognition in the West.
I proceeded from the premise that the EU accepted what had taken
place as it had happened without bloodshed, and as the new lead-
ership was willing to organise democratic elections to legitimise its
power. The EU and Germany, in particular, were still concerned
about Shevardnadze’s security. In that sense the situation looked
good – the new troika did not seem to threaten Shevardnadze’s se-
curity. He was given a residence, as long as he remained outside
politics.
I met Saakashvili with my delegation at the oﬀicial dacha soon
after the coup. He was dressed rather casually, seemed tired, but
was positively bursting with energy. He was drinking coca-cola and
sitting on a chair which suddenly broke underneath him. Saakashvili
was not perturbed, just announced that even the furniture of the old
regime was in a state of disintegration, and took a new chair. He was
surrounded by a big group of armedmen and security indeed seemed
to be of primary importance in his life. His car had recently been at-
tacked, and therefore there was good reason for security measures.
Saakashvili seemed like a revolutionary, he was the soul of the troika,
and preparing to step into presidential shoes.
The troika had decided that Burjanadze would act as interim Pres-
ident until presidential elections were held. Nino Burjanadze was
well-groomed and dressed and did not improvise in oﬀicial events.
Burjanadze met with Vladimir Putin, Russian president at the time,
and apparently the meeting had gone well, although nothing sub-
stantial could not have been achieved during the Georgian interreg-
num. The diﬀicult task of Prime Minister was being ﬁtted onto Zurab
Zhvania’s shoulders. He was the troika member best suited to deal-
ing with daily operations. In addition, he was adept at establishing
close relationships with other people – including opponents. He was
a hard-core politician and lobbyist.
EU activity in the region was now justiﬁed, since the coup in Geor-
gia was transforming the region’s future. One idea was that the
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EUSR would be permanently based in Tbilisi. I did not ﬁnd this a
particularly good idea. It would have meant, among other things, an
emphasis on Georgia vis-à-vis Armenia and Azerbaijan. I continued
my assignment still based inHelsinki, butmy visits to the regionwere
almost continuous. The South Caucasus states usually expected me
to work as their spokesman vis-à-vis Brussels. While this was partly
true, I wanted everyone to understand that my primary task was to
represent the EU in the region and that therefore I was looking af-
ter the EU’s interests. If I happened to promote the interests of the
states in the region, then in my opinion those were in line with the
interests of the EU.
7.5 Georgia’s Presidential Elections 2004
To the credit of the new government it must be said that they started
a vigorous campaign to educate voters. Now there was freedom of
choice. In the event, Saakashvili still won more than 90% of the
vote, which was not a surprise. The same had happened when ﬁrst
Gamsakhurdia and then Shevardnadze were elected as president.
Both gained a rating of more than 90% in their ﬁrst election, but
then quickly lost popular support. The provinces and Tbilisi voted
quite traditionally, voting for the person who actually held the power.
The big question was how Saakashvili would manage to maintain his
popularity in Georgia’s complex political game.
Saakashvili became the third president of independent Georgia.
His inauguration was held in front of the Parliament building, and
very closely followed the protocol of the US presidential inaugura-
tion ceremonies. People cheered, and ﬂags were ﬂying. The ﬂag
adopted by Saakashvili’s party had a background dating from the
Middle Ages. It was colourful and appealing with its cross of St.
George. This ﬂag had already been suggested as the state ﬂag in
1991, but without success. I also spotted the EU ﬂag, and began to
ask the Georgian Chief of Protocol what was going on. It was well
known that Saakashvili aimed at Georgia’s EU and NATO member-
ship. Protocol told me not to worry, because this was the ﬂag of the
Council of Europe, which, incidentally, is similar to the EU ﬂag. After
receiving this explanation I was no longer perturbed. Solana visited
me once during my mission in Tbilisi and Saakashvili was going to
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host him a dinner. However, Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania showed
up as the host, informing us that Saakashvili was delayed. When
Saakashvili arrived, he informed Solana that his party’s ﬂag had just
been made the state ﬂag. According to Saakashvili, Georgia’s old
ﬂag was colourless, and not even created by Georgians: the colours
had been inﬂuenced by imperial Germany, which had been powerful
in the region at the time.
The new president launched an energetic campaign to have his
program adopted. Saakashvili had three main aims: to create a solid
foundation for the economy, get rid of the all- encompassing corrup-
tion, and to unite Georgia’s state territory. These guiding principles
were acceptable as such. They motivated Georgians to pursue a bet-
ter future. Foreign powers had no objections at that stage. On the
contrary, the ﬁght against corruption was applauded in general and
Georgia was promised support in those activities.
7.6 Plan to re-unite Georgia’s state terri-
tories
Restoring Georgia’s territorial integrity was one of Saakashvili’s
main objectives. It was a demanding task, requiring a lot of
determination but also diplomacy, patience and time. In addition, it
would not have hurt if Saakashvili had had a realistic assessment of
the relative strengths and weaknesses of the diﬀerent actors. This
calculation was undoubtedly complicated by the seemingly
black-and-white perception of the world as “unipolar.” The United
States was the only superpower able to pursue its global interests
also by military means. Diplomatic mediation was not in vogue, and
resorting to it as the only alternative was considered a sign of
weakness in the US. In addition to security policy, the US was able
to help Georgia ﬁnancially, train the Georgian army and supply it
with weapons.
Saakashvili was not the only one who relied on US support for
re-unifying Georgia’s territories. According to Saakashvili, the Eu-
ropean Union had no teeth. The EU was needed in strengthening
the economy and for lending political support. Saakashvili seemed
to overestimate the ‘realpolitik’ value of political support in the Great
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Game. Even the EU itself harboured illusions in this respect. There
was hot debate on what kind of great power the EU really was. The
idea was to coordinate a common foreign and security policy and to
expand at a blindingly rapid pace. From time to time, Saakashvili
treated the EU arrogantly, without the EU having the unity or even
the will to draw the line.
With Russia Saakashvili did not get along at all. It is diﬀicult to
say what were all the factors contributing to this. The legacy of the
Soviet Union was, in part, a heavy burden in Georgia, and people
wanted to get rid of the Russian troops still present in Georgia as
soon as possible. The attempts via the CIS to control the former
Soviet empire were rejected in Tbilisi. Moreover, Saakashvili calcu-
lated that when the chips were down, Russia would not react. He
considered Moscow’s threats a bluﬀ. Saakashvili was a revolution-
ary by nature, and did not shy away from tough opposition. Finally,
it should be noted that Saakashvili underestimated Russia’s politi-
cal and military power, and the will to use them when its interests
were at stake. Nevertheless, he was not the only politician or public
oﬀicial involved with the South Caucasus who made the wrong as-
sessment in this respect. Almost the entire West shared this dilemma
with regard to Russia.
The world was changing from unipolarity towards multi-polarity.
Several substitute players were needed on the playing ﬁeld, because
the old players often lacked the preconditions for making new esti-
mates and for a new kind of realism that was now needed. The game
was, however, still played with old cards in the middle of the ﬁrst
decade of the 21st Century. This was to have a decisive inﬂuence on
where we now are with regard to South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
7.7 Adjara
Saakashvili started the country’s territorial uniﬁcation from Adjara.
It was incorporated into Georgia as an autonomous region when
Lenin expanded Soviet Russia. This transfer from Turkish subor-
dination to that of Soviet Russia was regulated by the 1921 Treaty
of Kars. The treaty was signed by Lenin and Atatürk, among others,
and it was required to ensure the autonomous status of the mainly
Muslim Adjara. The population of the area was predominantly made
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up of Georgians who had converted to Islam during the Ottoman era.
Adjara had mostly been ruled by the strong Abashidze family since
the Middle Ages. When seeking support for himself, Shevardnadze
had corrupted regional leaders, and he had placed Aslan Abashidze
in power –once again one of the Adjara Abashidzes. Aslan Abashidze
had abused his position, ruling Adjara like an autocrat. He was deaf
to calls from the new government in Tbilisi, refusing for example to
pay revenues from the port of Batumi to the State Treasury, which
had originally been agreed between him and the central government.
At this point is perhaps worth pointing out that Adjara is just
one example of Georgia’s ethnic diversity. Georgia is like a minia-
ture version of the Caucasus. Diﬀerent nationalities, languages, re-
ligions and cultures live side by side in a small area. Respecting
ethnic minority rights is a huge challenge for the unity of the coun-
try and one of the pivotal questions in the creation of a new Geor-
gia. Besides Ossetians, Abkhazians and Adzarians, also Georgia’s
Meshketian Turks, Armenians and Azeris are waiting for their rights.
Saakashvili wanted a strong and united Georgia under the leadership
of a powerful President. The only comment that needs to be made is
that forcing national minorities into a certain political system always
causes the emergence of some degree of resistance. It may be a la-
tent or active, but in crisis situations it may trigger a conﬂict with
dangerous repercussions for the integrity of the state.
In the beginning, Saakashvili calculated his power and the in-
terests of external actors correctly. He wanted to oust Abashidze
from Adjara and to channel the revenues from the port of Batumi to
the central government. He also had active and talented support-
ers in Adjara. These were spearheaded by Zurab Nogaideli, who
became a powerful and skilful minister of ﬁnance. He later became
prime minister, after Zhvania’s death, although in that role he left a
somewhat weak impression. At that point in time, the Russian am-
bassador stated in a discussion that Adjara was part of Georgia. It
seemed that Russia, the United States and the EU all agreed with
Saakashvili that Adjara was part of Georgia and that it was best to
get rid of Abashidze and his regime. While Saakashvili was concen-
trating around Adjara his military resources – which were still rather
weak – the tense situation calmed down when Russia’s Foreign Min-
ister Igor Ivanov persuaded Abashidze to go with him to Moscow,
thus resolving the Adjara question. Yuri Lushkov, mayor of Moscow
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at the time, arrived in Georgia to discuss the major investments that
the City of Moscow had in Adjara, but Saakashvili did not warm up
to compensating them.
I asked the Russian and Turkish representatives whether they
considered the Kars treaty still to be valid. Both regarded the treaty
still binding for Georgia, but at the same time they stated that they
would not actively demand compliance with the agreement. When
I talked to Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania for the ﬁrst time about
the Kars treaty, he did not know of the existence of such an agree-
ment. After the change of power in Georgia, information tradition-
ally transmitted by civil servants was lost, and everything had to be
started anew. The Turkish ambassador said that she was making a
list of eﬀective agreements that Turkey had with Georgia. It was
clear to me that as the EU Special Representative I should, however,
draw the attention of the new government to the fact that the sit-
uation in Adjara should be resolved as far as possible according to
the existing agreements and in consultation with the region’s pop-
ulation. I estimated that what now would be done in Adjara would
be of the highest signiﬁcance when Saakashvili’s activities were di-
rected towards South Ossetia and Abkhazia. We agreed with the
new leadership that the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe
would give recommendations to Georgia about what to include in
Adjara’s traditional status. Formally, Georgia’s view was that Adjara
had autonomy, but this autonomy had no content in practice. I asked
Saakashvili whether some of the Venice Commission’s recommenda-
tions could be taken into account for Adjara, but the response I got
was negative. Thus the unity of the State prevailed at the expense
of the content of Adjaran autonomy.
7.8 South Ossetia
A Joint Control Commission had been established for the manage-
ment of the conﬂict in South Ossetia. Its primary task was, of course,
to monitor the implementation of the cease-ﬁre, but to some extent
also to encourage eﬀorts at conﬂict resolution. The parties rep-
resented on the Commission were Georgia, Russia, South Ossetia,
North Ossetia and the OSCE. The EU Commission had observer sta-
tus. The OSCE Representative on the Commission was Roy Reeve,
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with whom I had good cooperation. Reeve was an experienced diplo-
mat and very fair towards the parties of the conﬂict. Russia, how-
ever, was not satisﬁed with his work, claiming that OSCE monitoring
of the South Ossetian cease-ﬁre was biased in favour of Georgia. In
time, Reeve ran into problems with Saakashvili as well. Reeve did
not see any point in ending the work of the Control Commission, and
said so to Saakashvili. In crisis situations, the credibility of the heads
of OSCE missions is often at stake in the eyes of other actors, con-
suming their diplomatic capital at a fast pace. This was happening
to Roy Reeve, too.
My policy was to relatively often visit Tskhinvali, South Ossetia’s
capital city. This gave South Ossetians access to one more communi-
cation channel with the outside world. Georgia also supported these
visits. This became clear once when I was about to cancel a visit to
Tskhinvali because I was not satisﬁed with the program organised
for me by the Ossetians. I had told the Georgian foreign minister
that I was cancelling my trip. The minister led me to understand
that they would appreciate if I could make the trip. I was often re-
ceived in Tskhinvali by the leader of South Ossetia Eduard Kokoity.
In the West, Kokoity is generally considered “Moscow’s man.” I
would be surprised if it were otherwise, as the status of South Ossetia
is fully reliant on Russia’s support. I held formal talks in Tskhinvali
with South Ossetia’s representative on the Joint Control Commission
Chochev and “foreign minister” Dzhioev.
The West had given priority to supporting Georgia in order to
balance Russian inﬂuence. This had left South Ossetia mostly at a
disadvantage. In Tskhinvali it was largely calculated that the West
was supporting the return of Georgian administrative control to the
whole of South Ossetia. Georgians and Ossetians had a lot of con-
nections, so their dispute was not seen on the society level. Oﬀicial
South Ossetia was afraid of Georgia attacking its territory and merg-
ing it under Georgian administration. Such attempts had taken place
earlier, so the fear was not misplaced. President Mikheil Saakashvili
made some suggestions about granting South Ossetia autonomous
status. It must be said, though, that the credibility of these propos-
als was extremely weak. First of all, Adjara was an example of what
autonomy meant for Georgia. Secondly, when Saakashvili presented
his proposals, he was simultaneously referring to the members of
the Tskhinvali administration as a bunch of criminals, which could
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not have increased the readiness in Tskhinvali to negotiate with him.
Zurab Zhvania had direct links with Ossetians, but after his death,
none of Georgia’s prime ministers were able to establish relations
with Tskhinvali. Georgia establised a kind of integration minister’s
post. Again, Ossetians found this title inappropriate, and although
it was modiﬁed in due course, it was too late. In my own work, of
course, I tried to bring about direct contacts between Tbilisi and
Tskhinvali, but negative factors tipped the scales.
In the spring of 2004, it was generally believed in the West that
Georgia could get back most of the control over South Ossetia, if
it could agree with the Ossetians about credible autonomy. As for
Abkhazia, nothing but a federal arrangement could have been con-
sidered. At the same time, the Russian interests in South Ossetia
and Abkhazia needed to somehow be taken into account. The situ-
ation did not look good on paper, let alone in practice. There was
no prior indication that Georgians would be able or willing to live
in a framework of autonomy. The same applies to federal solutions.
Saakashvili’s initiatives failed to meet any positive response from the
breakaway regions and no negotiations were launched.
During a visit to Moscow right after Saakashvili’s ﬁrst proposal
on autonomy, I said that the EU now wanted to give Saakashvili an
opportunity, and I hoped Russia could do the same. Moscow’s re-
action was not negative, but guarded. In spring 2004, Saakashvili
was not fully trusted in Moscow, but neither was there any categor-
ical refusal to listen to him. After the successful conclusion of the
Adjaran conﬂict, Saakashvili thought that the situation should be ex-
ploited in South Ossetia as well. With Adjara, he had put pressure
on all outside actors by amassing soldiers to the border region. This
probably had some inﬂuence on the policies of Russia, the US and
the EU. At least the West hoped for a solution without bloodshed.
Saakashvili ﬁgured that, correspondingly, exerting pressure would
work in the case of South Ossetia. What was becoming clear was
that Saakashvili was attempting to reunite Georgia’s state territo-
ries during his ﬁrst term as president. His credibility in the eyes of
the people would otherwise be endangered.
Saakashvili wanted to increase the pressure on Russia, the US
and the EU to compel them to start seriously solving the South Os-
setia problem. At this stage it must have become clear to him that
Russian and US positions had to be taken into account to some ex-
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tent. The Russian side made clear that South Ossetia was not Ad-
jara and the solution to the South Ossetian question could not follow
that example. The United States also warned Saakashvili that if he
used military power in South Ossetia, he would face Russia, and the
US would not participate in any way in this kind of military conﬂict.
Based on this information Saakashvili saw best to continue political
pressure but refrain from mobilising military force at the South Os-
setian border.
Georgian, Russian, South Ossetian and North Ossetian
peacekeepers were present in South Ossetia. Rules existed about
how many could be stationed there and how often they could be
replaced. These peacekeepers worked under Russian leadership.
This became a crucial factor in the unstable situation up to 2008.
Georgia doubted the sincerity of the other party and relocated its
peacekeepers quite often, and during these exchanges their
numbers on South Ossetian soil could double. In 2005 at the latest
began a development, whereby both sides increased the proportion
of combat troops as opposed to peacekeepers during these
exchanges. This development then culminated in 2008, when
peacekeeping was carried out by purely military organisations on
both sides.
7.9 Abkhazia
The United Nations had a mandate in Abkhazia. The UN oﬀice in
Tbilisi was led by an energetic Swiss diplomat, Heidi Tagliavini, who
sought to organise relief projects in the region and made regular vis-
its with a view to promote the return of refugees to Abkhazia. The
Abkhazia issue was also being tackled by a group of countries that
called themselves the “UN Secretary-General’s friends.” The United
Kingdom, France, Germany, the United States and Russia, among
others, were involved, Germany acting as chairman of the Group.
The EU countries in the group did not particularly encourage me to
take steps to address the situation in Abkhazia. It seems there was
a fear that the EUSR would take over something essential that the
“friends” were doing. I did not consider myself a threat to them, I
supported all activities which aimed at creating more contacts for
Abkhazians with the outside world. The fact that the United Nations
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was already taking care of these issues quite vigorously hadmore im-
pact on me. I began to support Heidi Tagliavini’s work by promoting
the EU Commission Delegation’s activities in reconstructing human-
itarian contacts during the cease-ﬁre. The Commission in Brussels
was also interested in these projects, which included concrete mea-
sures and direct aid beneﬁting the local population. As chairman,
Germany supported my work, and then in the spring of 2008 Ger-
many took the initiative. However, at that point things were already
at the stage that compromise proposals were no longer supported by
any party to the conﬂict.
It is often said that South Ossetian leadership was more Moscow-
oriented than Abkhaz leadership. This is true in some respects, but
Abkhazians did not have much room for manoeuvre in relations with
Russia either. When Abkhazia held presidential elections in October
2004, much to everyone’s surprise, the candidate backed by Russia
did not win. The winner, Sergei Bagapsh, discovered very quickly
how dependent he was on Russia. Neither Abkhazia nor South Osse-
tia could rely on the support of the West. The West sided in the ﬁrst
place with Georgia, and value of Abkhazians in the eyes of the West
was of secondary importance. This is also why Russia was the Abk-
hazians’ only hope, if they did not want to return to Georgian control.
For Abkhazia, a federal arrangement could have been considered, if
it had taken into account Russia’s interests. Georgia, however, was
no model country in terms of implementing federalism and was not
particularly willing or able to take into account Russia’s interests in
the Caucasus region –that is, not only in Georgia. Georgia’s sincerity
was not trusted in Abkhazia, any more than in South Ossetia. There
was one younger politician in Georgia who was able to get along
with the Abkhazians. This was Irakli Alasania, with whom Abkhazia
agreed to discuss a federal model. Saakashvili, however, sent Alasa-
nia to New York as Georgia’s Ambassador to the UN, ending this little
glimmer of hope. In all likelihood Alasania acted too independently,
and Saakashvili did not want competitors.
I made one trip with Heidi Tagliavini to Abkhazia. The purpose
was to demonstrate the EU’s interest in conﬂict resolution and at
the same time to support projects initiated by the Commission in
Abkhazia. These included road improvement and bridge construc-
tion, vital for rebuilding connections destroyed by the war.
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7.10 Border monitoring
The OSCE had been monitoring Georgia’s borders. During my mis-
sion, Russia announced that it would no longer support prolonging
the OSCE’s mandate in this question. The reason Russia gave was
that the OSCE’s monitoring was not fair and impartial. As a result,
the OSCE stopped supervising the borders. Within the EU opinions
diﬀered. Some thought that the EU should take over the monitor-
ing. The majority of member states, however, found no reason for
the EU to take on functions which might lead to direct conﬂict with
Russia. A compromise was found, and a “Border Support Team”
established. Its mission was not monitoring, but primarily assist-
ing Georgia in creating proper border troops, who would be able to
supervise the borders. Russia’s stance regarding this arrangement
was wait-and-see, but there was no negative reaction from Moscow
either. The United Kingdom and the Baltic States were still push-
ing for an arrangement in which voluntary EU countries would have
taken responsibility for Georgia’s border control. The weakness in
this model was that while the EU countries involved would be vol-
unteering, their presence at the borders would have meant that the
EU as a whole would be held responsible. As the Border Support
Team was set up under the umbrella of the EUSR, it was my task to
present the setting up of this limited model of support to the Geor-
gians. Georgia agreed to the EU’s proposed model.
The border team was led by the second member of my group, the
Danish William Boe. He was undoubtedly well-suited for the job, and
Solana and his staﬀ probably calculated that this way the operation
would be kept more in their hands. This worked also in my favour, as
we consulted with each other closely on issues relating to the team.
The team did not get its own budget, because France in particular
was sceptical about the operation. The budget was combined with
the budget of the Special Representative. All this resulted in my
working group losing a large part of the labour input of William Boe,
who had been of great importance vis-à-vis Brussels. In addition, cre-
ating the border troops required quite a lot of improvisation and a
careful monitoring of the budget which at times was impossible to do
from Helsinki. Nevertheless, the border team’s work turned out to
be successful. The EU realised that Georgia really needed training
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and organisational assistance to establish eﬀective border troops.
What’s more, it was essential that this need was also recognised by
the Georgian side, and that Georgia was ready to provide resources
for this activity. It is also worth mentioning that the Finnish Border
Guard was actively involved in this project. The value of the educa-
tional assistance that it provided was acknowledged by everyone.
7.11 European Neighbourhood Policy
EU policy goals –real or imagined –in the South Caucasus, and the
hopes South Caucasus countries harboured regarding the EU, natu-
rally had a major impact on the situation in the South Caucasus. The
same was true, of course, for NATO’s presence in the region. Russia
was not indiﬀerent to what EU and NATO were aiming for in the re-
gion. With its new member states from Central and Eastern Europe,
the EU’s neighbourhood had been transformed. The EU was going
through an intense period. There was a belief in European unity and
shared values, and that the new members would be integrated into
European structures –including ﬁnancial ones. Although the enthu-
siasm for enlargement was beginning to show signs of waning, and
the diﬀicult question of Turkish membership had emerged, an active
policy towards the new neighbourhood was being promoted. Euro-
pean security is aﬀected by the stability or instability of its neigh-
bourhood, so joint programs were sought to strengthen ties with the
Mediterranean and Black Sea regions and Russia’s neighbourhood.
Less attention was paid to what kind of reactions the EU’s activities
might cause in other countries. Enlargement thus resulted in the
development of a new European Neighbourhood Policy. Russia al-
ready had its so-called “near abroad”-policy pertaining to partially
the same area, so some kind of competition was about to begin.
The European Neighbourhood Policy became an integral part of
my work in developing relations between the EU and South Caucasus
countries. I worked in close cooperation with the EU Commission.
When Georgia and Armenia in particular, and Azerbaijan also – albeit
with major reservations – expressed their wish to join the EU, the
EU had to deﬁne its position regarding these aspirations. Saying
that the neighbourhood policy did not include EU membership, but
neither did it rule it out, became the agreed policy. This was thus
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a compromise that did not actually say anything. Everyone could
interpret it in a suitable or convenient way. Brussels, in any case,
believed that such a formulation would motivate the South Caucasus
states to reform their social structures according to the European
model. Now, a few years along the line, there might be less optimism
but more readiness to respect the values and traditions of the region.
During the Irish EU Presidency in 2004, I participated in
Saakashvili’s ﬁrst inauguration in Tbilisi, when Russian Foreign
Minister Igor Ivanov said to his Irish colleague that Russia was the
South Caucasus countries’ neighbour more than the EU. This
certainly reﬂected competition, but it was even more than that.
When I pointed out to the Russians that the South Caucasian states
were not candidates for EU membership and were not going to
become such for a long time, they replied “that’s what you said
regarding the Baltic countries too, and shortly thereafter they were
members in both NATO and the EU.”
If we think of the South Caucasus as a whole, the EU was attrac-
tive in comparison with Russia and the United States. The EU was
not a military power, but it was generally thought to bring about
stability and economic prosperity. From the EU’s point of view it
was essential that all actors be satisﬁed with having leverage in the
region and refrain from seeking all-out dominance and control. Nev-
ertheless, the EU itself had a problem in this regard. It was, namely,
membership. EU membership excludes much of the inﬂuence of
other countries in a given EU member state. This, of course, is the
grounds for how Russians see the EU’s objectives in the Caucasus
region.
7.12 The South Caucasus and NATO
The break-up of the Soviet Union created a security policy vacuum
in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, the South Caucasus and Central
Asia, which began to ﬁll up, like a law of nature. The European Union
and the Western military alliance NATO were ﬁlling this vacuum and
there was a need for their security policy services. Filling up a vac-
uum creates short-term security, but in the long term the outcome
depends on the kind of counter-forces it awakens.
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Russia had watched all this from the side while Yeltsin was pres-
ident and during Putin’s ﬁrst term. During Yeltsin, this was due to
weakness and the fact that the Russians themselves wanted more
partnership with the West. There were two main reasons for this.
Firstly, Russia needed to discard security policy obligations for which
it did not have the economic prerequisites. The second reason was
that Russia had absolutely no means to resist the expansion of the
West. During Putin’s ﬁrst term, the will to cooperate with the West
remained, but no longer at all costs. All the same, Russia was not
yet a real counterforce to Western enlargement policy, so the train
rolled on towards the east without any obstacles.
Putin’s second term was already diﬀerent. His “enough is
enough” speech in Munich in 2007 shocked the West. What was
Russia aiming at? Did it seek great power status, a position that
many Western observers felt it had lost? Closer to the truth were
those who argued that Russia had achieved such wealth with its
growing oil and gas assets, that it now had greater room for
manoeuvre in security policy. Thus Russia re-entered international
power politics, which in the period 1993-2004 had almost
exclusively been Western privilege. In addition, Russia called for
equal treatment as the price for cooperation with the West.
Although Russia did not match the West in strength, it wanted to be
treated as an equal. Putin’s signals were yet to be taken seriously
in the West. Russia was still weak and so were its armed forces in
comparison with the West. Forms of cooperation with the European
Union became more strained. Renewal of the Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement has been blocked because of the Russian
view that the EU treats Russia mainly as an object, whereas it
wants to be an equal partner in the co-operation.
NATO and Russia began a certain degree of cooperation in the
framework of the NATO-Russia Council. This Council has not exam-
ined any fundamental issues of NATO’s own activities, but it has been
a good forum for both parties to monitor the other’s actions and to
relate them to their own objectives. NATO expansion to Russia’s bor-
ders was seen in Russia as a threat. This open statement began to
be heard from top Russian leadership. NATO’s intentions in Ukraine
and the South Caucasus also posed sensitive questions. NATO’s ex-
pansion to these areas would bring the Western military alliance to
Russia’s doorstep in its most unstable regions. The South Caucasus
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countries had already been cooperating with NATO for a long time,
and the intention was to develop their partnership with the alliance.
This collaboration took place with Georgia and Azerbaijan as well as
Armenia, which is, however, more dependent on Russia than its two
neighbours.
During my EU mission, I had a good colleague as the NATO Spe-
cial Representative for the South Caucasus, Robert F. Simmons. I
had meetings with him in the region, and a few times in Brussels
also. He was a man with both feet on the ground, and he promoted
NATO’s eﬀorts in the South Caucasus with a high dose of realism.
He had the same problem as I did: How to give the countries in the
region hope for cooperation without promising too much, especially
vis-à-vis membership.
After Saakashvili became president, Georgia had clearly stated
that its goal was both EU and NATO membership. For the time be-
ing, Azerbaijan was happy to cooperate with both and kept its ulti-
mate objective under wraps. This was also because it did not want
the role of a beggar – after all, it was a country with substantial oil
and gas revenues. In addition, Azerbaijan had considerably more
leeway than Georgia and Armenia in relation to the players of the
Great Game. Armenia’s situation was the most diﬀicult. It was ﬁght-
ing tooth and nail not to become internationally isolated due to the
Nagorno Karabakh conﬂict. Therefore, Armenia has been involved
in NATO co-operation while simultaneously trying to juggle this with
Russia’s interests.
7.13 The South Caucasus, Central Asia
and Islam
The clash of civilizations has been a topic of much discussion around
theworld in recent decades. Civilizations are not only in competition,
they may also be hostile to each other. Even a bitter war between
civilizations has been seen in the cards. In a way all of this is true al-
ready in this day and age. The battle for energy is intense, reﬂecting
negatively on state sovereignty and self-determination. Once the oil-
producing countries joined together, OPEC achieved a global market
price for oil, reducing dependence on the decisions and politics of the
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major consumers. The next stage is still in progress. Radical Islam
wants the producing countries to control their energy resources also
in the sense of not having foreign troops in their territories to secure
energy access for the great powers. The whole Middle East policy
revolves around this question. Radical Islam has also been inter-
ested in the energy resources of the Caspian Sea and, more broadly,
in the energy produced by Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turk-
menistan. It wants these resources under Islamic control.
In its struggle against the dominance of the West, radical Islam
has even resorted to terror. Terrorist attacks directed at airplanes,
metros and trains have demonstrated the vulnerability of Western so-
cieties. The most powerful attack with its far-reaching consequences
was made on September 11, 2001 against the World Trade Center’s
twin towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, throwing
Americans oﬀ balance. Attacking such targets, whose vulnerability
had not been doubted, was possible with highjacked planes. Western
societies have been forced to compromise on a number of freedoms
and rights, which earlier were taken for granted, in their attempt to
protect themselves from terrorism. The war against terrorism is very
much a war between civilizations. In the South Caucasus and Cen-
tral Asia, all but Georgia and Armenia are Muslim countries. These
Muslim states are afraid of radical Islam, and maintain an ongoing
internal struggle in order to prevent radical Islam from getting an
upper hand.
Russia’s North Caucasus has been in a state of chaos through-
out the post-Soviet period. Chechens have had their own quest for
independence leading to two wars, in which the Chechens resorted
to guerrilla war against an organised but poorly disciplined Russian
army. Chechens have also resorted to terror, not only in the North
Caucasus but in Russia more widely – even in Moscow. Chechens
have received support from radical Islamists, whose aim has been
to break the Russian oil and gas monopoly in the North Caucasus,
South Caucasus and Central Asia. This development coincided with
the spread of theWest to the territory of the formerWarsaw Pact and,
in part, of the former Soviet Union also. To add insult to injury, this
was in turn followed by the Rose and Orange revolutions in Georgia
and Ukraine. Russia strongly perceived these events as operations
to isolate the Russian Federation and even as attempts to break up
the country. At the same time, regional organisations were created
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with the articulated goal of reducing Russia’s inﬂuence in the Black
Sea and Caspian Sea. These development prospects can be seen in
literature published in Russia that deals with the Caucasus and Cen-
tral Asia. The Georgian war in 2008 is not seen in them as an isolated
issue, but as part of a war, which has been going on in the Caucasus
throughout the 2000s.
The United States and Russia have also had a lot of common inter-
ests regarding the ﬁght against radical Islam and terrorism. NATO,
through its Secretary-General Robertson, declared war on those re-
sponsible for the terrorist attacks in the US. The only problem was
that NATO did not really know who the enemy was. The Americans
discovered their own enemy rather quickly, ending up with al Qaeda,
an Islamic terrorist organisation led by Osama bin Laden. It operates
out of Afghanistan, and thus the Russians had a lot of information
about its practices and the bases located there. It was in Russia’s
own interest to assist the Americans when the US was preparing its
attack on al Qaeda and the Taliban. Initially, Russia also had no ob-
jection to the US establishing a few bases in Central Asia for the war
in Afghanistan. Later, the Russian position changed regarding this
issue, and US bases in Central Asia began to be seen as part of the
policy to isolate Russia.
7.14 The Revolution eats its children
During a visit to Tbilisi, the EU High Representative Javier Solana
said to Saakashvili that the European Union supports evolution, sta-
ble development. I took heed of this message, and used it, especially
in Armenia and Azerbaijan. In Tbilisi, I congratulated Georgia on the
ﬁrst anniversary of the revolution, and many people saw a paradox
in this. In fact, my view was that I represented the EU in Georgia,
and naturally congratulated the country on the day of the revolu-
tion. I added that after revolution, what was needed was evolution.
Even if Georgia had taken many steps forward under Saakashvili,
politics was monopolised by the troika. The opposition did not have
any foothold, and during my mission I never met opposition leaders
for the simple reason that they did not exist.
At the time, I considered Mikheil Saakashvili to be a genuine
revolutionary leader. Authoritarian and action-oriented, but
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impatient with a short attention-span when it came to planning
long-lasting change in Georgian society. Plans came and went
without decisions being followed by solid implementation and
monitoring activities that often require several years.. The same
applied to the government. Ministers had no autonomy in reality,
all the power remaining in the President’s hands. The Constitution
was amended so that Saakashvili ended up with more power than
Shevardnadze. Ronald Asmus, who wrote an American version of
the 2008 war in Georgia (A Little War That Shook the World,
Palgrave Macmillan 2010), described Saakashvili as a person with
big ambitions for the Caucasus, Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions
to develop into Western democratic communities in the future.
According to Asmus, one of Saakashvili’s idols has been Marshal
Mannerheim, who defended Finnish independence in the Winter
War against the Soviet Union.
The only person who had any independent room for action was
Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania. As Prime Minister, he also supported
the third member of the troika, Nino Burjanadze. Burjanadze was an
important ﬁgure but increasingly sidelined in her position as Speaker
of Parliament, because she was not in government. Zurab Zhvania
died under very suspicious circumstances on February 3, 2005 of
carbon monoxide poisoning. Rumour has it that it was murder, but
these rumours have never been conﬁrmed and the issue remains un-
clear. In any case, Zhvania’s death was fateful for Georgia’s future
and for Saakashvili. The only person who had been able to inﬂuence
Saakashvili and create at least a degree of continuity in Georgian
politics now departed from the scene.
Saakashvili did have success in the international arena. The
United States was his strong supporter, and President George W.
Bush visited Tbilisi. In public appearances, Bush praised
Saakashvili to the heavens, but in conﬁdential discussions warned
him about measures that might lead to armed conﬂicts in the
region, meaning South Ossetia and Abkhazia in particular.
Saakashvili had a lot of support at the top level in Great Britain.
The same applies to Sweden, Poland and the Baltic States. In
addition, he was highly appreciated in Ukraine, where he had
assisted Yushchenko in the Orange revolution. Saakashvili initially
charmed everyone by speaking spontaneously, without papers. This
was revolutionary also in the sense that when his speeches
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stretched endlessly, he began to repeat himself, and the audience
was left wondering what ultimately was the message. Within the
European Union, Germany and France were a little more reserved
towards Saakashvili. The EU was clearly a disappointment for
Saakashvili. The EU was his big supporter, alongside the US, but in
his eyes did not give Georgia enough political support. Saakashvili
criticized the EU in very harsh terms, and began to gradually
isolate himself from EU actors in Tbilisi. As I had kept a certain
distance from Saakashvili and had also attempted to inﬂuence his
decisions –in particular, ones concerning the presidential powers in
the new Constitution and Adjaran autonomy –I was not surprised
when Saakashvili did not receive me nor the head of the
Commission’s Delegation for a long time.
During my round in the South Caucasus that autumn, I asked for
a meeting with each of the presidents. The others received me, but
Saakashvili was unavailable. I decided to leave Tbilisi outside the
travel program altogether. I described the situation to the Political
and Security Committee in Brussels without it even causing any dis-
cussion. Saakashvili’s harsh criticism of the EU and his dismissive
attitude towards EU representatives in Tbilisi came to light. In his
book, Ronald D. Asmus took the view that Saakashvili got along bet-
ter with Americans than Europeans. There could be several reasons
for this, but it was only logical that Saakashvili was an important
piece for the United States in the Great Game. The US trained him an
army and fully endorsed Georgia’s integration into European struc-
tures, whereas Europe was much more reserved in these matters.
At that time, the US ambassador in Tbilisi was Richard Miles, who
was a Russia expert. Miles kept a certain distance from Saakashvili
and was very careful about what commitments the Americans would
make with him. When Miles left Tbilisi, it was a completely normal
transfer but Saakashvili was pleased about it. In retrospect, how-
ever, Miles’s departure from Tbilisi may have been fateful from the
American point of view.
I endedmymission as the EUSpecial Representative for the South
Caucasus at the end of February 2006. The mission had been inter-
esting albeit strenuous. As the Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan
Oskanian said, I had initiated practical policies of the EUSR in the
South Caucasus countries. This is how I experienced it myself. I had
tried to avoid excesses that sometime in the future could result in a
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setback for the relations between the EU and these countries. The
time had also come for the EUSR to be seated in Brussels, where
an oﬀice was set up, and support groups were created in the capi-
tal cities of the region. We had been only three people and, looking
back, I can say that we were deﬁnitely not under-achieving. I greatly
enjoyed my assignment with the EU and the South Caucasus. It was
a wonderful opportunity to see and experience EU action from the
inside. Similarly, I felt it was an interesting challenge to try to out-
line the EU’s role in the South Caucasus: what it was according to
the union’s own interests, and what it could be in relation to the in-
terests of the other big players. And, of course, what to do in order
for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to be conﬁdent that we wanted
to assist the development of their societies, without trying to dictate
solutions which were ultimately within the countries’ own decision-
making power. I also wanted to act explicitly as the EU Special Rep-
resentative for the region and thus did not join any attempts of the
Caucasus countries to mislead the EU into obscure policy objectives
or concrete actions. In a nutshell, I tried to deﬁne a role for the EU
in the “Great Game”.
7.15 Year 2008: Finland as OSCE Chair-
man and the War in Georgia
Recent Western political literature regarding the South Caucasus
and Central Asia takes the Great Game very well into account. One of
the key books in this ﬁeld is Lutz Kleveman’s The New Great Game.
Blood andOil in Central Asia. The bookwas published in 2003, but its
prophecies range to the 2008 war in Georgia and beyond. Kleveman
demonstrated the links of the Great Game with the war in Chech-
nya. When the West began to plan an oil pipeline by-passing Rus-
sia, it became crucial for Russia to maintain the pipeline from Baku
via Chechnya to Novorossiysk. In addition, the pipeline from Kaza-
khstan’s Tengiz oil ﬁeld runs very close to the Chechen border on
its way to Novorossiysk. Kleveman also analyses US policy. Even
before the war in Iraq, Russia, Iran and China considered the war
against terrorism as a way for the Bush administration to seal its
Cold War victory over Russia, to constrain the growth of China’s
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inﬂuence, and to tighten its grip on Iran. Kleveman also referred
to Lord John Browne from British Petroleum warning Blair’s gov-
ernment that British oil companies would lose markets to American
competitors, if London did not become involved in the war in Iraq.
Kleveman’s rather bold assessment of the Caspian Sea oil boom is
that it has been more a curse than a bringer of better living condi-
tions for the people of the region. By this he means that great power
competition in the region might not reduce tensions or the possibility
of war. The facts do support his assessment.
In the autumn of 2006, Finland held the presidency of the Euro-
pean Union, and was very active vis-à-vis the South Caucasus. The
leaders from the region visited Finland and President Tarja Halo-
nen visited the South Caucasus. Similarly, the Finnish Roving Am-
bassador Terhi Hakala played a signiﬁcant role in getting an action
programme identifying areas of cooperation and guidelines signed
between the EU and all three South Caucasian states. I was not
involved in the Finnish EU Presidency in any way. Instead, I was
approached in 2007 by both Minister Ilkka Kanerva’s team and the
foreignministry’s permanent staﬀ. The question was whether I could
be available for an OSCE crisis management assignment during the
year 2008, when Finland would hold the OSCE presidency. I replied
with positive interest, because the task would be based in Helsinki,
and would last only one year. I knew Ilkka Kanerva from the years
I spent at the Foreign Ministry and knew that I got along with him,
especially as the task would be quite limited: election monitoring,
and the crises in the South Caucasus and Transnistria.
The Finnish team for the OSCE Chairmanship was built meticu-
lously. Aleksi Härkönen was the team manager. He had political
savvy in addition to civil service experience. In Finland, Härkönen
was assisted by Janne Taalas, who excelled in drafting, and Päivi Pel-
tokoski, adept at keeping things together. In Vienna, Antti Turunen
headed the Permanent Mission of Finland to the OSCE, with Vesa
Vasara and Mikko Kivikoski as his closest assistants, all competent,
measured and energetic civil servants. Terhi Hakala had moved to
lead the OSCE ﬁeld mission in Georgia. She was once again in the
key role when it came to acquiring information and interacting with
the OSCE’s headquarters in Vienna. Harri Kämäräinen, with whom
I had worked during my EU mission, was now Head of the Cauca-
sus unit at the OSCE Secretariat. Kämäräinen made sure that any
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Vienna intrigues did not harm us. Jori Arvonen and Mikko Hautala,
Ilkka Kanerva’s closest men in the cabinet, also had a signiﬁcant
role. I learned to trust them as people who kept their word and co-
ordinated skilfully.
Election issues fell into Finland’s lap as soon as early 2008.
ODIHR, the election monitoring unit of the OSCE, wanted
comprehensive coverage in Russia’s presidential elections. The
Russian side restricted the number of observers it would accept.
ODIHR considered that proper monitoring would not be possible
with such a small number of observers. Finland tried to mediate,
and the views of the two sides did move slightly closer to one
another, but time ran out and the ODIHR stated that it would not
send observers in those circumstances. This reﬂected, on a small
scale, the way the Finnish OSCE Chairmanship would go. Russia
wanted equality with the West and therefore rejected any Western
control of Russian society through election monitoring.
7.16 Saakashvili’s popularity wanes
In October 2007, President Saakashvili experienced the greatest dif-
ﬁculties of his ﬁrst term in oﬀice. His impulsive way of appointing
and dismissing ministers and other high-ranking oﬀicials began to
leave behind a trail of bitterness. This was not reﬂected in support
for any other politician, but as opposition to Saakashvili himself. In
fact, this is rather typical for Georgia. The same thing happened
to Gamsakhurdia and Shevardnadze. When Saakashvili dismissed
a long-term friend, Defence Minister Irakli Okruashvili, he created
an implacable enemy. Okruashvili took advantage of critical opin-
ions regarding the president, and particularly the media guru Badri
Patarkatsvili began to play an important role. On November 7, the
movement in front of the Parliament building reached such propor-
tions that Saakashvili must have been reminded of the “Rose revo-
lution” supporters’ march to the Parliament four years earlier. The
President ordered security forces to disperse the demonstrators, and
brutal force was used towards them. Georgia declared a state of
emergency, which lasted between November 7-16. After four years
in power, Saakashvili faced a situation in which he could no longer
rule with the spontaneous support of the people. Georgia’s popular
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revolution had run its course, and Saakashvili had turned into a pres-
ident whose most important political goal was to remain in power.
US protest was conveyed through the American diplomat
Matthew Bryza. He had been a close associate of Condoleezza Rice
on South Caucasian and Central Asian issues when Rice was at the
White House as National Security Advisor. When Rice became
Secretary of State, Bryza followed her to the State Department.
Bryza was a co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group and had good
relations with the region’s leaders. Bryza also enjoyed Saakashvili’s
conﬁdence. Bryza arrived in Tbilisi and brought Saakshvili a clear
message that Washington did not approve of his police assaulting
the demonstrators. The United States believed that the situation
needed to be rectiﬁed. It seems to me that initially Saakashvili did
not realise what a severe crisis he was heading into in his
relationship with the US. Saakashvili defended his measures
sharply. The support for Georgia in the US Congress began to wane
now, as Congress questioned Saakashvili’s actions. At some point,
this terrible situation seems to have etched into Saakashvili’s
consciousness. The President did not delay in making crucial
decisions. Whatever view one may take of Saakashvili, he is a
politician and a manipulator down to his ﬁngertips, and when he
takes action, he often leaves both opponents and supporters
bewildered. This time around also, the decision was swift and in
the right ball park. Presidential elections were brought forward to
be held on January 5, 2008. Parliamentary elections were
scheduled for spring 2008. The election law was corrected along
the lines called for by the opposition. Saakashvili’s United National
Movement Party elected him as presidential candidate, and he
resigned as president at the start of the election campaign.
Georgia’s internal situation was thus again in Saakashvili’s hands
and US criticism faded.
7.17 The presidential elections January 5,
2008
Following Georgia’s presidential election was my ﬁrst real opera-
tional task in my role as special envoy. OSCE’s ODIHR monitored
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the election and the actual assessment was made by parliamentari-
ans from OSCE countries as well as representatives of the EU Par-
liament and parliaments of NATO countries. At this point, the CIS
countries were not involved, but appeared in the picture during the
course of the year. The aim was to assess how free and fair the
elections were. ODIHR undertook extensive ﬁeld work during the
preparation phase of the elections and during the election itself. All
this was covered in a report produced by ODIHR, which was then
put forward to the review of the parliamentarians. My job was not
to take part in the assessment, but to see to it that we would get a
joint statement by ODIHR and the parliamentarians.
The opposition was very scattered due to Georgia’s political sys-
tem, which concentrated all power in the hands of the president.
Thus, the vote was going to be for or against Saakashvili. It was
somewhat strange that Saakashvili had done quite a lot of work to re-
build the capital Tbilisi after the turbulent 1990s. Nevertheless, the
capital was clearly in opposition to the President. In rural areas, on
the contrary, his support was unmistakable. Initially, Saakashvili’s
position seemed quite strong, but the longer the counting of the votes
progressed, the more evident it became that the result of the ﬁrst
round would be very close to the required 50% threshold. Either
slightly over or a little below. The oﬀicial election results indicated
that Saakashvili had won the majority in the ﬁrst round with 53% of
the vote. We held a meeting with the election observers on the ba-
sis of their information. It was clear that abuses and electoral fraud
had occurred in several constituencies. The parliamentarians came
to the conclusion that the elections had, nonetheless, expressed the
will of the voters. The parliamentarians’ position is a political opin-
ion and the ODIHR usually goes along with it, even if the technical
evaluation might give rise to many observations.
Saakashvili and his entourage were, of course, subjected to crit-
icism by the opposition. It was claimed that he won the election as
a result of electoral fraud. At this point, the US Ambassador John
Teﬀt, who had extensive experience in Russian aﬀairs, found it nec-
essary to support Saakashvili. The US embassy decided to prepare
its own report on the election process. Within a few days, the Amer-
icans ended up with an assessment that the elections were free and
fair. Thus Saakashvili’s victory was backed up by the authority of
the United States, but doubts increased about the extent of abuse.
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The opposition strengthened, and demonstrations against the Pres-
ident gathered force. Saakashvili’s position was at stake, and the
parliamentary elections in the spring would be decisive.
7.18 Kosovo
In early 2008, several Western countries were ready to recognise
Kosovo’s independence. Russians implied that recognising Kosovo’s
independence against Serbia’s position would worsen the
international atmosphere, and it would have a knock-on eﬀect in
other conﬂict zones. The Kosovo question had its own background.
The Kosovo war in 1999 had caused the Serbian President
Slobodan Milosevic to refrain from further resistance after the
NATO bombing of Serbian cities and rural infrastructure. President
Ahtisaari had presented Milosevic with the conditions under which
the Americans would stop the bombing. The long-term Russian
“energy-man” and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin took part in
the discussions with Ahtisaari. His involvement was necessary in
order for Milosevic to understand that help was no longer
forthcoming from any quarter. Chernomyrdin subsequently
defended his own conduct by saying that thanks to it, Russia saved
the world from a third world war. Be that as it may,
Chernomyrdin’s position in Russia collapsed. His conclusions were
not accepted in Russia, even if they were not repudiated either.
Chernomyrdin was sent to Ukraine as Ambassador.
The Kosovo solution meant that Russia was in practice forced out
of the Balkans. Kosovo Albanians were used to the support of the
West and they were no longer content with anything other than full
independence. President Ahtisaari began to seek a solution to the
question. The time for compromise proposals had already passed.
Many Western countries were ready to recognise Kosovo’s indepen-
dence. On the other hand, Russia and Serbia and a number of EU
countries were against independence. These countries have their
own minority problems, and for them the independence of Kosovo
was a dangerous precedent. Kosovo’s independence was an issue
that badly divided the European Union.
The way in which Finland would proceed in this matter was not in-
signiﬁcant with respect to the OSCE chairmanship. In terms of con-
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ﬂict mediation eﬀorts it might have been advantageous if at least for
the time being we would have refrained from recognising Kosovo’s
independence. But from Finland’s own perspective this was not an
option and, according tomy knowledge, was not even discussed. For-
eign Minister Kanerva was warming relations with the United States
and as an EU country Finland wanted to be in the Western camp, in
“all cores”. It was therefore clear that we would recognise Kosovo’s
independence and that this needed be taken into account when open-
ing contacts to the parties in the conﬂict area. The division of labour
was such that the Minister undertook visits to all the conﬂict areas,
the South Caucasus and Transnistria. This created the necessary
political basis for my work, which began after Kanerva’s round.
Whereas Russians had stated to the Finns in bilateral
discussions that the recognition of Kosovo’s independence would
signiﬁcantly deteriorate the international atmosphere, the
Transnistrian conﬂict was at a peaceful stage. Negotiations could
be started quickly. In Moscow I informed the Russians that Finland
would recognise Kosovo’s independence, and I assumed that Russia
would show its discontent. I did not want to harm the negotiations
on Transnistria by starting in a bad atmosphere, so I asked directly
how long Moscow would be showing its discontent. The Russian
side stated that they were ready to start negotiations immediately,
but indicated, however, that they understood my point. We then
met in Vienna on March 15, 2008 with all parties. Agreement was
reached on the continuation of the negotiations, but diﬀiculties
were in store. In retrospect, of course, it is easy to see that in
actual fact Russia did not want to open negotiations in a situation
that was disadvantageous to itself. Recognition of Kosovo’s
independence, Ukraine’s unstable political situation and plans of
the West for Ukraine to join NATO, the fate of the Crimean
Peninsula and the Sevastopol naval base, the diﬀiculties in the
negotiations on Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
and, ﬁnally, the instability in the South Caucasus eﬀectively
prevented political negotiations on Transnistria.
The situation in Transnistria was a lot like the South Caucasus.
The United States and the EU tried to proceed as if the situation
was still the same as in the 1990s. But Russia had decided that this
time it would not give up. Russia’s policy was to emphasise that the
solutions found for Kosovo related signiﬁcantly to other regional con-
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ﬂicts. For its part, the West saw that the conﬂicts had nothing to do
with each other and should be treated separately. In the South Cau-
casus, the Kosovo issue was followed with great interest. Georgia
feared that the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by many West-
ern countries would increase the possibility of Russia recognising
South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s aspirations for independence. Azer-
baijan had similar concerns because of Nagorno Karabakh. Armenia
did not have these fears, since Nagorno Karabakh’s independence
or integration with Armenia was in Armenia’s interest. Nonetheless,
Armenia wisely remained silent and did not bring up a direct con-
nection between the conﬂicts in Kosovo and Nagorno Karabakh.
7.19 Saakashvili raises the stakes in the
Great Game
Saakashvili’s second inauguration largely reﬂected the same issues
as the ﬁrst. Only the characteristics of the army had changed.
Now, marching was to the beat. There were more troops and
motorised units than before. During the parade, ﬁghter planes
appeared above the President’s head at exactly the right moment.
Training seemed to have done the trick. Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov wondered to those seated close him whether all
these soldiers and weapons were necessary for defending Georgia.
The period after the presidential elections was critical for
Saakashvili. He had lost the initiative and his dominant position
faltered. Parliamentary elections in the spring had to show that the
people really supported the president. This could not be attained
just by sitting back and waiting for the elections. Neither were
there any ways to reform Georgia which could have brought quick
gains for his party.
At the same time there was a policy area in which Saakashvili had
pledged an active role. His starting point had been that Georgia’s
state territories would be re-united during his ﬁrst term of oﬀice.
Now he considered that the time was ripe to return to this theme.
After all, it might raise Georgians’ patriotic feelings. By challenging
Russia in Abkhazia, he would create tension in the region and also
show the extent to which Russia was already in place in Abkhazia,
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which Georgia and the West considered as belonging to the Georgian
state. After this, the situation in Abkhazia worsened. Russia was
repairing railways and other infrastructure in the event that it would
have to defend Abkhazians against Georgia. Israel supplied Georgia
with unmanned planes, which were capable of collecting intelligence
deep in enemy territory. Georgia sent one of these planes to Abkhazia
and a Russian ﬁghter plane shot it down.
As OSCE Chairman, Finland had to come up with a forum where
this controversy could be dealt with. Such a forum was found, al-
though of course it was clear that the dispute could not be resolved.
Georgia had the right to send a UAV, but it should have given prior
notice, and it hadn’t. Russian ﬁghter planes did not have the right
to ﬂy in Georgian airspace, although there was disagreement on the
matter. The international controversy continued. Russia organised
military exercises in the area, clearly intending to show that it would
not swallow everything from Georgia. Saakashvili, for his part, made
very harsh accusations towards Russia. Russia then held a military
parade on the Red Square in Moscow on May 1, something it had not
done for a long time.
Parliamentary elections were held in Georgia in May 2008 in this
international climate. Saakashvili’s party won an overwhelming ma-
jority. There were electoral abuses, but they were predominantly
unintentional – free and fair elections could now be aﬀorded. The
situation in Abkhazia allowed Saakashvili to re-gain a strong posi-
tion in domestic politics. He also had to re-gain the initiative, and
conﬂicts were a good tool, without necessarily getting into direct
confrontation with Russia. After the parliamentary elections, ten-
sions in Abkhazia decreased, but in South Ossetia they were clearly
on the rise again. Georgia had made the decision to create a coun-
terweight for the South Ossetian President Kokoity. This was the for-
mer South Ossetian leader Dimitry Sanakoyev whom Kokoity had re-
placed. Sanakoyev was now leader of the Georgian villages in South
Ossetia controlled by the Georgians.4 He was, of course, a provo-
cation for Ossetians and Russia, and using him did not increase the
hopes of reaching mutual understanding. I met Sanakoyev in Tbil-
isi myself, and he made a very favourable impression on me. If the
situation worsened, he was in danger of losing the Georgian villages
4Oﬀicially, the Head of South Ossetian Provisional Administrative Entity.
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which his mandate was based on, and this was his evident concern.
Besides, he had little room for manoeuvre. No sympathy was forth-
coming from Russia, so in a way he was prisoner to Saakashvili’s
policy.
7.20 NATO meeting in Bucharest
In the middle of Finland’s OSCE chairmanship, Ilkka Kanerva had to
leave the Foreign Ministry. He was replaced by Alexander Stubb, a
member of the European Parliament. Stubb was a European politi-
cian to the core. He spoke several languages very well and had es-
tablished good networks in Europe and in the West in general. His
appointment heralded a new era with the Internet and mobile phone
as smooth working tools. Stubb had also worked at the Foreign Min-
istry earlier in his career, so he had inside knowledge of the Min-
istry. What he lacked was experience of Finnish politics and of the
Finnish parliament. Russia was a challenge for Stubb in many ways,
because he had previously had relatively few contacts with Russians.
From our OSCE team’s perspective he nevertheless had very positive
characteristics. He was an optimist, a quick thinker with an ability
to motivate others. The fact that right from the outset he had to deal
with Georgia and Russia whose relations were clearly deteriorating
did not seem to be a problem for him. Stubb focused his work around
a speciﬁc project, and as a sporty person, rose to the challenge. He
was also able to create contacts with US and Russian Foreign Minis-
ters before the “frozen conﬂict” in Georgia began to melt and show
signs of overheating.
A NATO summit was to be held in April 2008 in Bucharest. A very
signiﬁcant decision was to be made there: whether to oﬀer Georgia
and Ukraine the next phase (i.e. the Membership Action Plan/MAP)
on the road to real NATOmembership. Washington had not been able
to make a decision on the matter by springtime. Prior to Bucharest,
however, it was possible that Washington would decide to endorse
MAP status for Georgia and Ukraine.
And this is what happened. The United States pushed hard for
Georgia’s MAP-status, Germany was against it. In Bucharest a com-
promise was sought between the US and German positions. NATO
countries were determined to show clear support for Georgia and
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Ukraine, even though the MAP phase would not be launched. Com-
promise was reached: Georgia and Ukraine did not yet embark on an
action plan leading to membership, but it was announced that both
countries would be accepted into NATO. This was intended for some
time in the future, but the interpretations began to have a life of their
own. The decision proved to be very bad, as Georgia and Ukraine
were disappointed but also Russia was left unsatisﬁed. NATO coun-
tries were now declaring in unison that NATO’s doors were open for
Georgia and Ukraine, albeit with a short time-out.
Kosovo, Abkhazia, Bucharest were all signposts towards the con-
ﬂict in August. They were individual events, and their importance
seemed quite limited in the West. But their combined weight in Rus-
sian calculations was totally diﬀerent.
The fact that George W. Bush was in his last months in oﬀice be-
gan also to be reﬂected in US policy. His administration became
weak, and several other contenders found eager ears in the South
Caucasus and particularly in Georgia. To what extent Saakashvili
received contradictory information about US policy from diﬀerent
sources in the United States is not in my knowledge, but this point
cannot be ignored when analysing the events of August 2008.
7.21 Estonia joins the Great Game
The world congress of Finno-Ugric peoples was held in
Khanty-Mansiysk, Russia on June 26-30. These congresses take
place every three years and rotate alternately in Russia, Finland,
Estonia and Hungary. All four presidents were present in the 2008
ceremony. The Russian hosts emphasised Russia’s support for the
development of Finno-Ugric culture and linguistic preservation.
This was, of course, policy statement in principle. In practice, a
variety of problems surrounded these issues. All four presidents
held their speeches and things were going according to plan until
the Estonian president Toomas Hendrik Ilves in his speech said that
Russia’s Finno-Ugric peoples could not be free until they joined the
European Union. President Medvedev did not react to this
statement in any way, but the following day the State Duma
Foreign Aﬀairs Committee Chairman Konstantin Kosatsev
expressed strong criticism against Ilves, who left the room.
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I was personally present at the event. I found the statement to
be damaging not only to future Finno-Ugric cooperation, but also in
terms of the situation in the Caucasus. Former Estonian PrimeMinis-
ter Mart Laar was an advisor of Saakashvili, and experts from Baltic
countries were heavily involved in the reorganisation of Georgian
ministries. Russia’s strong reaction to Ilves’s provocation should
have sounded alarm bells with regard to Georgia. I was worried, but
I did not draw suﬀiciently far-reaching conclusions. Russia showed
now on several fronts that its patience was being put to the test.
7.22 Conﬂict in Georgia turns into war
Some attempts were made during the late spring and early summer
to create common ground for some kind of political dialogue on the
Georgian question. Georgia pushed its own demands very strongly
seeking Western support for them. Tbilisi was less concerned with
Russia’s interests in the region and how they could be taken into ac-
count. Georgia attempted to negotiate directly with the Abkhazians
and South Ossetians, but formulated solutions which had no hope
of being accepted in Moscow. Georgian-Russian relations had been
poor throughout Saakshvili’s presidency, and because of Kosovo and
Bucharest they could not be remedied.
In June, Saakashvili met with President Dmitry Medvedev in St.
Petersburg at the CIS summit and discussed Abkhazia. According to
Asmus, Saakashvili proposed a solution for Abkhazia whereby Geor-
gian and Russian sectors would be created. They agreed to con-
tinue the discussion, but later in Astana, Medvedev was no longer
interested in the project. During the summer of 2008, the situa-
tion in South Ossetia began to escalate. Georgia’s State Minister
for Reintegration Temuri Yakobashvili toured Europe and preached
war. Yakobashvili’s purpose was to warn the West that Russia was
preparing to consider military action in South Ossetia, but in actual
fact his message had a counter-eﬀect for Georgia. What was really
expected of Yakobashvili was information about what steps Geor-
gia would now take to reduce tensions in the region, particularly in
South Ossetia. I was accustomed to Georgian political rhetoric and
did not interpret the threats of war very seriously. I thought they
were Georgian attempts to increase the pressure on the great pow-
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ers in order to make progress in conﬂict prevention and crisis man-
agement in South Ossetia. Maybe I was wrong, but I do not believe
that at that stage Georgians were thinking of resorting to military
action. Georgia therefore increased the pressure at a time when the
escalation of the conﬂict should have been prevented. Yakobashvili’s
European tour failed also in that EU leaders did not warm up to his
war talk. Another kind of tactic would have brought better results.
People well-acquainted with Georgian politics were already used to
August being a “hot” month. In Tbilisi this meant that conﬂicts had
the tendency to become worse in August. It had been so in the past,
without leading to war. Things had become more or less routine, and
it was thought that some show-oﬀ action was necessary in order to
maintain credibility.
The Beijing Olympics were about to begin. I was visiting friends
with my wife at Kymijoki on August 7, when I received several calls
from Victor Dolidze, Georgia’s OSCE Ambassador in Vienna. He
seemed very nervous when he said that the war in South Ossetia
was very close to beginning. I tried to calm him down, while at the
same time considering what Finland as OSCE Chairman could do if
the situation was so acute. Our conversation ended with my promise
to raise the issue in our OSCE group the next morning.
On the morning news on August 8, I heard that military action in
South Ossetia had started during the night. On the way to Helsinki
I spoke with Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen on the phone. He was
in Beijing, and was scheduled to meet Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
later that day. The only thing I was able to convey to the Prime
Minister was that as OSCE President, Finland should emphasise the
importance of a quick cease-ﬁre to Putin. I did not have details of
war events. At midday, we gathered to discuss our own reaction,
deciding that I would go to Tbilisi as quickly as possible. Foreign
Minister Stubb had a lot of connections, especially to France, which
held the EU Presidency. Finnish television news showed images of
South Ossetia, where almost parade-worthy Georgian troops were
moving toward Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian capital, in transport
vehicles. Terhi Hakala, Head of the OSCE Mission to Georgia, was
also in Finland. Together we decided to try to go to Tbilisi via Ams-
terdam. We had heard that the Tbilisi airport had been bombed, but
there was no certainty. In Amsterdam, a Georgian airline’s plane
was waiting, and then embarked on its regular ﬂight as if nothing
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had happened.
7.23 The days of the war in Georgia
We arrived in Tbilisi in the evening of August 9, and immediately
met Yuri Popov, who was the Russian co-chairman on the Joint Con-
trol Commission for South Ossetia. He had stayed in Tbilisi after
the beginning of military operations. We saw this as positive inso-
far as Popov might have an important role if some kind of contact
were to be sought between the two sides. Terhi Hakala spoke to
Popov about possible relief corridors in South Ossetia to evacuate
civilians. The next day we met Georgian Foreign Minister Ekaterine
Tkeshelashvili. She seemed very worried and strained. We managed
to speak to her about relief corridors for civilian needs. Then the
Finnish and French Foreign Ministers Alexander Stubb and Bernard
Kouchner arrived in Tbilisi, representing the OSCE and the EU re-
spectively. They had a meeting with President Saakashvili and For-
eign Minister Tkeshelashvili with a view to determine what kind of
cease-ﬁre proposal Saakashvili would agree to.
The two foreign ministers were in talks in Georgia’s Foreign Min-
istry on August 11, when Kouchner got a call from Paris. Later, we
learned that President Sarkozy had been given a mission to mediate.
Immediately after the beginning of military operations the US Sec-
retary of State Condoleezza Rice had called for an immediate cease-
ﬁre, a withdrawal of both sides to their positions of August 6 as well
as for setting up a new international peacekeeping force. Although
the Russians did not respond to this proposal in the negative, they
did not commit to anything either. Georgia had attacked and gotten
the upper hand at ﬁrst, and Russian counter-measures did not begin
to bite straight away. In fact, the Russians suﬀered heavy casualties
in the early stages of the war. Now, when Sarkozy called Kouchner,
the situation was diﬀerent, because Russia had started its counter
oﬀensive. The Americans, naturally, wanted to avoid a situation in
which the United States would be faced with Russia. The US did not
have many candidates for a mediator who would be credible and wel-
comed in Moscow. This task was well suited for France, President
Sarkozy and the European Union.
Foreign Ministers Stubb and Kouchner continued, however,
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drafting a text for a cease-ﬁre. Saakashvili approved the proposal
where the central point was both parties withdrawing to their
positions prior to the military operations. Saakashvili also proposed
that the foreign ministers would visit the city of Gori, which had
been bombed. At that time we did not know that the Georgian
artillery had been placed outside Gori when late at night on August
7 it opened ﬁre on Tskhinvali.
In Gori it became clear that Kouchner did not want to go to
Moscow immediately to take the cease-ﬁre text to Foreign Minister
Lavrov, but wanted to visit Vladikavkaz, where the Russian and
Ossetian wounded and dead had been transported. This was
because Sarkozy was due to arrive in Moscow on August 12
bringing his own proposal for a cease-ﬁre. Stubb left for Moscow
via Yerevan. He met with Lavrov in the morning of August 12 and
gave him the cease-ﬁre proposal Saakashvili had agreed to. Lavrov
was already aware that Sarkozy’s plan was more favourable to the
Russians, so there were no lengthy discussions on the matter. It is
worth noting that Lavrov agreed to receive Stubb in his role as
OSCE chairman. This was probably partly due to diplomatic
courtesy, but on the other hand the situation on the ground had not
yet been resolved on August 11 and thus all options were still under
consideration. In actual fact, Stubb’s and Kouchner’s initiative died
when the Russians broke the Georgian defence late in the evening
on August 11 and when in the afternoon on August 12 Sarkozy
presented his own plan, which was, of course, also supported by
the United States.
It is only to be expected that Sarkozy went to Moscow and things
were organised there in such a way that later when he went to Tbil-
isi, Saakashvili was to either accept or reject the cease-ﬁre proposal,
which had the support of the United States, Russia, France and the
EU behind it. When Stubb and Kouchner arrived in Tbilisi on 11 Au-
gust, they primarily sought to inﬂuence Saakashvili, and Saakashvili
still was able to discuss with the Foreign Ministers. But on August
12 the situation was already that the West tried to rescue Saakashvili
more or less onMoscow’s terms. Another question is what really was
agreed in Moscow, and how much space was left to interpretation.
I stayed in Tbilisi while Stubb and his staﬀ travelled to Moscow.
In the evening of August 11 the US representative Matthew Bryza ar-
rived in Tbilisi. It was good that Bryza was present, as Georgians had
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conﬁdence in him, but he also had autonomy over them. I met Bryza
and the Americans at the Marriott, where we were supposed to have
dinner together with Terhi Hakala from the OSCE and EU Special
Representative Peter Semneby. During the meeting the US Ambas-
sador John Teﬀt received a phone call from the Georgian Minister of
Defence. He informed that the Russians had broken the Georgian
defence lines and that Tbilisi was also at risk. Georgians were plan-
ning to defend the capital. Bryza was in contact with Washington
and it became clear that the United States would not intervene in
the course of events in any way. This had, of course, been known
for many years, but on the other hand Sarkozy’s mission had already
been kick-started and the West was counting on it.
Ambassador Teﬀt, whom I knew from before and with whom I had
enjoyed good co-operation, returned to his embassy armed with this
emergency information from the Georgian side. I relied on the Amer-
icans themselves having high-quality intelligence from the war zone
and Teﬀt acting accordingly. Later, I discovered in Asmus’s book that
American intelligence satellites were directed to other war zones,
and that thus also Washington was at ﬁrst in the dark about what
was happening in the ﬁeld. The Georgians were able to steer Teﬀt,
and at this stage Georgian information was mostly based on panic.
The rest of us moved to the Marriott hotel bar, which might be com-
pared to the Kämp hotel bar in Helsinki during the Winter War. All
kind of information was circling there, including information aimed
at confusing the adversary. There were ministers, diplomats, me-
dia representatives and intelligence service people. In the bar, one
of Saakashvili’s former ministers now in opposition to the president
criticized Matt Bryza for having encouraged Saakashvili, and now
Georgia had lost everything. This was not very impressive. In his
book, Asmus describes the Georgian Minister of Defence displaying
the same kind of attitude in relation to the Americans and Bryza. The
Georgians had stepped into their own trap, and now in their moment
of distress were accusing Americans for all their ills and woes.
The only impartial and expert eyes and ears which we had at our
disposal for information on Georgian and Russian movements, was
the OSCE’s patrol, which was monitoring the situation as close as
possible to the ﬁghting. We waited for the observers’ return at the
Marriott’s bar and noticed restlessness in the city. Several queues
had formed on the main avenue. The hastier inhabitants were leav-
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ing Tbilisi, which Georgians believed to be the next target of the
Russian oﬀensive. I was planning to transfer to the OSCE headquar-
ters, which had good radio connections, should the mobile phone
traﬀic be cut oﬀ. Late in the evening the OSCE observers returned
to Tbilisi. According to them the situation was becoming clear, be-
cause the Russians had limited objectives. Tbilisi would not be in
danger. I decided to stay in the Marriott. The OSCE observers told
us that the Russians had advanced via Abkhazia to the coastal city
of Poti, through which US arms shipments passed to the Georgian
army. The city of Gori had also been isolated. It had been the base
of the Georgian attack and the location of their artillery.
The next day, August 12, I attended the OSCE press conference
for Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt. He had arrived in Tbilisi
in the capacity of the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe. He was also one of President Saakashvili’s
supporters. Nothing was mentioned that we did not already know.
The situation reviewwas based on Georgia having taken the initiative
into its own hands, even though this was not said directly. Similarly,
Russia’s combat readiness cropped up, although there was no direct
criticism of this OSCE country either. I myself was thinking that
even Russia’s limited aims were suﬀicient to restore its position in
the South Caucasus. In addition, it was relevant to ask why Russia
would have seen ﬁt to aggravate the other players of the Great Game
by taking over a part of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. That
would have marked an escalation into a real crisis between the great
powers. I went from Tbilisi to Yerevan on August 12 by car. From
there I continued to Helsinki via Riga. It was clear that as OSCE
president, Finland would be involved in the aftermath of the crisis.
7.24 Cease-ﬁre and follow-up
Foreign Minister Stubb and our OSCE team had to work hard to en-
sure that the cease-ﬁre would hold. The EU had to agree on a line
of approach, and the United Nations had a central role, as it was
responsible for Abkhazia, where the Russians had pushed out Geor-
gian troops. The OSCE was also an important forum, because it had
a well-functioning mission in Tbilisi, and its vehicles had access to
South Ossetia. In Vienna, the OSCE negotiated on the number of mil-
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itary observers that could be sent to the region. Finland’s team was
led by Aleksi Härkönen, and partial decisions were reached. Agree-
ment was found on deploying 20 observers, and there was also talk
about later sending one hundred more.
The next phase came at the end of October, when Russia decided
to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This, naturally, changed
the situation completely. If the West had still harboured hopes of
later discussing Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s status, the time was
now over, with Russia guaranteeing the changed agenda. I have
to admit that Russia’s recognition came as a surprise to me. I had
thought that Serbia was important enough for Russia to refrain from
recognising Abkhazia and South Ossetia, because by doing so the
Russians pulled the carpet from underneath the Serbs on the Kosovo
issue. Of course I was wrong in the sense that Kosovo had already
been lost and Russia had been pushed out of the Balkans. Now the
question was about Russia’s interests in the South Caucasus, which
borders Russia’s very unstable North Caucasus. President Sarkozy’s
cease-ﬁre proposal and the subsequent EU observers sent to monitor
the region marked a change in the EU’s status in the region. When
I had previously sought to participate in the work of the Joint Con-
trol Commission as part of the EU Commission’s observer group, the
Russians had prevented it. Now Russia was accepting the EU in the
region. It was just in very diﬀerent circumstances. When it was no
longer possible to discuss Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s status, the
EU’s role was in practice reduced to making sure that Georgia did
not provoke the situation again.
The follow-up to Georgia’s war was launched at a high level in
Geneva on October 14, 2008 when the EU, UN and OSCE held a joint
dinner. The UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, Foreign Ministers
Stubb and Kouchner, the EU High Representative Javier Solana and
Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner were
present. This group still had hopes that Abkhazian and South Os-
setia’s status could be negotiated. When the negotiations began in
practice, they only focused on achieving an arrangement monitor-
ing the cease-ﬁre and establishing mechanisms in case the cease-ﬁre
was violated. The talks were not easy. They were conducted by the
French diplomat Pierre Morel, who had extensive experience from
Russia and Central Asia, where he was also the EU Special Represen-
tative. I represented the OSCE together with Terhi Hakala and Janne
165
Taalas. The troika of the EU, UN and OSCE, therefore, led the talks.
The actual parties were Russia, the United States, Georgia, Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. There were a lot of arguments regarding formal-
ities. This is normal. Especially the ID cards of Abkhazian and South
Ossetian representatives were hot bargain chips. The main thing in
these discussions, however, was that everyone understood how im-
portant it was to quickly bring about some kind of code of conduct
to prevent further conﬂicts. The parties’ contacts within the region
in practice shaped what could be agreed in Geneva, and what not.
Finland held the OSCE presidency, and had to look at the situation
from the organisation’s point of view. Finland was also an EU mem-
ber state and naturally supported EU policy. We were cautious as
there seemed to be rivalry within the troika. Eventually, the EU ac-
cepted that their representatives used OSCE vehicles when needed.
As it was already known that Russia probably would not continue
the mandate of the OSCE mission to Georgia in the form that it now
was, the OSCE’s role was consciously reduced. I did not think this
was wise policy. What happened in the end was that the OSCE was
forced to retreat from Georgia and the United Nations from Abk-
hazia. The Russians had made their decision about that early on,
and the only hope would have been paying more attention to Russia’s
considerations regarding these missions. All the same, no readiness
existed for this. Russia was on its own when deciding the fate of
Georgia’s mission. However, it was enough, because all decisions
within the OSCE are taken by consensus. In addition, in my opinion,
this emphasised the fact that Russia fully dominated the situation.
OSCE foreign ministers met in Helsinki on December 4-5, 2008.
The OSCE had not been able to organise a summit since December
1996 in Lisbon. It eventually managed to do so during Kazakhstan’s
presidency in 2010. At the foreign ministers’ meeting adopting the
ﬁnal documents proved diﬀicult. Foreign Minister Stubb worked to
maintain optimism, even though we knew that we would probably
fail. But Stubb’s attitude was the right one, because the OSCE Chair-
man needs to be optimistic. At the end we had to resign ourselves to
the fact that no ﬁnal document was forthcoming. We were too close
to the Georgian war and its consequences for any positive results. It
is not far-fetched to say, like Foreign Minister Stubb, that the Finnish
Presidency blew new life into OSCE mechanisms. Many issues were
discussed in OSCE forums in which diﬀerent parties met each other.
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That, too, is already something in a world in which the use of mili-
tary force has increasingly replaced diplomatic negotiation mecha-
nisms. In the late 1990s and early 2000s the use of military force be-
yond one’s own borders was the exclusive right of the United States
and the West. Yugoslavia, the Middle East and Iraq and Afghanistan
strengthen this trend. Russia returned to power politics with the war
in Georgia. Much has been said about the Georgian war creating a
new situation in relations between the West and Russia, and even in
international politics as a whole. This is probably true. US attitudes
had changed after Barak Obama became president. The US had to
focus primarily on domestic issues rather than wasting all its energy
on international armed conﬂicts. Obama wanted to approach Rus-
sia, and I think the Russians now gained an advantage in that the
United States recognised Russia as an equal partner – even if one
could not speak about any real parity. Alongside the US, also Ger-
many, France, Italy and Spain opted for this line of cooperation. The
European Union as a whole was not able to do so, because member
states have such diﬀerent perceptions of Russia.
If Finland in the early days of EU membership relied on the EU
in its relations with Russia, nowadays the general understanding is
that bilateral relations are needed and that they may be an eﬀective
way of promoting Finland’s interests. This does not preclude the
possibility of using the EU, if results can be achieved through that
forum.
Signs of decreasing tensions can be detected in the international
situation again. The US missile defence system in Europe has been
changed to make it less intimidating for Russia. Ukraine has contin-
ued the lease of Sevastopol’s naval base. Norway and Russia have
agreed on the boundaries of the continental shelf in northern sea ar-
eas. The Nord Stream gas pipeline is being built through the Baltic
Sea. The UN Security Council seems to be operational again. Rus-
sia and China did not prevent the West from using military force in
Libya. On the other hand, limits were set for this use of military force
and due to the developments in Libya the Security Council has not
been able to reach eﬀective resolution on Syria.
Regional conﬂicts in the South Caucasus, Afghanistan, the Mid-
dle East and elsewhere are still in a “unresolved” state. The “Great
Game” between the great powers is being played out in the region.
We are now in a tri-polar world dominated by energy scarcity. We
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endured the bipolar world, we survived the unipolar world, so why
would we not get along with a tri-polar world view. We do need to
develop rules for the new game in order to facilitate a return to the
negotiation tables and decrease the use of armed force. The solution
to any conﬂict or crisis can never be permanent, if it does not take
into consideration the balance of power in the area and beyond. If
the solution is temporary, it probably will create new issues of dis-
agreement for the future. Genuine crisis management is a process
that anticipates threats and seeks solutions through forums which
have proved to be functional and which are shared by all. The in-
ternational community is not just some sort of clique or alliance that
can be gathered around a speciﬁc strategic interest.
7.25 Interpretations of the war in Georgia
I am not going to assess the variety of interpretations as to what
really happened in the Georgian-Russian war in detail. Suﬀice it
to mention but a few. There were diﬀering views within the Euro-
pean Union as to why war broke out. The EU even commissioned a
study, which ended up stating that Georgia started the war, but Rus-
sia overreacted. This kind of review is always politically motivated,
and maybe it served to explain the situation to EU countries and es-
pecially to Finland. For a long time after the war, the Finnish media
was of the opinion that Russia started it. When the New York Times
then wrote that Georgia had begun the war, Finnish media began to
present a more truthful version after all. Nevertheless, the EU be-
lieved that Russia did over-react. Russia was undoubtedly prepared
for the possibility that Saakashvili would attack. It had tightened its
grip in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It had also secured the Roki
tunnel, which was the only way from North Ossetia to South Ossetia.
This is the way great powers usually react when their interests are
contested.
I consider Ronald D. Asmus’s book to be a good source from
among all the American books published on the war in Georgia. It
is, of course, a fully American approach in the sense that US policy
goals in the South Caucasus are accepted as such whereas the
Russian attempts to retain its inﬂuence in the South Caucasus and
the Caucasus in general are questioned. Asmus was also connected
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to the Democratic Party, so his views on the Bush Administration
are maybe biased. The book is, however, carefully written, and
events are recorded in detail. Asmus criticises the West for not
understanding that the Kosovo and Bucharest resolutions stirred up
doubt in Russia that the US and NATO were stampeding on Russian
positions on all fronts. He assumes that Saakashvili presented
concrete initiatives, although they all eventually vanished into thin
air, one after another. Asmus does not pay much attention to the
way Saakashvili was able to lead the US along as much as he did.
This has come to light from other government sources. Matti
Vanhanen, who was the Finnish Prime Minister during the war in
Georgia, has told the author that when he met President George W.
Bush after the war, Bush had stated that the Georgians fell into the
Russians’ trap. This apparently was the interpretation the US
administration of the time was able to live with.
Many books on the Caucasus have also been published in Russia.
The history sections are always interesting, as they aim to demon-
strate how Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been attempting to sep-
arate from Georgia from the late 1700s onwards. That is, before
Georgia asked for Russian protection in 1799. Stalin is accused of
the fact that Abkhazia and South Ossetia were merged into Georgia.
Georgia’s eﬀorts to hold on to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the
early 1990s are presented as an example of these areas’ continued
attempt to separate from Georgia and how Georgia has been trying
to subject these areas by force but without success. The rejection
of the Soviet Constitution in Georgia in the early 1990s by the Mili-
tary Council is also seen as an act that justiﬁed separation claims. In
Russia, the Caucasus wars, including the war in Georgia, are seen as
a whole: a 21st century war in the Caucasus. Russia is threatened
by both militant Islam and the United States and NATO. Sometimes
Georgia’s history is described as cyclical. At times moving away from
Russia, at other times approaching it. Cycles cover 30-year periods.
Ten years have passed since the beginning of the current cycle, so
the next change of course should be expected in some 20 years from
now.
With all this I just want to point out how greatly perspectives dif-
fer. As the EUSR, I often wondered whether all the players of the
Great Game could be satisﬁed with having inﬂuence in the region
without seeking one-sided domination. However, in the South Cau-
169
casus this would require a better international climate and new rules
for economic competition. In that way, the countries of this region
riddled with tensions, and with its Christian churches dating back to
the 4th Century, could better protect their own interests.
7.26 Finland’s role
In the Cold War world Finland was neutral and was able to oﬀer good
oﬀices for the superpowers. Finland has probably never been as
inﬂuential on the international scene as it was during its ﬁrst term on
the Security Council in 1969-70 and then during the CSCE process,
which culminated in Helsinki in 1975. Non-aligned countries then
gradually replaced neutral ones, but Finland’s active approach as a
mediator remained. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Finland
searched for its place in Europe and more widely in the world. In
1995 Finland became an EU member state. It is natural that Finland
supports positions and policies which can be agreed on among the
EU member states. On the other hand, it is clear that there is a
wide range of foreign and security policy solutions within the EU
that provide a variety of opportunities for member states to act in
the international arena. As a militarily non-aligned country Finland
is still able to operate in certain geographic areas thanks to its old
reputation, supporting peace building and conﬂict prevention.
It goes without saying that in terms of disputes between the EU
and Russia, Finland’s ability to mediate has diminished. It is mainly
due to the fact that Finland is an EU member and thus has solidarity
with the Union. On the other hand, in 1995-2008 Finland has oper-
ated in a way that has decreased our ability to inﬂuence. We have
seen consensus in the EU even when it did not exist. We indicated
for example with the Kosovo question that Finland was following EU
policy on the issue, when in fact there was no uniﬁed policy. Our
desire to identify with the EU’s “cores” and trans-Atlantic processes
has brought about a role where we are one small actor in a large
group. As for the war in Georgia, it can be said that we had no illu-
sions with regard to President Saakashvili’s intentions. It was good
that we cooperated closely with France, which held the EU Presi-
dency. France and the EU together had the capacity to adopt the
role of a buﬀer between the Georgians and the Russians. I believe
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we also watched out for the interests of the OSCE. Nevertheless,
we were unable to prevent the trend whereby the OSCE has been
ousted from some crisis areas in which the great powers have taken
the initiative into their own hands.
I have been left with the impression that on the one hand, Rus-
sians saw positive features in the Finnish OSCE Chairmanship, but
they undoubtedly had problems in pushing their policy through, be-
cause it meant objecting to Finland’s policy line. They actually had
a habit of saying to some of the Finns that there was nothing per-
sonal in the matter. They were only acting in accordance with their
own interests. There have been voices in Finland calling for Fin-
land to become a great power in crisis management. However, we
should clarify our own position ﬁrst. In Finland there is no consen-
sus regarding foreign and security policy. How can others take us
seriously, if we do not know what we stand for and how others should
relate to us. In these circumstances, Finland’s goals in the sphere of
crisis management are largely left up to individual people and their
political and professional capacity. There is nothing wrong in that,
but it certainly limits us in crisis management and leaves us out of
many tasks which we otherwise could be undertaking. Finland did
not manage to organise an OSCE summit in December 2008. Kaza-
khstan, for its part, was successful and the OSCE Summit took place
in Astana in December 2010. The world has become at least tri-polar,
if not more. It is time for Finland, too, to wake up to a new era.
Chapter 8
Politics of Insecurity:
Cross-Border Conﬂict
Dynamics and Security
Challenges in Georgia
Kornely Kakachia
8.1 Introduction
The proliferation, diﬀerentiation, and re-conﬁguration of political
borders are integral parts of the story of contemporary globalisa-
tion. Borders are not ﬁxed lines on the ground but something rather
more powerful and dynamic, representing a series of practices and
perceptions which are diﬀused into the society as a whole.1 Globali-
sation appears to make borders irrelevant in many ways –exempliﬁed
by our awareness that trade, migration, environmental and health
issues cross over the borders of many states – and to include large
1Lefteris Topaloglou. The role and nature of borders. COST Action IS0803. Work-
ing Paper. April 2009. http://www.eastbordnet.org/working_papers/open/documents/
Topaloglou_The_role_and_nature_of_borders_090414.pdf
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regions of the world. While challenges resulting from globalisation
are on the increase, security and terrorism seem to reassert the im-
portance of the borders of each state (Brunet-Jailly 2007, 3). Across
more than 100,000miles of international boundaries neighbours face
one another, some in a friendly, others in a suspicious or even a hos-
tile manner.
At the same time, territorial disputes continue to be the most com-
mon source of conﬂict between states and have increasingly become
the most frequent reason for violent conﬂict within states. It is prob-
ably proper to claim that territorial boundaries may be less impor-
tant as a barrier to the movement of capital, people and goods, but
the control of these borders and the territory that they encompass
often remains a central goal for nation states and citizens. Monitor-
ing borders raises important questions of cross-border cooperation
for scholars and policy makers, which call for profound institutional
changes and re-conceptualisation of our basic understanding of the
symbolic and functional role of borders, borderlands and boundaries.
It is widely accepted that cross-border cooperation contributes
to the creation of greater opportunities for people in the border re-
gions. Enhanced regional cooperation can contribute to economic
development and integration at the grass roots level as well as better
mutual understanding and conﬁdence building across the borders.2
But this is not the case in the South Caucasus yet. The collapse of
the Soviet Union and the opening of the Caucasian states’ southern
and western borders brought to an end a long period of relative sta-
bility and low intensity in international relations (Herzig 2000, 84).
While the newly established states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia)
have a similar past, their perceptions about their futures are diver-
gent. Unresolved problems with the delimitation and demarcation
of borders have been an important factor impeding the development
of cross-border ties. It seems that instead of boosting cross-border
cooperation, the region is becoming an area of apparent rivalry, with
isolation policies and zero-sum game logic serving as guiding princi-
ples for the regional actors. Another weakness of failed cross-border
cooperation is a lack of homogeneity (cultural, linguistic, ethnic, po-
2Markus Perkmann and Ngai-Ling Sum. Globalization, Regionalization and Cross-
Border Regions: Scales, Discourses and Governance. http://magpie.lboro.ac.uk:8080/
dspace-jspui/bitstream/2134/661/3/ch1Perkmann%2BSum.pdf
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litical, religious, etc.) combined with high political insecurity and
visa regimes holding back cross-border communication. This article
seeks to examine attempts of cross-border and cross regional rela-
tions between Georgia and the Russian Federation in the aftermath
of the 2008 conﬂict; outlines its weaknesses and explains the need
for a paradigm change. This article also analyses recent regional
developments within the South Caucasus and discusses current se-
curity challenges that impede successful cooperation in this ﬁeld.
8.2 South Caucasus: Dynamics of Cross-
Border Challenges and Regional Secu-
rity
The barrier eﬀect of national borders – as everywhere else – has been
created in the South Caucasus by historic developments in the last
three centuries and has been reinforced by military, administrative
and socio-economic policies. With natural borders, large neighbours
and considerable cultural homogeneity at various points in its his-
tory, the region is a distinct and interconnected area with a total
population of around 16 million.3 Small in terms of its geographical
size, the region is located in a geographical expanse – the region is
surrounded by Russia (bordering on Azerbaijan and Georgia), Iran
(sharing borders with Armenia and Azerbaijan) and Turkey (with Ar-
menia and Georgia to its east). It is claimed to be both European
and Asian, at the crossroads of major world cultures, religions, and
economies.
As throughout most of the world, borders in the Caucasus were
decided not through local mutual agreement by neighbouring state
entities, but instead by external imperial powers. Similarly, terri-
torial readjustments have often been the consequence of war, with
territorial changes clustered after major wars more than any other
event. As a result, in the age of empires, borders really served to
mark military and political extent. The collapse of the Soviet Union
gave South Caucasian states a unique opportunity for the ﬁrst time
in the complex history of the region to determine and codify their
3For a detailed account on demographic trends in the region see: Goble 2010.
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fate, including mutual border security arrangements.
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia (and Russia) share a compact
geographic area, many common cultural practices, and a long,
interlinked history. Despite these deep ties, cross-border relations
and collaborative eﬀorts on a regional scale have diminished
signiﬁcantly since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.4 One of the
reasons for reduced cooperation is political, ideological and
strategic diﬀerences among regional players. Ancient as nations,
but new as self-governing states, they have each taken separate
routes. While Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia all seek greater
security, their vision of security concerns and perceptions of
threats vastly diﬀer. The three countries diﬀer considerably, both
internally and in their geopolitical orientations as well. Whereas
Georgia grows more oriented toward the West, Armenia is seen as
more tied to Russia. Azerbaijan, rich in oil and gas resources, has
the luxury of straddling the fence, and even seeking an individual
role on the regional level.
Cross-border cooperation was further complicated due to the
emergence of ethnic conﬂicts. As Stephen Jones has observed, the
South Caucasus has traditionally been characterised by “the
internal conﬂict, fragmentation, and marginality tendencies
encouraged and exploited by its larger neighbours” (Jones 1995
cited in Sabanadze 2002). Stalled and highly problematic relations
between the Russian federation and Georgia, Azerbaijan and
Armenia, Armenia and Turkey have been a major stumbling block
on the way to normalisation. Much of this can be attributed to the
lingering political impasse between Georgia and Russia over the
separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but deep-rooted
socioeconomic hardships and introspective attitudes have also
contributed signiﬁcantly to this state of aﬀairs.
But a major factor undermining not only regional security but
cross-border cooperation as well was Russia’s unilateral economic
and political sanctions against Tbilisi and military buildup in Geor-
gia’s separatist regions. While these military bases do not promise
security, stability or cooperation to anyone in the region, they do not
pave the way for the civil and diplomatic solution to the conﬂicts ei-
4For best accounts on the topic see: Wright, Goldenberg & Schoﬁeld 2006 and
Coppieters 1996.
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ther. On the contrary, Russian heavy military presence turned some
of these state administrative boundaries into “sealed” unbridgeable
borders (Iron Curtains). As a result, the people in the border regions,
who were most aﬀected by the consequences of conﬂicts, developed
mutual fears and animosities. These conditions, in turn, have neg-
ative eﬀects on the willingness to cooperate and to establish closer
contacts.
As such crises like the one between Russia and Georgia have
shown, ethnic animosities, economic crises, refugees, environmen-
tal problems and disparities in military power make the area prone
to instability. Despite numerous attempts to put the “frozen con-
ﬂicts” into the framework of diﬀerent integration projects, they are
still far from being resolved.5 Arguably, they are even further from
resolution than ever before. As a result, the consequences of these
unresolved conﬂicts have weighed like a millstone around the neck
of the entire South Caucasus. Its costs can still be counted in terms
of refugees and internally displaced persons – nearly a million alto-
gether – provinces denuded of population, lost economic opportuni-
ties, and disrupted trade. The persistence of these conﬂicts ham-
pers the concerned countries’ ability to tackle other signiﬁcant chal-
lenges, such as rampant corruption, increasing poverty, unemploy-
ment, social unrest, a low level of democracy and religious radical-
ism.
Interestingly, in a region where religion is routinely seen as part
of cultural –and national –identity, it does not seem to play a major
role in shaping the foreign policies of the South Caucasian states.
Muslim Azerbaijan cooperates closely with Christian Georgia and
the two countries have successfully built a strategic partnership in
the energy ﬁeld. Christian Armenia has lucratively broadened its
energy, trade and economic relations with the Islamic Republic of
Iran and in recent years the two neighbours have developed mutu-
ally beneﬁcial projects.6 Thus, neither religious nor political factors
but economic ones appear to be predominant in these ties. In short,
twenty years on since independence the region is still searching for
a security framework that will satisfy all three countries, as well as
5See in detail: Cornell 2002.
6For geopolitical conﬁguration of the main players in the region, see Gachchiladze
2002, 26, 113.
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their larger neighbours.
8.3 Georgia: Geopolitical factors as deter-
minant for Cross-Border Cooperation
The problem of how cross-border cooperation can inﬂuence good
neighbourly relations is multi-dimensional, all the more so if the sub-
ject of analysis includes complicated historical, psychological and
geopolitical issues. Such is the case in Georgia – a country which
has a long history and great potential for cross-border cooperation.
The geographic location of Georgia is much more important than its
size and economic importance for the rest of the world. It lies at the
heart of the Caucasus region. Moreover, out of the nine administra-
tive regions of Georgia only one is an internal region, and all others
are located at international borders. Cross-border cooperation, i.e.
activity in border regions on the level of communication of the local
population as well as civil society, represents a certain foundation
for its current and future development.7
For the last twenty years, Georgia has gained experience of diﬀer-
ent forms of cross-border relations. In geopolitical terms the country
has played a key role for two competing allies in the Caucasus: on the
one hand Turkey and Azerbaijan, and on the other hand Russia and
Armenia. Both allies’ land communications links cross the territory
of Georgia. The role of Georgian borders was vital for these parties
during the war in Nagorno Karabakh, especially for Armenia, which
was in blockade and had its only link to Russia run through Georgia.
Although Georgia maintained neutrality, the control of arms or fuel
supply for each party was sometimes a tense question in Georgia’s
relations with both neighbours, which repeatedly raised questions of
border management and smuggling.8
7Olga Dorokhina. The international Program “Mlokosiewicz-The pilot program of
adapting the Polish experience in Cross-Border Cooperation in Georgia.” Policy Pa-
per. Polish Institute of Public Aﬀairs and CIPDD. 2007. http://www.isp.org.pl/files/
2619712080548091001202129731.pdf
8Alexander Kukhianidze. Criminalization and cross-border Issues: The case of
Georgia. Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). Confer-
ence Paper.p.8
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Georgia has common land borders with four countries: Turkey,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia. The Delimitation Commission was
created in Georgia in 1992, but still today one-third of Georgian bor-
der demarcation has not been agreed upon with neighbouring coun-
tries.9 The present Georgian-Turkish border runs along the former
Soviet-Turkish border, which is well demarcated and does not incite
any debate with Turkish authorities. As of today, the density of trans-
portation and transit means and ﬂows between the west-Georgian
and east-northern Turkey border areas resemble the best examples
of European cross-border cooperation.10
For Georgia there are no serious disagreements on demarcation
with Armenia and Azerbaijan11 where a free entry regime is main-
tained and inhabitants of the border regions closely cooperate in
various spheres. Good examples include trade, health services, par-
ticipation in religious holidays and cultural activities, and render-
ing assistance in extreme situations. But the most disputable bor-
der for Georgia is that with Russia, which runs mainly through the
high mountainous chain of the Caucasus Mountains, and remains the
longest Russian Federation external border in the Caucasus. As a
matter of fact it had never been demarcated before, and in conditions
of tense political and military relations between the two countries
this creates even deeper problems, such as the problem of frozen
conﬂicts and Russia’s encouragement of separatism in Georgia.
9For comprehensive analyses related to Georgia’s challenges promoting border se-
curity see: Welt 2005.
10In January 2006, Turkey and Georgia reached an agreement on the abolition of the
visa regime between the two countries, which allows Turkish and Georgian citizens
to stay on the territory of other state for a period of 90 days without an entry visa
permit.
11While Tbilisi and Baku do not oﬀicially regard the border issue as a dispute, some
35% of the 480-km border has still to be agreed. The dispute centres around a 6th-
century monastery on the border of the two countries – the monument is known as the
David Gareja Monastery in Georgia and Keshish Dag (Priest Mountain) or Keshikchi
Dag (Guardian Mountain) in Azerbaijan.
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8.4 Russo-Georgian Cross-border
Relations: Case of Upper Larsi
checkpoint
The Upper Larsi border crossing, (traditionally known as the “Geor-
gian Military Highway”) is perched 1,700 metres high in the Cauca-
sus Mountains between Georgia and the Russian republic of North
Ossetia. It is the only direct land route left between Russia and
Georgian-controlled territory. It is located at the very beginning of
the strategically important road leading to the Georgian capital Tbil-
isi. The highway itself is usually closed in wintertime when heavy
snow and frequent avalanches impede safe passage, but this road,
which has historically been traveled by both invaders andmerchants,
is the only place where cargo trucks can cross through the high
mountains that divide North Ossetia, Russia and north-east Georgia.
In 2006 Russia closed the border amid growing tensions with
Western-leaning Tbilisi that spiraled into war two years later.
Armenia, Moscow’s only ally in the South Caucasus, suﬀered most.
Having the land route to Russia via Azerbaijan closed, Larsi was its
only hope.12 In addition, Georgian law-enforcers intensiﬁed control
over the car routes coming from the Abkhazia and Tskhinvali
regions, which almost excluded the chance of not only Armenian
citizens but also persons from Russia from further crossing the
Georgian-Armenian border. This was an unintended result of the
Russian measures against Georgia and was interpreted as
unfriendly in Yerevan.
The Russian-Georgian stand-oﬀ has reminded Armenians that
their country’s economy is too dependent on Georgia as a transit
country for its own good. Only in August of 2008, when the war
interrupted Armenia’s export trade, the country lost over 600
million USD.13 At the time, 70–80% of Armenian exports travelled
12Alternative routes to Kazbegi previously traversed Georgia’s Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. But those routes have been closed to through-traﬀic since the bloody sepa-
ratist wars that wrestled the territories from Tbilisi’s direct control in the early 1990s.
13These ﬁgures were cited by Armenia’s foreign minister, Edward Nalbandian, dur-
ing an interview with the French journal Politique Internationale, No. 122 (Winter
2009), http://www.politiqueinternationale.com/revue/article.php?id_revue=122&id=
789&content=synopsis
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to Russia, left the Georgian port of Poti for Bulgaria, and were then
shipped to Novorossiysk on Russia’s southern coast. The whole
journey took up to eight or ten days, whereas the road through the
mountains and Upper Larsi is relatively quick and cheap. The
checkpoint has also been essential for channeling Russia’s exports
to Armenia.
Armenia continuously expressed its desire to see the border cross-
ing at Upper Larsi opened,14 Moscow, however, strictly opposed the
move and the dramatic change in its attitude deserves attention. In
late 2009, the countries unexpectedly reached a deal under Swiss
and Armenian mediation to reopen the checkpoint. At ﬁrst Georgia
did not expect any special economic or political beneﬁt from reopen-
ing this border crossing point, with two other border crossing points
in breakaway South Ossetia and Abkhazia uncontrolled,15 it consid-
ered the Kazbegi-Zemo Larsi border checkpoint as the only legally
operating land crossing point between the two countries.16
Moreover, according to oﬀicial information of the Georgian gov-
ernment,17 the crossing was at ﬁrst open to citizens of countries of
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a grouping of ex-
Soviet states, as long as they did not require visas for either Russia
or Georgia. Foreign nationals of those countries which required the
Georgian visa for entry into Georgia via this checkpoint had to ﬁrst
obtain a Georgian visa at the embassy of Georgia in their countries.
In the beginning, also Georgian and Russian citizens needed visas
14A new checkpoint was built on the Georgian side of the border in 2009 with 2.4
million USD in aid from the United States, involving adding of more traﬀic lanes to the
border crossing station, installing modern search equipment, and constructing oﬀices
and barracks for the co-located Georgian Patrol Police and Revenue Service, as well
as for installing of radiation equipment to detect radioactive materials. This facility
is equipped with new modern equipment which enables Georgia to eﬀectively ensure
security on the border.
15Editorial note: In November 2011, Georgia and Russia reached a compromise
where a Swiss company was assigned to monitor trade and movement of goods in
so-called trade corridors on the Abkhazia-Russia and South Ossetia-Russia borders.
See: Georgia-Russia WTO Deal in Details, Civil Georgia, 18 November 2014 http:
//www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=24158
16Civil Georgia. Georgia-Russia Border Crossing Point to Reopen onMarch 1. Febru-
ary 27. http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22031
17Rustavi2. Foreign Ministry welcomes re-opening of Larsi customs. March
1. 2010 http://www.rustavi2.com/news/news_text.php?id_news=35863&pg=1&im=
main&ct=0&wth=
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as they were unable to obtain them at the border.18 At present the
border crossing point is open again, bringing Georgia and Russia
physically closer, but not politically. The Georgian government un-
der Saakashvili articulated that the opening of the checkpoint did not
signify a warming of ties between the two countries. Diﬀerences of
opinion existed over how to handle residents of breakaway Abkhazia
and South Ossetia who wished to cross the border. According to
Russia, such residents –most of whom carry Russian passports –can
cross into Russia without visas asMoscow recognises the two territo-
ries as “independent” entities. This type of discussion is a nonstarter
for any government in Tbilisi.
8.5 Opening the crossing: Realpolitik or
prudent economic approach?
What incentive prompted the decision to reopen the crossing, also
known as Dariali, remains unknown. In large part, the Olympic spirit
of peace or at least Russia’s fervent desire to make the 2014 Winter
Olympics in Sochi a trouble-free success. Kremlin wanted to do ev-
erything possible to ensure that there were no more ﬂare-ups over
Abkhazia, just 25 miles away from Sochi.19 Making a quiet peace
with Georgia was one important step toward that goal. Georgia pre-
viously opposed opening the crossing, located at a high altitude in
the Caucasus Mountains, expressing fear that Russia might use it
“for new provocations against Georgia.”20
While the negotiations were being conducted, some Georgian an-
alysts hoped that Russia would lift its embargo on Georgian agricul-
tural products if it was also prepared to open the checkpoint, but
others stated that territory cannot be exchanged for the chance to
18Georgia removed restrictions it had imposed earlier and starting from July 2, 2011
Russian citizens were able to obtain Georgian entry visas at the Zemo Larsi-Kazbegi
border crossing point. See: Georgia Makes Available Visa for Russian Citizens at
Larsi. Civil Georgia 4 July, 2011. http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23700
19Owen Matthews. Peace Breaks Out in Georgia. Why Russia is extending an olive
branch to Tbilisi and other restive regions. Newsweek, April 15 2010 http://www.
newsweek.com/2010/04/14/peace-breaks-out-in-georgia.html
20The Messenger. Larsi checkpoint reopens: so what? March 3, 2010 http://www.
messenger.com.ge/issues/2056_march_3_2010/2056_edit.html
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sell wine and mineral water. The checkpoint is open; the Russian
embargo was lifted only in 2013 and Russia still occupies the Geor-
gia’s breakaway regions. Nor were any special beneﬁts given to the
Georgians living near the border. At ﬁrst Georgia received rather
limited economic revenue from the reopened checkpoint.21 More-
over, at the time Georgia insisted that the existence of two illegal
checkpoints in breakaway South Ossetia and Abkhazia and illegal
trade turnover between Russia and Georgia’s separatist regions vio-
lated the bilateral agreements previously reached between the two
countries. Georgia wanted a role in the customs administration in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a legal-political sign of its continuing
sovereignty over those regions, which Russia refused to recognise.
As a result, the Georgian government considered such actions as
a violation of trade rules that contradicted the key principles of the
World Trade Organization.22 It argued that Russia’s military pres-
ence in two breakaway regions disrupts its border customs arrange-
ments. Like all WTO members, Georgia had an eﬀective veto on new
members.23 However, on November 9, 2011 after several months
of tough negotiations Russia and Georgia signed the Swiss-brokered
bilateral deal unblocking Russia’s bid to join theWorld Trade Organi-
zation (WTO). According to the deal, observers of a private company
were stationed at both ends of so called “trade corridors”, but not
inside of these corridors, meaning that they were not stationed in-
side the breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgian oﬀicials
stated that trade corridors, which were deﬁned by their geographic
coordinates and not by names, lie through breakaway Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. The monitoring involved also the Zemo Larsi-Kazbegi
border crossing point, which is on the undisputed section of the
Georgian-Russian border, outside the breakaway regions.24
Another factor to explain this shift might have been the then
nascent Turkish-Armenian rapprochement and Moscow’s fear that
21Lizaveta Zhahanina. Opening at border Larsi-Kazbegi: a good beginning. In-
vestor.ge Issue 2, 2010 http://www.investor.ge/issues/2010_2/03.htm
22Georgian Economic Trends. Quarterly review. N4, March 2006. P.10 http://www.
geplac.ge/files/english_2006_4.pdf
23Jonathan Lynn. Russian WTO bid picks up momentum. Reuters. September 21,
2010. http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE68K3EB20100921
24Moscow, Tbilisi Hails WTO Deal. Civil Georgia. November 11, 2011 http://www.
civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=24129
182
without meeting Armenian requests concerning the opening of the
border between Georgia and Russia, it would have been diﬀicult to
convince Yerevan that its alliance with Russia had no alternative.
Perhaps Moscow also wanted to demonstrate to the West that it
was moving toward normalising its relations with Tbilisi and the
occupation and de facto annexation of Georgian territories should
not have been seen as an obstacle that the Georgians might not
eventually accept. The Georgian government and pro-government
media largely downplayed the re-opening, attributing Tbilisi’s
willingness to reestablish land communications with Russia to its
desire to help its neighbour Armenia, which depends on exports to
Russia for much of its revenue. Despite the Government’s
pessimistic view on Georgia’s own economic beneﬁts, the reopening
was believed to beneﬁt Georgian farmers living in the region, who
for decades had traded with the people of the North Caucasus and
were unable to do so while the border crossing point was closed. It
seemed that Tbilisi also recognised some economic damage as its
trade with Russia was reduced,25 and the beneﬁts from transit
revenues for the use of Georgian territory were dramatically cut.26
As Georgia did not expect any special economic or political ben-
eﬁt from the border’s reopening, it helped Russia’s main Caucasian
ally, Armenia, whose only road access to Russia is via Georgia and
which found itself also blockaded by default.27 Azerbaijan expressed
concern about the opening of a direct land connection between Rus-
sia and Armenia via Georgia. Azerbaijani’s concern was based on
the fact that through this connection, Moscow could potentially have
supplied Yerevan with military cargo designed for the 102nd Russian
military base located in Gyumri, Armenia. It should also be noted
that the Russian military base is a major element of Armenia’s na-
tional security strategy, and the Russian-Armenian agreement that
was signed August 2010 upgraded Russia’s mission in Armenia and
25For detailed analyses on the economic impact of Russian embargo on Georgia see:
Livny & Ott &Torosyan 2007.
26For years Russia was the largest trading partner of Georgia. The foreign trade
turnover between Georgia and Russia in 2006 was equal to 637.4 million USD. How-
ever, Russia moved down to the position of the fourth largest trading partner of Geor-
gia with USD 73.3 million in 2010. Source: http://www.geostat.ge
27At present, landlocked Armenia can trade only with two of its four neighbours,
Iran and Georgia, with the borders closed to Turkey and Azerbaijan since 1992.
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extended Moscow’s lease of its base by 34 years, until 2044.
In such circumstances, if Azerbaijan had received information
that Armenia was being supplied with arms through this route,
Baku would have immediately reacted and asked Tbilisi for
explanations.28 Under the conditions of almost a cold war with
Russia, Georgia could not have been pleased by the intensiﬁcation
of Russia-Armenia military cooperation by use of the Upper Larsi as
a transit corridor for military cargos. As a result, on April 19, 2011
Georgian Parliament unanimously endorsed the government’s
proposal to annul a ﬁve-year agreement with Russia which set out
procedures for transit of Russian military personnel and cargo to
Armenia via Georgia, a step which looked like it had been
synchronised with the Armenian leadership.29
The Georgian public was divided over the border issue. Some
feared that re-opening the border with a country that waged war
against their homeland in August 2008 would create additional prob-
lems. As Tbilisi has no diplomatic relations with Moscow, Georgians
who opposed the move wondered how their government would be
able to solve problems stemming from the regulation of transit and
border crossing. Others believed that any issue in relation to Rus-
sia should be solved within a complex framework aimed at the de-
occupation of the two Georgian territories and the restoration of
Georgia’s full sovereignty (Kvelashvili 2009). While analysts and
the general public discussed the advantages and disadvantages of
reopening the Kazbegi-Upper Larsi border checkpoint, it seemed
that everybody agreed that it is better than nothing. Georgian au-
thorities believed that a closed border contains more threat than
an opened one. The government claimed that opening Upper Larsi
meant recognition from the Russian side that the economic embargo
it had imposed on Georgia was amistake. It was also assumed that by
opening checkpoint, Russia recognised the state border at least on
this part of the Georgian territory. However, it should be also noted
that the reopening of Upper Larsi was not a sign of the warming of
Russian-Georgian relations,30 it was a merely ﬁrst step towards the
28The Messenger. Baku concerned about opening Larsi checkpoint, March 5, 2010
http://www.messenger.com.ge/issues/2058_march_5_2010/2058_econ_two.html
29Georgia Annuls Military Transit Treaty with Russia, Civil Georgia. April 19, 2011.
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23362
30Ghia Nodia. What Does ‘Confederation’ Mean In The South Caucasus? RFE/RL.
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normalisation of Georgian-Russian cross-border relations.
Acute political problems still remain, but the positions of the sides
in the humanitarian and economic ﬁelds have become softer espe-
cially after Ivanishvili ascended to power as a result of parliamen-
tary elections in October 2012. Many regional analysts claimed that
Ivanishvili’s choice of a foreign policy team suggested he planned to
tone down the heated rhetoric that previously had marked bilateral
relations with Russia. Accordingly, he tried to adopt a more prag-
matic, less ideologically driven and balanced line with Moscow and
improve economic and cultural ties with northern neighbour. As a
“pragmatic dreamer” he also realised the economic and other ben-
eﬁts of normalisation of relations with Russia and hoped to recover
trade and transportation links with reopening the Russian market
for Georgian wine and mineral water which took place in 2013. It
looked like a small window was opened, through which some oxygen
came in.
8.6 Introduction of Visa Free regime and
Georgia’s strategy in North Caucasus
As the opening of the Upper Larsi checkpoint was a positive move
in Russo-Georgian strained relations, Georgia’s trans-boundary ini-
tiative aimed at embracing Russia’s volatile North Caucasus region
looked more controversial and politically motivated. On October 11,
2010 the Georgian government unilaterally announced the introduc-
tion of a visa-free travel regime for residents of the republics of Rus-
sia’s North Caucasus region. The initiative is considered to be part
of a broader Georgian strategy aimed to improve its image in the
region and exercise its soft power against Russia. Visa regulation
allowed a 90-day visa-free entry regime for residents of Chechnya,
Ingushetia, Dagestan, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-
Cherkessia and the Republic of Adygea, and henceforth the inhabi-
tants from these regions no longer needed to go to Moscow to obtain
a Georgian visa.
September 17, 2010. http://www.rferl.org/content/What_Does_Confederation_Mean_
In_The_South_Caucasus/2160662.html
185
Shortly before that, on September 23, 2010 Georgian President
Mikheil Saakashvili described his vision of “a uniﬁed Caucasus” at
the United Nation’s General Assembly.31 According to him, the his-
torical move towards Caucasian unity should start with projects in
energy, education and cultural ﬁelds, and the civil society sphere.
“We might belong to diﬀerent states and live on diﬀerent side of the
Caucasus Mountains but in terms of human and cultural space, there
is no North and South Caucasus, there is one Caucasus, that belongs
to Europe and will one day join the European family of free nations,
following the Georgian path.”32 He outlined his rhetorical vision of
“a united Caucasus” and said he wanted Russia as a partner, and not
as an enemy.
Saakashvili also stated that this unity was not directed against
anyone and that Georgia did not aspire to change any borders, and
he called on the Russian authorities to be part of the process of trans-
formation.
The Georgian Parliament also found its own niche in elaborating
Tbilisi’s Caucasus policy. On December 15, 2010, the Georgian par-
liamentary committee for relations with compatriots residing abroad
was renamed into the committee for Diaspora and Caucasus issues
with the purpose of reﬂecting Tbilisi’s focus on Caucasian policy. Ac-
cording to the explanatory note, attached to the draft document, the
necessity for amendment was triggered after “the issue of Caucasian
solidarity became active”, as well as by the need “to develop uni-
ﬁed Caucasian policy.”33 Moreover, Georgian lawmakers launched
on February 18, 2011 a discussion on the national security concept,
which replaced the one adopted in July 2005. Georgia’s relations
with Russia were discussed in a separate chapter on “Major Direc-
tions of Georgia’s National Security Policy.”
The document mentions relations with the North Caucasus in the
portion where ties with Russia are discussed and says that establish-
ment of “peaceful and cooperative environment in the North Cau-
casus region of the Russian Federation is of particular importance
31Remarks of H. E. Mikhail Saakashvili, President of Georgia, The 56th Session of
United Nations General Assembly, 23 September, 2010. http://www.un.org/en/ga/65/
meetings/generaldebate/Portals/1/statements/634209147655000000GE_en.pdf
32Ibid. Remarks of H. E. Mikhail Saakashvili, 2010.
33Parliamentary Committee Renamed to Focus on Caucasus Issues. Civil Georgia.
December 10, 2010. http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22961
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to Georgia.” “Georgia realizes the need to deepen and develop rela-
tionships with the peoples of the North Caucasus,” the Security Con-
cept reads.34 The Georgian parliament also debated the possibility
of recognising as genocide the 19th-century mass killings of Circas-
sians by imperial Russian forces, and on May 20, 2011 ﬁnally made
the decision to recognise it as genocide.35 Thus Georgia became
the ﬁrst UN member state to recognize the 19th century massacre
and deportations of Circassians. This garnered noticeable support
around the globe among the numerous Circassian Diasporas. The
declarationwas expected to strengthen calls for a boycott of the 2014
Winter Olympics in Sochi, which the Circassians consider as part of
their homeland.
It seems Tbilisi took a note in changing geopolitical trends in this
explosive region that is often prone to violence and tried to exert
inﬂuence on it as it could not ignore it due to historical as well as
cultural and political ties with it. The focus on the north Caucasus
was also the result of a predominant opinion in Georgia –as well as,
increasingly, among liberal elements in Russian society –that one day,
in the not too distant future, Russia will lose the north Caucasus,
either through violent struggle or by realising the region is simply
too expensive to hold on to.
Tbilisi’s trans-boundary policy with North Caucasus,36 while it
may have had a political undertext vis-à-vis Moscow, according to
Georgian oﬀicials it was primarily dictated by the “humanitarian and
commercial needs” of societies in both parts of the Caucasus. More-
over, by showing openness and transparency, Georgia also claimed
to rebuild its image among the residents of the two breakaway re-
gions Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and oﬀered them alternative ways
of development by turning Georgia into a cultural and economic cen-
ter of the Caucasus. Besides, it was assumed that the eased travel
regulations would divert North Caucasians from Moscow to Tbil-
34National Security Concept of Georgia, http://www.mfa.gov.ge/files/12_9052_
136720_NationalSecurityConcept.doc
35Giorgi Lomsadze. Georgia Recognizes Circassian Genocide. Eurasianet.org. http:
//www.eurasianet.org/node/63530
36For comprehensive report on developments in North Caucasus see: Andrew
C. Kuchins, Sergey Markedonov, Matthew Malarkey, “The North Caucasus: Rus-
sia’s Volatile Frontier”, CSIS Report, March 2001 Available at: http://csis.org/files/
publication/110321_Kuchins_NorthCaucasus_WEB.pdf
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isi where education and medical treatment was more aﬀordable for
them.37 Claiming that a polarised media environment and barriers to
trade and transport had cultivated misunderstandings between Tbil-
isi and North Caucasian republics, the Georgian government also
launched a Russian-language television channel, the “First Cauca-
sus,” which was primarily designed for North Caucasus audiences.
While the Government considered that Georgia’s popularity and at-
tractiveness in the neighbourhood was on the rise, Tbilisi was ex-
periencing diﬀiculty in convincing the West of the usefulness of its
North Caucasus engagement.
According to a western analyst,38 with pursuing this new Cauca-
sus policy Tbilisi, which needed stability on its northern border, was
playing the irrational card.39 Critics said that Georgia’s decision to
introduce a visa-free policy for residents of the North Caucasus was
provocative toward Russia and some of the Georgian government’s
steps appeared to have nothing to do with engagement.40 Some con-
sidered Georgia’s initiative as a calculated attempt to repay Russia
for stationing troops in breakaway South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and
recognising both regions as independent from Georgia.41 Opponents
warned that the new Georgian policy in Moscow’s eyes appeared
as a strategy to divide the North Caucasus from the rest of Russia,
promote separatism and possibly terrorism, thus reinforcing Rus-
sian paranoia and fuel Russian-Georgian tensions. Echoing this per-
ception of certain western analysts, in an annual worldwide threat
assessment hearing at the US Senate Select Committee on intelli-
gence, U.S. Director of National Intelligence stated that “Moscow’s
continued military presence in and political-economic ties to Geor-
37Eka Janashia, Georgia eases visa rules for residents of North Caucasus. CACI
Analyst. September 27, 2010. http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5438
38Oliver Bullough, Letter From Tbilisi: Towards a United Caucasus. Foreign Aﬀairs.
December 23, 2010. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/letters-from/letter-from-
tbilisi-toward-a-united-caucasus
39Thomas deWaal. North Caucasus of the Bizarre. TheNational Interest. November
1, 2010. http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/caucasus-bizarre-4334
40Samuel Charap and Cory Welt. A More Proactive U.S. Approach to the Geor-
gia Conﬂicts. Center for American Progress. February 2011. P.47. Available at:
urllttp://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/pdf/georgia-report.pdf
41Giorgi Lomsadze. Georgia: Using the North Caucasus to Give Russia a Taste of
Its Own Medicine? Eurasianet.org. November 24, 2010. http://www.eurasianet.org/
node/62440
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gia’s separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, combined
with Georgia’s dissatisfaction with the status quo, account for some
of the tensions. Georgia’s public eﬀorts to engage with various eth-
nic groups in the Russian North Caucasus have also contributed to
these tensions.”42
While the initiative seemed somewhat risky and Moscow viewed
the step as a “provocation”, the Russian online tabloid
Kavkaz-uzel.ru reported that interviewed residents of Chechnya
and Adygeya mostly reacted positively to the Georgian initiative,43
although some thought that visa free travel opportunities should
have been provided for other citizens of the Russian Federation as
well.44 But at the same time, some were concerned that the
Russian authorities, because of their anger at Tbilisi, would
“toughen the rules” for border crossing into Georgia in order to
prevent more people from visiting the country.45 Among other
things, it oﬀers the citizens of the North Caucasus the shortest
route for hajj46 and Muslim pilgrims are taking advantage of an
42US Intelligence community. Worldwide Treat Assessment. Statement for the
record. February 16, 2011. http://intelligence.senate.gov/110216/dni.pdf
43Жители Чечни приветствуют отмену визового режима с Грузией. окт. 17
2010. http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/175633/
44Editorial note: Since February 2012, Georgia has granted visa free travel
to all citizens of the Russian Federation for 90 days (Georgia Lifts Visa
Rules for Russia, Civil.ge, 1 March 2012, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=
24502). However, Russia has not taken reciprocal steps to introduce a visa
free regime for Georgian citizens, but only eased regulations in cases of cul-
tural and youth exchanges or visiting relatives (‘Russia is not prepared to switch
to visa-free travel with Georgia’ - Sergey Lavrov, Georgia Journal, 18 Decem-
ber 2013, http://www.georgianjournal.ge/politics/25717-russia-is-not-prepared-to-
switch-to-visa-free-travel-with-georgia-sergey-lavrov.html). One of the stated rea-
sons for Russia tomaintain visa requirements for Georgian citizens is the Georgian law
on occupied territories. In particular article 4. of that law which criminalises entry
into South Ossetia or Abkhazia from territory other than Georgia (The Law of Georgia
on Occupied Territories, Article 4. Limitation on Free Migration in the Occupied Ter-
ritories, http://www.smr.gov.ge/docs/doc216.pdf). It is also noteworthy that Russian
Federation was not among the thirteen countries with which Georgia tightened visa
requirements in September 2014.
45Георгий Зедгенидзе. Грузия ведет борьбу за умы и сердца российских горцев.
Slon.ru, September 10, 2010. http://slon.ru/blogs/gzegenidze/post/479724/
46For more information on role of hajj in North Caucasus republics see: Mikhail
Alexseev, The Impact of the Hajj Pilgrimage in the North Caucasus. PONARS Eurasia
Policy Memo No. 74. September, 2009. http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/
pepm_074.pdf
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overland route via Georgia. According to Georgian oﬀicials, the
oﬀer attracted more than 12,000 visitors in the ﬁrst three months
after the new visa regime was introduced.
Besides of Moscow’s resentment and criticism in and outside of
Georgia, there were mixed reactions to Georgia’s policy towards the
North Caucasus by Georgian civil society. Georgian public and op-
position politicians pointed out many other risks that the initiative
may generate. They argued that under the visa free regime, North
Caucasian militants could penetrate into Georgia, which would con-
stitute a security threat and might jeopardise the situation in Geor-
gia. Others claimed that Georgia which itself suﬀered from Russia’s
unilateral attempt to revise borders47 cannot craft a Caucasus policy
on its own.
However, it seemed that, while being aware that the proposals
put forward towards the North Caucasus increased pressure against
Georgia from Russia, Georgian authorities didn’t share any alarmist
ideas, and asserted that the visa free regime has not created any
threat to Georgia’s national security. On the contrary, according
to their estimations at the time, Russian threats towards Georgia
may signiﬁcantly decrease in the context of increasing solidarity to-
wards the North Caucasian nations. The government claimed that
amid sustained military tension with Russia, pursuing a North Cau-
casus policy was important as Russia’s gradual strategic retreat from
the Caucasus appeared irreversible. In Georgia’s geostrategic cal-
culation, Russia and the Caucasus mentally as well as emotionally
have already separated from each other. According to this narrative,
Georgia had no choice but to shore up relations with all their neigh-
bours as previously Russian oﬀensives against Georgia had some-
times included military detachments from the North Caucasus re-
publics.48
While Georgia’s unilateral trans-boundary initiatives might have
47In December 2003, Russia unilaterally simpliﬁed visa rules only for residents of
Georgia’s Adjara Autonomous Republic, a move described byMoscow at the time as “a
temporary measure,” which triggered protest in Tbilisi. Before that Russia introduced
visa rules with Georgia in December 2000; the decision, however, did not apply to
residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which at the time were formally recognised
by Moscow as part of Georgia.
48When the Russian military poured into South Ossetia during the ﬁve-day war of
2008, for example, the most feared units came from a war-hardened Chechen battal-
ion.
190
posed some danger for Tbilisi itself, it may also have overshadowed
a process of genuine engagement in cross regional cooperation with
Russia. Clearly, it is in Georgia’s interest to have a stable north-
ern frontier. However, remembering well what the neglect of this
region caused in the 1990s, when in response to ethnic conﬂicts in
Georgia, the North Caucasus became infused by anti-Georgian sen-
timents. Therefore developing good neighbourly relations with the
North Caucasian republics is of paramount importance to Georgia.
Georgia has historically had close relations with all ethnicities across
the Caucasus and there is a pervasive, popular belief among Geor-
gians that most of the North Caucasians are related to them ethni-
cally and linguistically. Moreover, the notion that Georgia aspired
to become the leading country for a “Caucasian federation” was not
new and dated back at least to period of collapse of tsarist Russia
in 1917, when newly independent Georgia tried with active assis-
tance of imperial Germany to take a lead in forming a federation of
Caucasian people. However, this attempt did not materialise due
to the collapse of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Repub-
lic49 and later the annexation of the Georgian Democratic republic
by Soviet Russia.
Additionally, it seemed that Georgia sought to increase its eco-
nomic interaction in the North Caucasus as a way to restore its ter-
ritorial integrity in the long run. Put diﬀerently, Georgia intended to
boost the economies surrounding South Ossetia and Abkhazia as a
way to induce them to desire a future together with Georgia rather
than survive in a fragile status quo. Questioning the attraction power
of Georgia, it was hard to believe that Georgia had been able to at-
tract many people from the republics of the North Caucasus since
Russia had much more attraction power than Georgia.50 Having said
that, it is hard to imagine that Georgia’s peaceful “soft power” initia-
tives have made matters worse in North Caucasus. But what is quite
49The Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic, (Zakavkazskaya
Demokraticheskaya Federativnaya Respublika (ZKDFR) also known as the Tran-
scaucasian Federation was a short-lived state (February 1918 –May 1918), composed
of the modern-day countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in the South
Caucasus.
50Agshin Umudov. Why Does Georgia’s Visa-free Regime in the North
Caucasus Concern Russia? Journal of Turkish Weekly. October 22, 2010.
http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/108867/-jtw-analysis-why-does-georgia-39-s-
visa-free-regime-in-the-north-caucasus-concern-russia.html
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evident is that the entire Caucasus needs a comprehensive strategy
that would transform the region from an area of confrontation into
an open geo-economic system. Russia and Georgia should formulate
a new agenda which would allow them transform their interest for
mutual accommodation or even complementarity of those interests.
The new agenda should be based on the recognition that there is
a time, albeit very limited, and resources to utilise existing competi-
tive advantages of cross-border and cross regional cooperation. Eco-
nomic cooperation, demilitarisation and decriminalisation should be
parallel with conﬁdence building measures, including the implemen-
tation of joint regional programs. These projects could havemanifold
eﬀects, such as the restoration of the economy in conﬂict-torn areas
and encouragement of human contacts via joint business activities,
thus facilitating reconciliation. The stability based on cross-border
and cross regional cooperation in the Caucasus may, over time, have
a positive impact on Georgian-Russian relations. However, a legal
vacuum is a risk giving rise to increasing conﬂict rhetoric. In gen-
eral, the North Caucasus continues to play a decisive role in the fu-
ture of the South Caucasus and the Caucasian security complex as a
whole. The viability of independent states in the South Caucasus is
inconceivable without minimal political stability in the North Cauca-
sus.
However, after Ivanishvili’s more cooperative policy towards Rus-
sia, things could be changing in relations with the North Caucasus.
As a ﬁrst step towards this direction, Ivanishvili placed Georgia’s
former ambassador to Moscow, Zurab Abashidze, in a new post as
Special Representative for Relations with Russia who reported di-
rectly to the Georgian Prime Minister. Ivanishvili also expressed
hope that Moscow would reciprocate. It seemed that with such steps
Tbilisi tried to test whether or not Russia had changed its approach
towards Georgia in the changed political reality. Overall, whatever
the real outcome might be of political ﬂirting with the Kremlin, ﬁnd-
ing a middle path between confrontation and capitulation was one of
the toughest tasks for Ivanishvili’s government.
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8.7 Conclusion
The post-Cold War and post-9/11 periods have seen the rise of bor-
der walls, symbols of separation which seemed to be on the way out
in the wake of decolonisation, and were believed to be entirely ﬁn-
ished and done with the end of the Cold War. However, the fall of
the Berlin Wall did not mean the end of security arrangements, and
security infrastructures like fortiﬁed borders, even in a highly glob-
alised world. Instead it signalled the beginning of a new era of secu-
rity arrangements focusing on borders and borderlines. The Russo-
Georgian conﬂict in 2008 was a reminder that a Europe that is whole,
free, and at peace remains a goal still to be achieved –a project not
yet accomplished, and a challenge, unmet.
The hard line positions taken by Moscow and Tbilisi on the re-
gional conﬂicts resulted in a stalemate in their relations, heavy de-
fence expenditures and infectiveness of regional cooperation. With
no side in the mood to make concessions, the status quo grows ever
more entrenched. As most of the South Caucasus conﬂicts have
cross-border and cross regional dimensions, cross-boundary coop-
eration between countries should be an integral part of any strategy
to reduce conﬂict. Cross-regional cooperation is also the most eﬀec-
tive instrument to gradually reduce the eﬀect of the conﬂict between
Georgia and Russian Federation. It should be seen as a tool for con-
ﬂict transformation and peace-building, as they promote conﬁdence-
building across ceaseﬁre lines and increase engagement with sepa-
ratist regions.
Problems and challenges in creating an alternate architecture for
conﬂict resolution and cross-border cooperation between Georgia
and Russia are numerous. First, the forces that have beneﬁted from
the decades of violence in conﬂict regions will create maximum ob-
stacles to the process of reconciliation, peace and conﬂict resolution.
So far, the vested interest groups have succeeded in subverting ef-
forts for purposeful dialogue and settlement. Second, false egos and
stubbornness of the parties involved in the conﬂict will also make
things diﬀicult for either establishing or strengthening an alternate
architecture for conﬂict resolution process in Georgia. Until the
time that there exists an element of maturity, prudence and sincer-
ity among those who matter in the Russo-Georgian conﬂict, it will
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be diﬀicult to change the paradigms of conﬂict and remodel these
on pragmatic and realistic lines that are so much needed for cross-
border cooperation to kick oﬀ.
Whereas for Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia may be a major
issue negatively aﬀecting Russo-Georgian relations, it is certainly
not the core issue as repeatedly stated by Tbilisi. The holding of a
composite dialogue between the new government of Georgia and
Russia to discuss various critical issues, including Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, has been a positive development as far as the
process of conﬂict resolution in these troubled regions is
concerned. The primary objective of cooperation (especially in
conﬂict regions) should be to support the activities aiming at
spatially unlimited development, naturally interconnecting these
regions with neighbouring regions in all directions of geographical
space. Such a development should aspire to minimise the inﬂuence
of the boundaries and their barrier eﬀects. The cardinal purpose of
this kind of cross-regional engagement is building conﬁdence,
reducing the disadvantages of borders and improving living
conditions of inhabitants. Fulﬁlling these goals is not simple and
there were some signs that Ivanishvili’s government understood
this.
In the short and medium term it is hardly possible to expect any
major improvements in the relationship between Tbilisi and Moscow
even under a government formed by the Georgian Dream coalition,
taking into account that Russia occupies 20% of Georgian territo-
ries which the international society considers to be integral parts of
Georgia and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons
and refugees are without proper shelter in Georgia. The Russian
decision to move missiles into Georgia was believed to be a danger-
ous move that was clearly in violation of the ceaseﬁre agreement
between Presidents Medvedev and Sarkozy. But if Georgia and Rus-
sia will decide towards going forward, to kick oﬀ cross-border and
cross-regional cooperation initiatives, which have so far been under-
used, it could pave a way towards a normalisation of relations at
least on the local level. The gradual softening of border control and
administrative boundaries in Georgia’s separatist regions controlled
by Russia and the step-by-step management of separatist conﬂicts
are good steps to follow. Therefore the opening of the Larsi-Kazbegi
checkpoint could be considered as a ﬁrst step towards the right di-
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rection in countering the alienation among the people of diﬀerent
ethnic backgrounds across the borders.
Capitalising on the positive trends on cross-border contacts of re-
cent years between Moscow and Tbilisi will require a cooperative,
transparent and creative approach not only from Georgia and Rus-
sia, but also from the European Union and the United States. As the
world remembers the violence that erupted six years ago in Georgia,
it should not be forgotten that the frozen conﬂicts in this part of the
world were neglected for years as hopelessly complex and unwor-
thy of attention by Western leaders and governments. If attention is
not focused on Russo-Georgian rapprochement and the resolution of
ongoing conﬂicts in the near future, a valuable opportunity will be
lost.51
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Chapter 9
The EEU, the EU and the
New Spheres of
Inﬂuence Game in the
South Caucasus
Suvi Kansikas and Mikko Palonkorpi
The South Caucasus is a geographical region. It could even be re-
garded as a cultural region in the sense that there are certain typ-
ically Caucasian cultural traditions or dimensions to which all the
region’s ethnicities can in a varying degree relate. However, in the
two decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the South
Caucasus has not been politically or economically integrated.1
Given its strategic location, the South Caucasus is a region in
which major external powers have competing energy-, security- and
prestige-related interests. Compared to Russia, Turkey, Iran, and
even the United States, the EU has been somewhat of a newcomer:
its presence has been low-key and centred on the provision of assis-
tance through various programmes. On the other hand, its member
1For a more intensive historical analysis of the missed opportunities of the South
Caucasus regional integration, see the article by Jeremy Smith in this book.
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states, such as Germany and the UK, as well as Estonia, have been
active there already before the 2000s. As a sign of increased interest
of the EU in the South Caucasus region, Ambassador Heikki Talvitie
was nominated as the ﬁrst EU Special Representative for the South
Caucasus in July 2003.2 Today the EU is by far the largest donor in
the region and the most important trade partner for all three Cauca-
sus states.3
A new phase of EU engagement started in 2004 with the inclu-
sion of the three Caucasus countries into the European Neighbour-
hood Policy (ENP). This was followed a few years later by the launch
of the Eastern Partnership (EaP). The policy steps by the EU have
been countered by Russia’s reciprocal actions such as the launch of
the Eurasian Customs Union in 2010 and the soon to be launched
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).
This new phase of Euro-Eurasian integration has created yet
another layer of region-dividing, centrifugal forces in the South
Caucasus. Already since the independence of the three countries in
the early 1990s, the deﬁning feature of the region has been a
complete lack of attempts of comprehensive and region-wide
political and economic integration.4 Centrifugal forces of the
protracted ethno-separatist conﬂicts in Nagorno Karabakh,
Abkhazia and South Ossetia have driven the parent states and the
aforementioned non-recognized separatist “states” apart.
As a consequence, ﬁrst of all, all three countries of the region
have become political entities with contested borders and bound-
aries. And secondly, they have chosen to integrate into and with
mutually opposing formal and more informal alliances involving ac-
tors outside the South Caucasus region. These are for instance the
NATO, the EU, the EEU, the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Or-
ganisation), the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) and the
GUAM, comprising of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova.
2COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2003/496/CFSP.
3See: European Commission trade policy.
4At best, the economic cross-border cooperation between the conﬂicting sides has
taken place on two grass-roots level markets, one in Ergeneti in Georgia, where Osse-
tians and Georgians traded with each other. The other one is in Sadakhalo, Georgia,
where Armenians and Azeris were previously able to conduct business together. Both
markets were closed on the grounds of smuggling and other criminality charges by
the mid-2000s (de Waal 2012, 1721).
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Subsequently, the states and de facto states5 in the South Cauca-
sus are bound together not only by protracted conﬂicts, but also by
competing and mutually exclusive sovereignty claims. These con-
tribute to the disintegration of the existing states as well as to the
lack of political cohesion of the region as a whole.
The lack of regional political and economic integration in the
South Caucasus resembles the situation in Central Asia, where
intra-regional integration has also been non-existent. There is,
however, a distinction between the regions: due to the unresolved
conﬂicts in the South Caucasus, in the near future, regional
integration is much more unlikely to occur there than in Central
Asia. Under such conditions, it is perhaps unrealistic to compare
the South Caucasus with a politically and economically tightly
integrated area like Western Europe.
Nevertheless, there is one seemingly weak, but important simi-
larity. When the European Coal and Steel Community was estab-
lished in 1952, the embryonic Western European integration was
partly based on energy integration. The nascent European integra-
tion evolved around the idea that the integration of the coal and
steel production capacity of the six participating European countries,
most importantly the former enemies France and West Germany,
needed to be brought to such a high degree that it would raise the bar
for waging war between its members. Also in the South Caucasus,
energy cooperation has been themost successful form of integration.
The construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil export pipeline (BTC)
and the South Caucasus gas pipeline (SCP) have so far been the most
successful examples of integration and cross-border cooperation in
the region.6 The BTC and the SCP have integrated two out of three
of the South Caucasus countries (namely Azerbaijan and Georgia)
more closely together with each other and with Turkey.
These energy transit projects involve elements of voluntary eco-
nomic integration between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. They
seek to establish a trans-border energy transit infrastructure from
the Caspian production region to the export hubs in the Mediter-
ranean and North-Eastern Turkey. The idea is to in the future con-
5Depending on the perspective, also the term “partially recognized states” has been
used in this context.
6For more on the EU’s Southern Gas Corridor, see the article by Gulmira Rzayeva
in this book.
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nect gas pipelines from the Caspian even further to the European
gas distribution networks.
However, when this South Caucasus energy-driven integration is
compared with the also partly energy-driven embryonic stages of the
West European integration of the early 1950s, one may notice that in
the South Caucasus (energy) integration, the aspect of conﬂict po-
tential reduction through integration is to a large degree missing.
The lack of a de-securitizing element is due to the exclusive rather
than inclusive nature of Caucasus energy integration: Armenia has
been left out of it.7 Therefore the South Caucasus (energy) inte-
gration has strengthened existing divisions and tensions rather than
defusing them, as happened in Western Europe.
Another major diﬀerence between the processes is that while the
US has been supportive of West European integration even when it
has worked against some of its own national interests, Russia has
been a less of an integrating power for the countries of the South
Caucasus. In fact, Russia seems to be pursuing divide-and-rule poli-
cies, a tradition inherited from both the Russian empire and the
Soviet Union. On the other hand, as Thomas de Waal has argued,
the Soviet Union could be seen as the most successful case of the
(Russian-led) integration in the South Caucasus: it left behind the
legacy of integrated transport (and energy) networks and Russian
as a common language that is spoken in all three countries (de Waal
2012, 1719; 1722).
As Georgia has recently deepened its ties with the European
Union and Armenia has committed itself to the Eurasian Economic
Union, the whole region will be aﬀected. A new supranational layer
and new institutions have been added into the power equation of
the South Caucasus. The aim of this article is to investigate how
the competition of the two seemingly incompatible integration
processes will aﬀect the South Caucasian states and especially
Armenia.
7However, it should be noted that the director of the state oil company of Azerbai-
jan, Sabit Baghirov, made oﬀers already in 1993 for Armenia to receive substantial
economic beneﬁts from the then planned oil transit pipeline projects in exchange for
compromises in the Nagorno Karabakh. The Armenian side rejected these so-called
“peace pipeline” oﬀers with the argument that Armenia would not trade Karabakh for
oil. Alieva (2011), 201.
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9.1 The new integration projects divide
the region
Economic and political integration has proceeded at a quick pace on
the Eurasian continent since the collapse of communism in the early
1990s. East European former socialist countries joined the European
Union and NATO in the 2000s. Since 2004, the EU has been present
in the South Caucasus through its European Neighbourhood Policy
(ENP) – a wide-reaching foreign policy programme for the countries
of the former Soviet Union (excluding the Baltic States that already
joined the EU). The countries are oﬀered the possibility to establish
closer political, economic and cultural links with the EU. A new phase
of EU engagement started in 2009 with the launch of the Eastern
Partnership (EaP).
However, the stability and prosperity the EU is oﬀering to the
countries is being contested by another integrationist force: Russia
is also seeking closer economic and political cooperation with the
countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Russia wants to oﬀer
these countries an alternative integration model: its crown jewel is
the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), to be built on the already ex-
isting Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia (ECU). It
starts operating in January 2015 with Russia, Kazakhstan and Be-
larus as its founding member states. The prospects are that Armenia
will follow shortly afterwards. On 14 November, the Armenian Con-
stitutional Court gave a ruling on the constitutionality of the EEU
treaty and the Parliament is intent on ratifying it later this year. Ar-
menia is expected to join the Eurasian Economic Union once it starts
operating.8
Seen from Moscow, the EaP is a direct challenge to Russia’s in-
ﬂuence in the FSU. And consequently, seen from Brussels, Russia’s
Eurasian Union project challenges both the partnership countries’
sovereignty to choose whom to align with, as well as the legitimacy
of the EU’s presence in the South Caucasus.
The South Caucasus has thus recently become the target of two
integration projects that are competing for partners and members.
The eﬀect of this competition has been that the South Caucasus re-
8Karlen Aslanian, Constitutional Court OKs Armenian Entry To Eurasian Union,
Azatutyun.am, 14.11.2014, http://www.azatutyun.am/content/article/26692504.html.
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gion is divided into two: each of the three countries has opted for a
diﬀerent integration option. Armenia has aligned with Russia, Geor-
gia with the EU, whereas Azerbaijan considers limited cooperation
with both.
Armenia decided to seek membership in the Eurasian Customs
Union in the fall of 2013; the extent to which this was due to Rus-
sian pressure is a matter of debate. By its decision to seek alignment
with the Customs Union, Armenia eﬀectively ceased its negotiations
on the EU Association Agreement (AA). Georgia, on the other hand,
sealed its Western orientation by signing an AA in the summer of
2014. Azerbaijan, for its part, has a limited interest in cooperation
with the EU, and none for the EEU. It does not seek closer associa-
tion with the EU, although it has an agreed Action Plan with it. With
an inﬂux of substantial oil and gas windfalls, Azerbaijan considers
that the EU needs its hydrocarbon resources more than it needs the
EU. From Azerbaijan’s side, there is a lack of interest in cooperation
due to the EU’s normative policies: closer and deeper cooperation
implies more emphasis on sensitive human rights and democracy is-
sues.
The external actors seem to play a zero-sum game in making the
countries “choose sides”. The EU’s policy as such was compatible
with the commitments already made by the EaP countries, for
instance their membership in the CIS free trade area. On the other
hand, the provisions of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade
Agreements (DCFTAs) the EU oﬀered to the partnership countries
are not compatible with membership in the Russian-led Customs
Union. The fact that both Russia and the EU wanted to see the
Eastern European countries join their own integration projects –
which are incompatible – polarised the situation.
It is very worrisome that the decision to join one group, or that
one is made to join, clearly has unwanted outcomes, as the cases
of Armenia and Ukraine demonstrate. What is even more crucial is
that there seemed to be, mostly for political reasons, no real eﬀort
from either side to ﬁnd complementary solutions that would allow
alignment with both of them. The EU and Russia have been engaged
in negotiations over the Ukrainian crisis. No such commitment was
seen prior to the escalation of the conﬂict.
Membership in the Eurasian Customs Union as well as EU’s
AA/DCFTAs will have direct consequences on the trade relations of
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the countries of the South Caucasus, particularly on the
relationship between Georgia and Armenia, which are now part of
diﬀerent trade blocs. The crucial issue at the moment is whether
the competing integration projects are able to come to a
compromise with each other to ensure that the countries situated
in the intersection of their spheres of inﬂuence are not more
severely harmed.
9.2 Russia’s Eurasian integration projects
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has sought to establish
economic and political alliances with the newly-independent coun-
tries of the former Soviet Union. The CMEA (1949–1991) and the
Warsaw Pact (1955–1991) have been followed by various attempts
at cooperation in the post-Soviet space, all of which have reﬂected
both Russia’s ability as well as its wish to stay/regain its position as
a regional hegemon. The Commonwealth of Independent States was
established immediately after the collapse of the Soviet empire.9 In
the 2000s, the economic integration process in the post-Soviet space
has been rapid and, unlike previous initiatives, the latest phase has
already had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the member states and their eco-
nomic actors (Dragneva & Wolczuk 2012, 5).
There are presently two institutions operating in the region, the
Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC)10 and the Customs Union
of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. A new body, the Eurasian Eco-
nomic Commission,11 established on 1 July 2012, took to oversee that
these two organs will be able to see through the most ambitious plan
yet: the Eurasian Economic Union.
On 29 May 2014, the presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Rus-
sia signed the treaty establishing the EEU. As the parliaments of the
three founding member states ratiﬁed the treaty in October, it will
start operating on 1 January 2015.12 The document establishes the
9In the South Caucasus, Armenia and Azerbaijan are still CIS member states,
whereas Georgia denounced its membership right after the August war in 2008 and
formally withdrew from the CIS on 18 August 2009. http://www.cis.minsk.by/.
10http://www.evrazes.com.
11http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/Pages/default.aspx.
12RFE/RL, Nazarbaev Signs Law On Ratiﬁcation Of ‘Eurasian’ Treaty, 14.10.2014,
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international legal status, organisational framework, goals and oper-
ating mechanisms of the Union. The EEUwill base its executive body
in Moscow, the high court in Belarus and the top ﬁnancial regulator
in Kazakhstan.
The treaty provides for closer economic integration between the
three countries who, signing it, undertook obligations to guarantee
the free movement of goods, services, capitals, and labour. The
member states will pursue a coordinated policy in key sectors of
the economy: energy, industrial production, agriculture, and trans-
port. However, the treaty stops short of introducing a single cur-
rency. It also delays the creation of a common energy market. In
fact, based on the ﬁrst press commentaries, Russian experts are cau-
tioning against haste in establishing a single energy market. As a
protective measure pursued particularly by Russia, there will be an
11-year-long transition period, during which the member states aim
to set up a common oil and gas market. On the other hand, according
to Kazakh oﬀicials, they see the EEU’s immediate beneﬁt as granting
landlocked Kazakhstan better access to, and moreover, a say in the
use of the transport and logistics and other pipeline systems of the
Union’s member states.
The EEU, which is the latest phase in the continuum of Russian-
led cooperation, has been one of the major foreign policy goals of
Vladimir Putin. Russia has regarded the European Union’s Eastern
Partnership as a challenge to its interests in the FSU area. With its
own integration plans, it seeks to attract new members away from
EU’s orbit. It wants to oﬀer an alternative integration model to the
EU.
There has been one small victory and one major blow in the
work towards the EEU: in the summer of 2013, Armenia
discontinued its negotiations with the EU and announced that it
would join the Eurasian Economic Union. In October 2014, it
signed the founding treaty, which it plans to ratify by the end of the
year. The new government of Ukraine, on the other hand, decided
to integrate with the EU instead. On 21 March 2014, it initialled
the political sections of its Association Agreement. The DCFTA was
signed on 27 June 2014. By taking these steps, Ukraine de jure
http://www.rferl.org/content/nazarbaev-ees-putin-eurasian-economic-union-belarus-
treaty-law/26636645.html.
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discarded Putin’s EEU option.
Up until the present, the Russian-led integration processes have
been largely declarative, with little practical economic or political
integration taking place. The ECU and the anticipated EEU are look-
ing to change that situation. As analyses show, the latest integration
phase in the form of the Customs Union, unlike previous initiatives,
has already had an an increasingly concrete eﬀect on the member
states and their economic actors (Dragneva & Wolczuk 2012, 5–7).
The planned EEU framework is explicitly modelled on the EU.
EEU integration will take place in the form of harmonisation of leg-
islation, regularisation of customs valuation, rules of origin, customs
forms and procedures, and other key elements. In terms of the or-
ganisation’s relations with the outside world and trade links to the
global market, Russia’s WTO membership has become an important
regulatory element. During Russia’s negotiations with the WTO on
entry into the organisation, it was negotiating as a member of a
customs union, the ECU. This has forced the non-members, Belarus
and Kazakhstan, to adapt to the rules of the multilateral trade sys-
tem. WTOmembership has not only made Russia modernise its trade
regime – with the Eurasian integration projects, Russia is exporting
this rule-based modernisation into its neighbourhood. (Dragneva &
Wolczuk 2012, 8.)
Customs unions eliminate barriers to trade between members,
which is why they are assumed to provide a considerable increase in
intra-bloc trade. And on the other hand, they reduce trade between
members and non-members in two ways. This is because, ﬁrstly, the
members of a trading bloc substitute their imports from third par-
ties with imports from their own partners. This causes loss of export
markets and accompanying revenues to third parties. Secondly, in
order to protect the members’ economies, a trading bloc establishes
barriers to trade such as customs and duties, which might limit or
hinder access to their markets, or make the access more costly (Haf-
tel 2004, 123–125). However, in the case of the Eurasian Customs
Union, its establishment has in fact brought mixed results. This is
because Russia has higher levels of protectionism over its domestic
market.
Customs unions often initially raise the average levels of the mem-
bers’ trade protection vis-à-vis the outside world. In the case of the
ECU, the external tariﬀs were set by Russia’s standards which were
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much higher than the othermembers’. Kazakhstan, the economically
most liberal among the three members, has had to nearly double its
external tariﬀs from 6.5% to 12.1%. This has led to trade diversion,
but to Russia’s beneﬁt. For instance, Kazakhstan and Belarus have
not gained signiﬁcant improvement in their access to Russian mar-
kets, and there has been no marked Customs Union-related trade
growth as such. For Kazakhstan to start reaping beneﬁts of its mem-
bership, the organisation would need to keep to its commitments to
foster deeper integration (Carneiro 2013, 2–3).
The establishment of the common external tariﬀ necessitates the
reformulation of the members’ trade structures. The countries that
have so far accrued signiﬁcant revenues from importing goods from
the non-ECU market and re-exporting them to the countries belong-
ing to the ECU will face negative consequences. One example is the
diversion of Kazakh car imports of German, Japanese and Korean
cars via Georgia to Russia, although Russian cars are less competi-
tive. Similar scenarios will be facing Armenia as it joins, and Kyrgyzs-
tan if it decides to join, the EEU. Kyrgyz imports from China, which
until now have brought signiﬁcant incomes, will decrease drastically
due to the raising of the import tariﬀ. They will be replaced by more
expensive Russian products.
The eﬀects will be felt by outsiders as well. Georgia, for instance,
has established itself as a regional car re-export hub, achieved by
a simpliﬁcation of customs clearance procedures and lowering of
tariﬀs. With the implementation of the ECU common tariﬀ, it now
faces duties four times higher for its imported second-hand cars. The
Kazakh market has already been lost, and prospects are that the Ar-
menian market will be too, as the latter joins the ECU. This car trade
has been quite important for all of the countries concerned. For in-
stance 70% of Armenia’s car imports were from Georgia and only 5%
from Russia. Moreover, car re-exports have accounted for almost
25% of Georgia’s total exports and the industry employs around 20
000 people.13
Joining the ECU/EEU, Armenia will face several consequences.
The ﬁrst is the economic eﬀect that membership will have on its
13Nino Patsuria, Eurasian Union Dumps Georgian-Armenian car trade. 12 June
2014, Georgian Journal, http://www.georgianjournal.ge/business/27489-eurasian-
union-dumps-georgian-armenian-car-trade.html.
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trade relations. As a WTO member, Armenia might be faced with
compensation claims for any beneﬁcial treatment it gives its Cus-
toms Union partners. On the other hand, in case it stays out, it will
be facing possible customs duties and tariﬀs when entering the ECU
market. Currently, Russia is its biggest trade partner and by far the
most important investor.
The second aspect is related to the prospects of establishing free
movement of labour within the EEU. In case the organisation will
move towards a common policy, the outsiders will face restrictions
in access to the labour market. A signiﬁcant amount of Armenian
state revenue is in fact received from emigrant workers, and this
policy would have severe repercussions. For example in 2007, re-
mittances from the Armenian migrants working abroad amounted to
about 1.5 billion dollars – around 18% of Armenia’s GDP (ILO 2009,
1). According to Hrant Mikaelyan (2013, 60), in the period 2000-
2012, approximately 320 000 people, or 11% of the population, mi-
grated from Armenia. Russia is the main destination of Armenians
working abroad; almost 1.2 million ethnic Armenians live in Russia,
making Armenians the seventh largest ethnic group in the Russian
Federation (Markedonov 2013, 30). Remittances from Russia have
at times accounted to as much as 89% of the total remittances sent
to Armenia (IMF 2012). The domestic labour market situation is al-
ready very strained, with an unemployment rate of 16,2% in 2013.
The consequences of an end to labour migration to Russia would not
only be economic, they would have huge destabilising eﬀects for the
whole of society.
Economic integration always entails a security aspect as well.
Choosing to join an organisation is a show of allegiance. The commit-
ment is made with an expectation of reciprocal actions on the part
of other alliance members and particularly its leader. In the era of
globalisation, the signiﬁcance of economic integration has increased
considerably. Economic turmoil has the power to shake governments
and destabilise political systems. The members of an economic or-
ganisation are interdependent and thus very likely to support the
smooth operation of all partners’ economies. This is the insurance
provided by economic alliances: membership reduces the threat of
an outside destabilising force, be it economic or military warfare.
From this viewpoint, Armenia’s decision to enter the EEU can be
seen as a security policy action. None of the other members of the
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organisation wish to see Armenia’s borders vulnerable, as that would
threaten the functioning of the customs union borders.14
The EEU can be seen as an attempt to bring the Soviet Union
to life in a more limited form,15 a sort of a combined coalition of
willing and forced partners of Russia. This process is the most dif-
ﬁcult for Kazakhstan. The reasons for this are manifold. One of the
most important is that Kazakhstan exports some of its energy via
the Southern Energy corridor and in particular via the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan pipeline. As a consequence, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have
many common economic cooperation interests. Therefore Armenia’s
accession into the EEU is a problematic question for Kazakhstan.16
This centres in particular on the delicate question of Karabakh and
whether or not there needs to be a customs post between Armenia
and the Nagorno Karabakh (NK). InMay 2014, leaders of Kazakhstan
and Belarus demanded that a customs post should be established on
the Armenia-NK border.17 On the other hand, the Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov has stated that the Nagorno Karabakh con-
ﬂict does not impact Armenia’s accession to the Eurasian Union.18
In October 2014 President Sargsyan stated that “Armenia will join
within the borders that it has itself recognised, just as it has followed
this principle in joining and being a member of the rest of the inter-
14Since Georgia is such a vital transit country for Armenia’s trade with the three
other members of the Eurasian Union, Armenia’s trade with the EEU could become
hostage to a major re-escalation of conﬂicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This
could cause trade disruptions similar to the negative impacts of the August 2008 war
on Armenian trade. On the other hand, this same logic could also provide a new
restraint for a re-escalation of Georgia’s separatist conﬂicts, as Russia would not want
to jeopardise the smooth functioning of the Economic Union. This could also indirectly
slightly improve Georgia’s security.
15President Putin himself has said that the Eurasian Union bloc would build upon
the “best values of the Soviet Union.” Andrew McChesney, Eurasian Economic Union
Panned by WTO Chief, The Moscow Times, 21.6.2013, http://www.themoscowtimes.
com/business/article/eurasian-economic-union-panned-by-wto-chief/482014.html.
16Naira Hayrumyan, SOS From Wrecked Ship, Lragir.am, 3.11.2014, http://www.
lragir.am/index/eng/0/comments/view/33166.
17Armen Grigoryan, Armenia to be Admitted into Eurasian Union. CACI Analyst,
15.10.2014, http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13065-
armenia-to-be-admitted-into-eurasian-union.html.
18Ria-Novosti, Nagorno Karabakh Conﬂict Has No Impact on Armenia’s Accession
to Customs Union – Lavrov. 10.8.2014, http://en.ria.ru/politics/20140810/191888353/
Nagorno-Karabakh-Conflict-Has-No-Impact-on-Armenias-Accession-to.html.
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national organisations.”19 This statement conﬁrms that Armenia will
not demand special treatment from its EEU partners on the NK is-
sue. Lately it seems that the parties involved settled for a short term
compromise of deciding nothing for now. The Russian customs au-
thority has sent its representative to Armenia and apparently he will
be in charge of managing the customs post issue.20
Since the customs post issue on the “border” between Armenia-
Karabakh has been left on an undecided status, this creates further
uncertainties for Armenia as it does not know exactly how the cus-
toms union will aﬀect its trade relations with Karabakh in the fu-
ture. However, Russia can be expected to understand Armenia’s po-
sition on this issue as Russia itself is deepening its political, military
and economic integration with Georgia’s breakaway republic Abk-
hazia. According to the draft on the “Agreement Between the Rus-
sian Federation and the Republic of Abkhazia on Alliance and Inte-
gration,” Russia expects Abkhazia to harmonise its tax and customs
legislation with the Eurasian Economic Union regulations in three
years21, thereby paving the way for closer integration of Abkhazia to
the Eurasian Union.
These are issues that have to be considered when assessing Arme-
nia’s decision to join the EEU, a topic addressed later in the article.
Finally, it needs to be noted that eﬀective economic integration in the
form of a customs union necessitates giving up some sovereignty in
favour of a supranational organ that administers common policies.22
What is received with this decision is a share in the decision-making
process of the organisation. Most often the references made about
Armenia losing its sovereignty in the EEU refer to Russia’s geopoliti-
cal and great power aspirations, which have never been well-hidden
19Interfax.kz, Armenia membership in Eurasian Economic Union not to cover
Nagorno-Karabakh - Nazarbayev, 14.10.2014, http://azh.kz/en/news/view/4758.
20Hakob Badalyan, Russia Has Appointed “Attendant” To Armenia, Lragir.am,
25.10.2014, http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/comments/view/33138.
21Civil Georgia, Russia-Proposed Treaty with Abkhazia on ‘Alliance and Integration’,
Civil.ge, 13.10.2014, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27714.
22The sovereignty paradox in Armenia’s foreign policy is that as it is not willing to
make concessions in the “sovereignty” of the Nagorno Karabakh (although even Arme-
nia has not formally recognized Karabakh’s independence), Armenia is forced to make
all kinds of concessions to Russia, which protects Armenia, including in the Eurasian
Union membership process, which in the end compromises Armenia’s sovereignty as
a whole.
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in the EEU project. The discrepancy between what is decided and as-
pired to on paper and what is happening in the real political sphere
inevitably needs to be taken into account when assessing the EEU
project.
9.3 EU’s Eastern Partnership programme
The EU presence in the South Caucasus has been very limited. Since
around the mid-1990s, the EU started providing humanitarian and
technical assistance to the region with projects such as TACIS. The
EU negotiated Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs, from
1999) with all three. The countries were included into the ENP only
in 2004, in the aftermath of the Rose Revolution in Georgia. Through
the Neighbourhood Policy, the EU strove to achieve the closest possi-
ble political association and the greatest possible degree of economic
integration.
This policy of non-engagement has proved to be eﬀective in the
sense that the EU avoided confrontation with Russia over inﬂuence
in the region. However, at the same time, the ENP has received
a lot of criticism, from the partner countries as well as European
policy-makers. From the EU‘s point of view, the organisation has
not achieved its major goals in the region: democratisation, conﬂict
resolution, regional cooperation and energy diversiﬁcation.23 From
the partners’ point of view, the problem was that the policy had too
much rhetoric and too little concrete assistance.
Towards the turn of the 2010s, developments in the region posed
new challenges to EU’s foreign and security policy. The result was
a new policy vis-à-vis the post-Soviet space. In 2009, the European
Union inaugurated its Eastern Partnership (EaP), an initiative based
on a Polish-Swedish proposal from the previous spring. It was sus-
pended for over a year and launched only after the August 2008
23There has been limited success in democratisation and the ﬁght against corruption
(Georgia) and in energy diversiﬁcation (Georgia & Azerbaijan), however in the energy
sector this has not necessarily been due to the EU eﬀorts. For example the EBRD has
been ﬁnancing hydropower projects, which increase Georgia’s energy self-suﬀiciency
and energy security and further decrease dependency on Russian natural gas in elec-
tricity generation. See: Paravani Hydropower Plant Opens in Samtskhe-Javakheti.
Civil.ge, 11.10.2014, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27711.
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Georgian-Russian war and the subsequent Russian recognition of in-
dependence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
The EaP includes six countries – the South Caucasus states to-
gether with Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. It has several policy di-
mensions: bilateral and multilateral relations, governance and ﬁnan-
cial assistance. The focus of multilateral cooperation is on energy
projects. The key objectives include the creation of a free trade area
and gradual visa liberalisation. The initiative entailed annual meet-
ings of Ministers of Foreign Aﬀairs and meetings of Heads of State
or Government of the partnership countries every two years.
In terms of bilateral relations, the main instrument of the EaP
is the Association Agreement (AA) and its largest integral part, the
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). These
provide for enhanced trade relations and a political dialogue. The
DCFTA provides better access to the EU market for goods and ser-
vices. It also sets a path for further reforms in trade-related policies,
such as hygiene standards for agricultural products and regulations
for industrial products. The AAs are expected to boost the inﬂow of
European direct investment into the region. The AA/DCFTA scheme
aims at allowing the partner countries, with the support of the EU,
to drive forward a programme of comprehensive modernisation and
reform based upon shared values, political association and economic
integration. However, the DCTFA is a demanding free trade agree-
ment: it entails compliance with the acquis communitaire, the Com-
munity rules. The EaP countries are expected to meet the high re-
quirements of the EU in areas of legislative and systemic reform.
The EaP opens new partnership perspectives, while none of the
countries have been oﬀered the possibility to become EU members.
The EU endeavours to “deepen trade and economic relations” with
the partnership countries. This is in fact the same term that the
European Community used during the Cold War era to talk about
its relations with the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. It was
a means to maintain the division between “us and them”. The EC
never prepared or never even thought of the socialist countries of
Eastern Europe joining the Community. It is not inconsequential that
the same wordings are now used to denote the distance between
“Europe” and its “neighbourhood”. Political rhetoric is a means of
making politics. The EU’s predicament at the moment is that it does
not want to give false hope, but at the same time it wishes to remain
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a pole of attraction for non-members.
Two of the EaP countries nonetheless have declined closer align-
ment with the EU. Belarus never started negotiations on an AA.24
Armenia, on the other hand, withdrew from the ﬁnalised agreement.
In July 2013, the EU and Armenia had concluded negotiations on
the AA/DCFTA. Just a few months later, the process was withheld
following Armenia’s announcement to start negotiations on its mem-
bership in the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. As
mentioned above, the obligations resulting from the membership in
the ECU are incompatible with the commitments EU was expecting
from Armenia.
ECU membership is incompatible with an AA/DCFTA, because as
a member Armenia agrees to give up sovereignty to decide nation-
ally over policy areas it was to have an agreement on with the EU,
such as technical and sanitary norms. The DCFTA’s main aim is to re-
duce the customs tariﬀ, whereas – as stated above – Customs Union
membership in fact entails its increase. What is more, for DCFTA im-
plementation, full autonomy in the areas covered by the agreement
is required, while a CU member state loses sovereignty over its own
trade policy. Last but not least, preferential relations remain exclu-
sively within the Customs Union and are not meant to extend to the
EU.
The DCFTAs with the EU would not prevent EaP countries from
concluding free trade agreements with the Eurasian Customs Union.
Furthermore, it should be underlined that the CIS free trade agree-
ment already oﬀers an almost fully liberalised market access for
goods from most EaP countries. The countries could also, if they en-
ter a DCFTA, cooperate with the ECU, perhaps as observers. What
is on oﬀer by the EU does not economically limit the EaP countries’
relations with Russian-led integration schemes. Therefore it seems
that Armenia’s decision was more about politics.
9.4 Armenian motives for joining the EEU
Regional economic integration is a global phenomenon. The main
regulatory trade organisation in the world, the WTO, has currently
24It does not meet the EU requirements for the DCFTA, which is WTO membership.
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160member states. Through the globalisation process, governments
have started to see relative advantage in aligning with others, and
negative consequences in staying outside preferential trade arrange-
ments. This is true for countries all over the globe, the South Cau-
casus included. Many times a decision to integrate is made because
staying outside will be with time more costly. It can be assumed that
countries, which to a very high extent rely on special export sectors
or export partners, are hit relatively harder when they are forced to
stay outside a preferential trade arrangement. For the exporter, this
is because it might be diﬀicult to ﬁnd alternative markets to sell to
or to restructure the country’s export composition. Such countries
are also very vulnerable to economic blackmailing, because sanc-
tions can be addressed to small but crucial sectors, as the case of
Georgian wine exports to Russia shows.25
Therefore, ultimately the choice of staying outside EEU and EU
integration would be themost hazardous scenario for Armenia. Azer-
baijan is trying to stay outside economic integration projects, but it
seems to be able to aﬀord this policy due to the revenues from the
exports of its natural resources. Armenia does not have this luxury.
The better alternative for Armenia, of course, would have been to in-
tegrate with both the EU and Russian-led arrangements. This, how-
ever, was not an option due to the above explained incompatibility
between the two projects.
Membership in regional economic organisations is understood to
bring economic beneﬁt. As a member, a country will beneﬁt from
protectionist policies and it also has the power to inﬂuence the
25Georgian wines and mineral waters were banned from the Russian market in
2006 only to be reinstated in 2013 after the lifting of the embargo. As Russia was
main export market for Georgian wines and mineral waters, the Russian ban forced
Georgian wine producers to improve quality and ﬁnd new markets in Ukraine, Azer-
baijan, China, the Europe Union and the United States. As a result of opening
the Russian market again for the Georgian products last year, the trade between
Georgia and Russia increased by 35% in ﬁrst half of 2014 compared to the previ-
ous year and Georgian exports to Russia grew almost four fold. This might have
also contributed to the fact that wines were left out of the list of products on the
Russian counter-sanctions for the EU in 2014, since banning the European wines
from the Russian market would have beneﬁtted the Georgian wine producers, which
would not have been in Russia’s interests. Yigal Schleifer, Georgia: Lifting of Rus-
sian Wine Embargo to Have Limited Economic Impact?, eurasianet.org, 14.8.2013,
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/67391; Civil.ge, Georgian, Russian Diplomats Meet
in Prague, 9.7.2014, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27468.
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decision-making process. In the case of Armenia joining the EEU,
its prospects have not been painted as very rosy. As the EEU voting
power in the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly for the Eurasian
Economic Union is based on the size of population, its weight in the
organisation is miniscule. However, the Supreme Eurasian
Economic Council, which determines the strategy, direction and
prospects of cooperation and makes the ﬁnal decisions on key goals
and targets, is composed of the heads of state of the member
states. Its decision making is based on the principle of unanimous
voting. Thus, on the highest level of policy-making in the EEU,
Armenia – on paper – has the same voting power as Russia and any
other member. More importantly, the unanimity rule gives all
members the veto right. This sovereign right has been many times
referred to by Kazakhstan’s president Nazarbayev as a sacred
component of the decision-making rules: his country could even
leave the union, if its independence is in any way restricted by the
organisational rules.26
Belarus and Kazakhstan both have already showed their power
in the EEU negotiations. Kazakhstan has brought up its scepticism
about Armenia joining the organisation, referring to the unresolved
NK conﬂict that would be a hazard on the customs union border.
Nazarbayev has also given several statements which show that the
many national diﬀerences observed during the years of
negotiations, have remained unsettled. Belarus’s President
Alexander Lukashenko said before the signing of the EEU treaty in
May 2014, that he was not fully happy with the deal, but saw it as a
compromise. Nazarbayev said the new treaty was based on
consensus. Moreover, Nazarbayev and other Kazakh oﬀicials have
been eager to point out that as a result of their demands, all
aspects of political integration have been removed from the EEU
treaty. The eﬀorts of Putin’s Russia to use the organisation towards
(geo)political goals will be adamantly objected by Kazakhstan.27
This could well relieve some pressure that Russia could be thinking
of putting on Armenia within or through the EEU.
26News.am: Kazakhstan can leave Eurasian Union if opposing certain decision,
25.08.2014, http://news.am/eng/news/225513.html.
27Alex Vatanka, Kazakhstan’s Crafty Eurasian Union Strategy, National in-
terest, 20.6.2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/kazakhstans-crafty-eurasian-
union-strategy-10705?page=2.
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Armenia’s incentives to opt for the Eurasian Union are manifold.
If Armenia has to choose between security and economy, it always
chooses security. Painful historical memories of genocide contribute
to this sentiment, as well as a more recent sense of insecurity related
to the Nagorno Karabakh conﬂict, as Armenia feels threatened from
two sides by Azerbaijan and Turkey.
According to Armenian experts, Armenia can manage the eco-
nomic losses caused by abandoning the Association Agreement with
the EU, but it cannot bear the loss of security that could be caused
by saying no to the EEU, which in Armenia’s case equals to saying
no to Armenia’s strategic partner Russia – the ultimate guarantor of
Armenia’s security. For example Armenia is a member of the CSTO,
Russian border guards patrol on Armenia’s borders with Turkey and
Iran, Armenia is included in the united air defence system of the
CIS, and the lease of Russia’s military base in Gyumri was recently
extended until 2044. The two countries are also collaborating in cre-
ating joint military units (Markedonov 2013, 30).
However, on the economic level Armenia is also heavily depen-
dent on Russia. Armenia is almost completely dependent on (cheap)
Russian gas deliveries. After Armenia announced its decision to join
the EEU, gas and oil prices from Russia were cut by 35%, and in
the case of gas, the price was reduced to 189 dollars per thousand
cubic meters. In exchange, Gazprom received 100% of the shares
in Armenia’s gas distribution company ArmRosGaz. Russia is also
modernising the Metsamor nuclear plant – the only one in the South
Caucasus – which is vitally important for Armenia’s electricity pro-
duction, as is the Hrazdan gas power plant constructed by the Rus-
sian company RAO. Russia is also the main source of investments to
Armenia (accounting for 40% of investments).28
In military terms, Armenia is for Russia a strategic military out-
post that has signiﬁcance beyond the volatile South Caucasus region,
since Armenia is bordering both Iran and Turkey – key geopolitical
players not only in the South Caucasus, but also in the rapidly re-
escalating conﬂicts in Iraq and Syria. For this reason, Russia can
project its military power (mainly air power) potentially deep into
Middle-Eastern theatres of wars. In this regard, Armenia’s impor-
28Vladimir Socor, Armenia’s Economic Dependence on Russia Insurmountable by
the European Union, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 10, Issue: 221, 10.12.2013.
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tance to the Russian military could be compared to the role of Ice-
land as a permanent aircraft carrier for the United States and NATO
at the height of the Cold War.
Membership in the Eurasian Union is bound to deepen Armenia’s
dependency on Russia, as the customs barrier creates less incen-
tives to trade with non-EEU countries. Despite Armenia’s policy of
compliance, this has not always been rewarded by Russia. Instead,
there has been pressure from Russia to establish Russian as an oﬀi-
cial language in Armenia in order to deepen integration also in the
cultural sphere.29 But from the Armenian perspective, even worse
have been the Russian arms sales to Armenia’s arch enemy Azer-
baijan. According to the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliev, his
country will buy four billion USD worth of military hardware from
Russia, including modern battle tanks, multiple rocket launchers, at-
tack helicopters and so on. Russia’s arms deals with Azerbaijan not
only question Russia’s reliability as an strategic partner with whom
Armenia has cast its lot in military security, but also indirectly the
security argument for joining the Eurasian Union. As Armenian Pres-
ident Serzh Sargsyan formulated in a statement in July 2014: “Our
nation is very concerned about the fact that our strategic partner is
selling weapons to Azerbaijan.”30
9.5 The EEU and the EU and the clash of
the integration projects
The EU’s stated objective in the ENP was to share the EU’s stabil-
ity, security and prosperity with neighbouring countries. The pol-
icy was designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines in
Europe by oﬀering neighbouring countries closer political, security,
economic and cultural cooperation. However, Russia has regarded
the policy as a threat to its security: according to the Russian For-
eign Minister Sergey Lavrov, the EU was trying to establish its own
29Emil Danielyan, Kremlin-Linked Media Chief Warns Armenia, RFE/RL, 11.6.2014,
http://www.azatutyun.am/content/article/25418743.html.
30Tigran Gevorgyan, Yerevan Angry at Russian Arms Sales to Baku, Institute for War
& Peace Reporting, 22.7.2014, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/yerevan-angry-russian-
arms-sales-baku.
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sphere of inﬂuence through the European Neighbourhood Policy and
then later the Eastern Partnership.
The EU did not want or pursue a zero-sum game in the South
Caucasus, or Eastern Europe for that matter, but that is what it
was dragged into by Russia’s attempt to salvage its inﬂuence in the
FSU. The AA/DCFTA’s were not an attempt to lure the EaP coun-
tries from their prior commitments, for instance the free trade agree-
ments within the CIS. A DCFTA is compatible with other free trade
area arrangements. What the EU is trying to give the partners is a
chance to participate in EU programmes and to have a stake in the
EU’s internal market. This is to the partners’ own beneﬁt, as the
programme supports their own political and economic reforms.
However, the EU neglected to see that for Russia, the EaP was
analysed in a very diﬀerent context than what the EU had envisioned.
Russia’s own EEU project was never just about economics. In fact, it
was perhaps not about economics at all. For Russia, and especially
President Putin, who has been the primus motor of the project, it was
about Eurasia as a geopolitical project.31 Putin’s statement about
the dissolution of the Soviet Union as the most tragic geopolitical
catastrophe of the 20th century needs to be understood in the light of
his later policies and ambitions in the FSU. It needs to be understood
that from the Kremlin’s point of view, the EU’s attempt to provide
these countries with better possibilities to modernise, is seen as a
geopolitical threat.
Russia’s decision to use hard economic power in the midst of the
escalating Ukrainian crisis can threaten its commitment to
furthering the integration of the EEU. Sanctions against the three
states that signed Association Agreements with the EU, Ukraine,
Moldova and Georgia, and the ban on food imports from the EU
were not followed by Russia’s Customs Union partners Belarus and
Kazakhstan.32 Russia was left to act unilaterally. More importantly,
Russia is acting in violation of its commitment in the customs union.
These independent decisions go against the rules of the
31Putin’s grand strategy (2014).
32On the other hand, Georgia did not join the EU and other Western Countries on
imposing sanctions on Russia after its occupation of the Crimea and involvement in
the conﬂict in Eastern Ukraine. See: Civil.ge, FM ’Clariﬁes’ Remarks on Tit-for-Tat
Sanctions Between West and Russia, 8.8.2014, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?
id=27567.
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organisation and are a serious blow to the credibility in the eyes of
outside viewers, and perhaps even more importantly, by Russia’s
allies and hoped to be allies.
Why the countries chose to establish a customs union, which is a
more constraining form of integration for its members than a com-
mon economic space with a deep free trade area, is from the eco-
nomic perspective somewhat incomprehensible. The Eurasian Cus-
toms Union, which in eﬀect has meant the imposition of the higher
Russian external tariﬀ regime on the other members, is judged to be
contrary to the economic interests of both Belarus and Kazakhstan.
This gives credence to the view that Russia considers its national in-
terests and geopolitical goals more important than its commitments
to economic integration with its neighbours, and furthermore that it
sees the EEU as a political rather than a purely economic aﬀair.
The AA/DCFTA’s are not only about reforming and modernising
the economy. They are also political agreements. This is why Rus-
sia has protested against them. And here is where the EU-Russia
dialogue has gone astray: the EU continues to counter Russia’s ar-
guments with economic facts, whereas Russia in fact talks in hard
security and political language. The point that Russia regards the
EaP from a zero-sum point of view has not been fully understood in
the EU. For Russia, the threat induced by the EaP is also not just
economic, but deeply ideological. The EU integration is a threat as
it promotes a diﬀerent political system from what Russia is adher-
ing to. This point is usually not verbalised in the Russian protests
against EU policies in the region.
From the Kremlin’s point of view, the main questions are: if the
corrupt leaders in neighbouring countries are voted or thrown out,
how long can similar leaders stay in power in Russia? And if the
neighbours choose western liberal values, when will Russians start
wanting the same?
This is not a new phenomenon: during the Cold War, the socialist
bloc was penetrated by Western ideas and inﬂuences, such as the
liberal market economy, consumer culture and competition, which
helped to undermine the system’s legitimacy and thus the Soviet
role as the leader of its bloc. Today the Western imports are democ-
racy, good governance, anti-corruption, human rights and freedom
of speech. All are elements that Russia’s authoritarian government
tries to bloc from Russia.
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9.6 Prospects and problems for the coun-
tries in-between
EU-Armenia relations are governed by the EU-Armenia Partnership
and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which was signed in 1996 and en-
tered into force in 1999. The ENP Action Plan for Armenia, adopted
in 2006, provides a comprehensive framework for closer coopera-
tion. The Eastern Partnership (EaP) policy initiative launched in
2009, aimed to deepen and strengthen relations between the EU
and its neighbours, is another framework for EU cooperation with
Armenia. Within this framework, the EU and Armenia completed
negotiations on an Association Agreement, including the DCFTA, in
July 2013. However, the parties did not proceed with it following Ar-
menia’s declaration to join the Eurasian Customs Union. Currently,
Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements between the EU and
Armenia have entered into force in January 2014.
The EU and Armenia have scaled down their ambition levels fol-
lowing Armenia’s volte-face. As concluded by Mårten Ehnberg from
the Swedish Embassy in Yerevan, the AA/DCFTA negotiated between
Armenia and the EU became outdated after Armenia chose to join the
EEU. The EU is currently working out whether to start negotiations
on a new agreement with Armenia. The EU is waiting to see how far
Armenia – taking into account its commitments within the EEU – can
go in its relationship with the EU. The EU is interested in deepening
integration with Armenia within the EaP, and a new legal framework
would help that process.33
In the side-lines of the EaP Vilnius Summit in November 2013,
both parties made commitments to continue cooperation based upon
common values. As a follow up, in the beginning of November 2014,
Armenia and the EU signed a memorandum of understanding for the
implementation of the Single Support Framework for EU aid to Ar-
menia. For the time period of 2014–2017, the EU has budgeted 140–
170 million euros for the support of private sector development, pub-
lic administration and justice sector reforms, support for capacity de-
velopment and institution building and for civil society organisations.
Some of the speciﬁc aims of the framework include, for example, the
33Correspondence with the author on November 6, 2014.
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creation of job opportunities, facilitating the investment climate for
small and medium size businesses, improving economic competitive-
ness of Armenia’s regions, reduction of corruption in the public sec-
tor and support of the statistical capabilities on the municipal and
regional levels. After signing the memorandum, the Armenian Econ-
omy Minister Karen Chshmaritian stated that Armenia appreciates
the EU’s understanding of its situation and expressed his wish to
continue cooperation with the EU in investment and trade related
issues. Also Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and
Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn expressed his wish that
there would continue to be close cooperation between the EU and
Armenia also in the future.34
There are plenty of practical challenges for Armenia’s entry into
the Eurasian Economic Union. To start with, 90% of Armenia’s
foreign trade, and almost 100% with Russia, is conducted via
routes through Georgia. Altogether, almost 100% of its trade with
the other customs union members is conducted via a Georgia,
which just signed the AA/DCFTA (Baghramyan 2012, 9). The ﬁrst
big open question is how Armenia’s entry into the customs union
will be eﬀectively implemented, since it does not share a border
with the ECU. Due to its geographical isolation, it is hard to
envision free movement of goods and services between Armenia
and other EEU member states, which is the core goal of the
Eurasian integration project. Therefore Armenia appears not to be
getting the full beneﬁts of the Russia-led integration project. At the
same time, it will suﬀer disadvantages of not being included into
the EU free trade arrangements.
What remains unclear is how Georgia’s accession into the EU’s
free trade area and Armenia’s entry into the EEUwill aﬀect the coun-
tries’ foreign trade. The eﬀect deals with multiple issues: ﬁrstly, the
bilateral Armenian-Georgian trade, secondly, the transit of goods be-
tween Armenia and Russia (and the ECU) via Georgia, and thirdly,
Armenia’s trade with its European partners. Georgia will continue
to trade freely with Armenia because the DCFTA will not aﬀect its
trade policy. However, Armenia will need to raise its external tariﬀ
34Single Support Framework; Heghine Buniatian, EU to Provide Armenia
with Fresh Aid, RFE/RL, 4.11.2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/european-union-
armenia/26673213.html.
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to the ECU levels. It might also need to place some quotas on imports
from non-ECU countries. For Georgia this means that it will be fac-
ing higher duties, its exports might need to be diminished through
ECU quotas, and Armenia might want to look for new partners on
the ECU market. Georgia will surely be aﬀected and so will Arme-
nia. Armenia will also need to deal with another blow to its trade
relations: it will be left outside the EU preferential arrangements as
it had to decline the AA/DCFTA. The crucial question is: will Russia
compensate Armenia for its losses?
The Nagorno Karabakh enclave as well as the seven Azerbaijani
provinces outside NK-proper (comprising 20% of Azerbaijan’s terri-
tory), which Armenia occupies, form a particular problem for Arme-
nia’s entry in to the EEU. How will this non-recognized entity be in-
corporated into the Eurasian Union if Armenia is accepted as a mem-
ber? Azerbaijan has demanded, and Kazakhstan has supported the
claim, that the customs post should be established between Nagorno
Karabakh and Armenia proper, if Armenia becomes a member of the
Customs Union. Should there be a real functioning customs post
between NK and Armenia, it would create grave economic conse-
quences for the already struggling economy of Nagorno Karabakh.
A customs post between Karabakh and Armenia would add yet an-
other obstacle and threshold also for Armenia, which already suﬀers
from the closure of its borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey.
As a result of the war in Ukraine, Russia and the EU35 have im-
posed sanctions on each other. The struggle over inﬂuence on the
political and economic destinies of the states in the FSU has already
caused considerable harm for their respective economies. Conse-
quently, both Russia and the EU may ﬁnd themselves in an awkward
position since they might be less than capable of economically sup-
porting their chosen allies in the grey area between them.
For example, is Russia able to support or take on another
economic liability for Eastern Ukraine after it already has to
support Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria and the newly
annexed Crimea?36 This is added to the cost that Russia bears for
35EU together with other countries such as Norway, Australia and the United States.
36The annexation of the Crimea has proven to be major economic drain for Rus-
sia, which among other things has to construct new transport, tourism and energy
infrastructure to compensate now broken links with Ukraine-proper that used to
provide in past almost 90% of electricity and 66% of natural gas. Russia has also
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the continuing need for the Kremlin to support the North Caucasus
republics and their infrastructure development. In the long run, as
Russia’s economic growth is slowing down due to the drop in oil
prices, and lately because of EU sanctions, will Russia be able to
support its ally Armenia?
A survey was conducted in October-November 2013 in Armenia
to measure the citizens’ support for the two integration schemes.
Among the respondents, there was 15% more support and 10% less
resistance among Armenians for their country’s membership in the
EEU than in the European Union (see the footnote for precise ﬁg-
ures).37 The same survey revealed both less support (34%) and less
opposition (17%) for Azerbaijan’s EU membership compared to re-
sults in Armenia. In Georgia, the study showed – perhaps expectedly
– high levels of support (65%), and low levels of resistance (8%), for
Georgia to join the EU.38 Moreover, in Armenia there is an almost
equal amount of trust and distrust towards the EU, 28% and 27% re-
spectively, although the share of those who fully distrust (17%) the
EU is much higher than those who fully trust it (7%).39
The eﬀects of the EU’s sanctions on Russia over the Crimea and
supporting separatists in Eastern Ukraine, as well as the Russian re-
sponse of placing harsh counter-measures, will aﬀect the Armenian
economy well before its accession into the Customs Union. As the
made promises to meet Crimea’s 1,5 billion dollar budget deﬁcit that was previ-
ously paid by Kiev and to increase pensions and salaries of government civil ser-
vants in the Crimea to match those in Russia. In order to ﬁnance all this, Russia
has been forced to allocate 7,2 billion dollars from its pension funds for Crimea-
related expenses, including the construction of a bridge across the Kerch Strait.
On the other hand, the Crimean annexation and the war in Eastern Ukraine has
frightened foreign direct investments and international capital away from Russia,
but also caused capital ﬂight out of Russia, which IMF estimates to be 100 billion
in 2014 alone. See: Larry Hanauer, Crimean Adventure Will Cost Russia Dearly, The
Moscow Times, 7.9.2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/crimean-
adventure-will-cost-russia-dearly/506550.html; Owen Matthews, Putin Annexed
Crimea, but He’s About to Pay the Price, 15 July 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.
com/opinion/article/crimean-adventure-will-cost-russia-dearly/506550.html.
37Support of Armenia’s membership in Eurasian Economic Community: rather sup-
port 24%, fully support 31%, rather not support 5% and don’t support at all 8%. Sup-
port of the Armenia’s membership in EU: rather support 25%, fully support 15%,
rather not support 10% and don’t support at all 13%. Source: Caucasus Barometer
2013 Armenia.
38Caucasus Barometer 2013 Azerbaijan; Caucasus Barometer 2013 Georgia.
39Caucasus Barometer 2013 Armenia.
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crisis in Ukraine has been escalating after the ﬁrst quarter of 2014,
money transfers home from Armenians working in Russia diminished
by several million dollars compared to the same period in 2013. As
mentioned earlier, remittances and money transfers from Armenian
immigrant workers are an important source of revenue for Armenia’s
economy and one could expect that the low paid, (often) poorly ed-
ucated, immigrant workers in Russia would be the ﬁrst ones hit by
the economic downturn. Out of the two billion dollars transferred by
Armenians abroad, 1.7 billion came from Russia. This is four times
more than the total foreign investment into Armenia. Armenia’s de-
pendency on Russia (trade share 25%), illustrated by the impacts
of the sanctions, has reduced previous and expected growth rates
of the Armenian economy much more than those of its neighbouring
Georgia and Azerbaijan, which have recovered more rapidly from the
2008 economic crisis.40
9.7 The new competition and the existing
regional alliances
The Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan -axis represents an ever-increasing
form of integration between these three countries. This is not solely
in the ﬁeld of East-West energy transit demonstrated by the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Southern Gas Corridor, but also
in the transportation of cargo from the Caspian Sea and Central
Asia to the Black and Mediterranean Seas and further on to Europe
via the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars –railway (BKT)41 and similar infrastructure
ventures.
Georgia has not shown any interest towards the Eurasian
Economic Union and most likely will never join it. Thus Armenia
will continue not to have a border with the ECU. To be able to fully
beneﬁt from the EEU and the free trade and movement of people
and goods, Armenia would need to have ﬁrstly, a settlement of the
40Armen Karapetyan, Armenian Economy Hit by Knock-on Eﬀects of Russia Sanc-
tions, 16.6.2014, Institute for War & Peace Reporting, http://iwpr.net/report-news/
armenian-economy-hit-knock-effects-russia-sanctions.
41Azerbaijan Railways LTD, Baku-Tbilisi-Kars, http://railway.gov.az/index/en/2nd-
column-3/baku-tbilisi-kars.
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Nagorno Karabakh conﬂict, secondly, the opening of the
Armenia-Azerbaijan border and thirdly, Azerbaijan joining the
Eurasian Union. This would allow Armenia to have a direct
geographical link to the EEU area. None of these factors, however,
are expected to happen in the short or medium term future.
Iran and Armenia have held talks on a possible Free Economic
Zone on their common border and they are planning to construct a
railway link that would connect the two countries. These two eﬀorts
could be combined; if possibly a new Iran-Armenia railroad could
connect the Aras free trade area with Armenia. However Iran has
been signalling to Armenia that it should show more commitment to
joint plans and sign a free trade agreement also with Iran similar
to the one it has with Georgia.42 Such a new railroad connection
could also form a linkage between the Persian Gulf and the Black
Sea, thereby creating an alternative transportation route for the BKT
project. The end result would be an increase in the importance of
Georgia as a transport hub. Iran could also have a bigger role to
play in Russia’s plans for the EEU in this regard. Since Armenia’s
borders with both Azerbaijan and Turkey are closed, and Russia does
not want to further increase the importance of Georgia as a transit
country for Armenia’s trade, Russia and Iran might do well to nego-
tiate new logistical connections for Armenia via Iran to the Caspian
Sea to establish alternative connections with Russia and Kazakhstan.
On his visit to Baku in June 2014, Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov stated that Azerbaijan will not receive a formal
invitation either to the Eurasian Customs Union or to the Eurasian
Union, but he indicated the wish that Azerbaijan deepen its
cooperation with both organisations. Lavrov did not see Nagorno
Karabakh as an obstacle for Armenia’s accession since it would be
joining in its internationally recognized borders, excluding Nagorno
Karabakh. However, the Foreign Minister did not have a comment
on the customs post requirements on the border between Armenia
and Nagorno Karabakh.43
42Paul Goble, Iranian Rail Links and the Geopolitics of the South Caucasus, Eura-
sia Daily Monitor, Vol. 11, No. 169, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/
single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42873&cHash=20916fc6f2c5d3d46bb1f2538b31f562#
.VGN_gGPER8E; INRA, Railway network to be extended by 10000 km, 10.11.2014,
http://www.irna.ir/en/News/81381459.
43Voice of Russia, Azerbaijan receives no formal invitation to Customs, Eurasian
225
9.8 Conclusions and recommendations
The competition between the European Union and the Eurasian
Economic Union has added a new layer on top of the already
existing political struggles that aﬀect the resolution of the
protracted conﬂicts in the South Caucasus region. For example, on
the ﬁrst layer there is the conﬂict between parent states and
separatist enclaves (Azerbaijan–Nagorno Karabakh, Georgia–South
Ossetia and Georgia–Abkhazia). On the second layer, there are the
conﬂicts between the states (Armenia–Azerbaijan and
Georgia–Russia). The third, additional layer is the competition
between the EU and EEU integration projects. This new layer tends
to reinforce the existing divisions and freeze the prospects for
solution of the conﬂicts further. One of the major knockdown
eﬀects of this process is the increase of importance of borders and
boundaries in the South Caucasus. This is in striking contrast to
Western Europe, where borders are losing their importance and the
free movement of people and goods is the norm.
In the South Caucasus, there are three types of boundaries.
Firstly, contested administrative boundary lines or borders as
between Georgia and Abkhazia, between Georgia and South
Ossetia and between Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan (including
seven provinces around Karabakh that Armenia is occupying).
Secondly, the non-contested (including closed Armenia–Turkey and
Armenia–Azerbaijan) state borders within the South Caucasus and
with the surrounding countries Iran, Turkey and Russia. Thirdly,
the integration projects, in the form of a customs union (EEU) and a
free trade area (DFCTA) have included some countries in their
preferential arrangements but at the same time left others out, and
thereby have added another type of dividing line in the South
Caucasus. Not only do these new, mutually exclusive integration
layers impede conﬂict transformation and resolution, but they will
also hinder possible cooperation within the South Caucasus, should
one or all of the protracted conﬂicts be resolved.
It can be argued that Armenia has been the biggest loser in the
recent developments in the South Caucasus. There is a threat that
Union - FM Lavrov, 18.6.2014, http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_06_18/Azerbaijan-
receives-no-formal-invitation-to-Customs-Eurasian-Union-FM-Lavrov-5744.
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Armenia will suﬀer triple isolation. There is already the geographi-
cal isolation due to the fact that Armenia is a landlocked state. This
situation has been made worse by the closure of two out of four of
Armenia’s external borders (with Azerbaijan and Turkey) as a result
of the unresolved conﬂict in Nagorno Karabakh. With Armenia’s ac-
cession into the Eurasian Economic Union, there will be a third layer
of isolation, namely higher customs barriers towards third countries
(including EU member states) which remain outside the EEU.
Since increased trade between Armenia and Turkey could be re-
garded as one of the possible drivers of conﬂict transformation and
conﬁdence building measures in the frozen rapprochement process
between the two countries, higher tax barriers of the EEU could
create further disincentives for Turkish investments in the Arme-
nian economy in the future. On the other hand, the closed Armenia-
Turkish border eﬀectively blocks any prospective for Turkey’s mem-
bership in the EEU, because that would have to be preceded with
progress in the Armenia-Turkey rapprochement.
One should also see the European Union and the Eurasian Eco-
nomic Union as two very diﬀerent projects to build peace, stability
and prosperity for their member states. The ﬁrst one is liberal, demo-
cratic with decentralized political power. The latter is composed of
authoritarian regimes of diﬀerent degree and one dominant political
and military power. However, the countries which are on the border
or between the two Unions and have been left out of the European
Union or NATO for the time being (or are waiting for more concrete
steps in their accession process) are ridden with protracted conﬂicts
and various levels of instability (Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and Azer-
baijan). One of the diﬀerences between the Eurasian Union and the
European Union is that due to the Nagorno Karabakh conﬂict, Arme-
nia also belongs to the grey zone of conﬂict and instability, despite
being a member candidate for the EEU. From this perspective, Ar-
menian membership could prove to be problematic for the Eurasian
Union, if one assumes that economic integration is about bringing
more stability for the member states.
Diﬀerences between the EU and the Eurasian Union are striking.
The strength of the EU has been its pull factor, i.e. its ability to
attract member candidates voluntarily to join the Union, but as the
example of Armenia (and attempted in Ukraine) shows, the Eurasian
Union is put together partly by threat and coercion. The EU is a mul-
227
tipolar institution whereas the Eurasian Union appears to be much
more of a unipolar system with Russia as an uncontested dominant
power.44 The same is true for dependency structures. In the EU,
the driving logic is interdependency, whereas in the Eurasian Union
dependency (on Russia) plays the main role. Obviously within the
Eurasian Union, the degree of dependency varies: Kazakhstan is the
least and Armenia the most dependent on Russia. If the formation
or adoption of a European identity within the EU for the citizens of
its member states has been a very slow progress, it is to be expected
that the creation of a distinctive Eurasian Union identity is an even
much more diﬀicult task.
The problems for the countries in the grey zone are caused by the
diﬀicult relationship between the EU and Russia and their unwilling-
ness, or at least incapability, to understand one another. The his-
tory of Russia’s opposition to and criticism of EU integration dates
all the way back to the beginning of West European integration in
the 1950s. The principles of Moscow’s objections to the EEC/EU
have remained constant from the Cold War decades to the present.
First of all, Russia is reluctant to deal with a supranational institu-
tion. It will counter the EU with a policy of diﬀerentiation, opting
for bilateral relations instead of negotiating with the organisation as
a whole. Secondly, it aspires to limit cooperation to economic af-
fairs only, avoiding sensitive issues such as human rights or other
European core values. Thirdly, it pursues to ratify the status quo in
the relations, but also accepts a modus vivendi, even if this means
the continuation of mutual neglect and antagonism. And lastly, it is
willing to resort to revisionist methods to achieve its goals.
The principles of Russian foreign policy need to be understood,
because they inform Russia’s policies. This does not mean that they
should be accepted or considered legitimate.
9.8.1 Recommendations
1. Armenia should continue on its path of reforms that were the
core of its negotiations with the EU. The crucial question is
whether the Armenian government and its people want democ-
44The volume of Belarus-Kazakhstan trade is minimal compared to the share of Rus-
sia in the two’s trade.
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racy and whether they share the same Western values as the
EU is promoting.
2. Armenia should continue a dialogue with both the EU and Rus-
sia in an eﬀort to ﬁnd an acceptable balance between its EU-
aspirations and the commitments through its EEUmembership.
This would consolidate the complementary element in its for-
eign policy. Ultimately, Armenia could, being the only EEU
country that is interested in deeper cooperation and integra-
tion with the European Union, become a bridge between the
two organisations.
3. To help Armenia in its precarious situation, the EU should con-
tinue its dialogue with Russia. This would, ﬁrst of all, require
a peaceful settlement of the crisis in Ukraine and the lifting of
the economic sanctions and embargos currently in force. Sec-
ondly, the EU should review its engagement in the region and
the goals and results of the EaP. Although the EU sees itself as
providing a complementary assistance programme to the east-
ern partners, Russia does not see the policy in this way. Russia
has always viewed, and continues to view EU advances into its
neighbourhood as a challenge and a threat.
4. The unresolved issue in Armenia’s entry into the EEU remains
the customs post settlement of Nagorno Karabakh. It could be
organised in the same way as was done with regard to Abkhazia
and South Ossetia when Russia joined the WTO. As a conﬁdence
building measure and compromise, Armenia should seek to es-
tablish a trade corridor that is monitored by an outside, neutral
party, for instance by a private Swiss company as is done in
Abkhazia. The company would provide details of trade between
Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh. The information would be pro-
vided to both the Eurasian Customs Union members and, in the
best case scenario, also to Azerbaijan.
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Chapter 10
Policy
Recommendations
Mikko Palonkorpi
10.1 Diminishing prospects for cross-
border cooperation in Georgia
After the August 2008 war in Georgia and the declarations of inde-
pendence by Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia was left with a
few alternatives to advance its agenda towards these two provinces,
which the country still considers as integral parts of its sovereignty.
By stationing thousands of troops in both breakaway republics, Rus-
sia has not made Georgia’s task easier.
In the beginning of 2010, the Georgian government launched an
ambitious new initiative entitled State Strategy on Occupied Terri-
tories: Engagement through Cooperation. The conﬂict resolution
aspect of the State Strategy was argued as follows: “The Strategy is
developed with the conviction that the remaining residents of Abk-
hazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia are an integral part of
Georgia’s society and future. The Government of Georgia believes
that a policy of engagement that restores conﬁdence and trust be-
tween the war-aﬀected communities of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali
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region/South Ossetia, currently separated by dividing lines, will sig-
niﬁcantly contribute to the ﬁnal settlement of the conﬂicts.”1 There
were many elements in the State Strategy that emphasized cross-
border cooperation. However, the mere title of the State Strategy
was enough to make Abkhazia and South Ossetia denounce it, since
it labelled them as “Occupied Territories.” Moreover, the document
made a reference to the resolution of the political status of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia within the state boundaries of Georgia.
The Subsequent Action Plan for Engagement, published in August
2010, set out more speciﬁc and concrete objectives for cooperation.
Initiatives outlined in the Action Plan included, among others, neu-
tral identiﬁcation cards and travel documents, access to healthcare
in Georgia for residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, eliminating
obstacles for trade across the division line, promoting youth and cul-
tural exchanges, supporting radio broadcasting in Abkhaz and Osse-
tian languages and increasing capacity of radio transmissions near
the ABL.2
The initiatives outlined in the Action Plan were implemented with
varying degrees of success. For example neutral travel documents
were introduced in 2011, but three years later only dozen countries3
have recognized them as legal and not very many have been issued
so far.4 The idea behind a neutral travel document was to oﬀer
the inhabitants of South Ossetia and Abkhazia not only an alterna-
tive to Russian passports issued in these two regions already before
the 2008 August war, but also alternative documents for traveling
abroad.
After signing the Association Agreement with the EU in the sum-
mer of 2014, Georgian politicians started to express hope that the
visa requirements would be eased and eventually abolished for Geor-
1State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement Through Cooperation, http:
//www.civil.ge/files/files/SMR-Strategy-en.pdf
2Government of Georgia – Action Plan for Engagement, August 2010, pp. 64-78.
3Hungary, Bulgaria, Estonia, Israel, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Ro-
mania, the Czech Republic and the United States.
4Hungary recognises Georgia’s neutral travel documents, Agenda.ge, 15 Jan-
uary 2014. http://agenda.ge/news/6203/eng, See also: Antje Herrberg, Rainer
Hofmann & John Packer, Comparative Study on Status Neutral Travel Docu-
ments, The European Forum for International Mediation and Dialogue (media-
tEUr), July 2011 http://www.themediateur.eu/resources/publications/item/download/
1_d5ca8722620387e09afa7b980d03cace
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gian citizens who wish to travel to the EU. The former State Minis-
ter of Georgia on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Alex Petri-
ashvili adviced the EU-member states to grant a visa-free regime for
Georgian citizens.5 According to him, such steps would be impor-
tant for the Georgian citizens to realize concrete advantages of the
EU integration. However, EU-Georgia visa free regime could have
an impact on the conﬂict resolution and trust building process as
well. Establishing a visa free regime with the EU would make the
Georgian citizenship, or more precisely Georgian passports, more
attractive for the inhabitants of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as this
would provide easier travel procedures to the European Union.6
An opportunity to access health care in Georgia has been per-
ceived more positively by the inhabitants of Abkhazia, and it could
be considered as a success. There have been hundreds of patients
from Abkhazia who have traveled across the ABL to receive medi-
cal treatment in Georgia, especially in the hospitals of cities such as
Zugdidi which are located nearby the “boundary line.” Treatment
in Georgian hospitals has been appreciated especially in cases of
emergency, when hospitals on the Georgian side of the ABL have
been closer than those in Abkhazia (or in Russia); or in cases where
the patients have required sophisticated treatment that has not been
available in the local hospitals in Abkhazia, such as demanding heart
disease treatments. However, in some instances, people residing in
the occupied territories were denied social beneﬁts in Georgia (for
example when requiring medical care), because they did not have
proper identiﬁcation cards. This prompted the Georgian Ombuds-
man to take action to ensure that all Georgian citizens should have
equal access to free health care, even if they reside in the conﬂict
regions.7
5European Parliament ready to ratify Georgia-EU AA deal in December, Agenda.ge,
8 October 2014. http://agenda.ge/news/22289/eng
6Remarks by the State Minister Alex Petriashvili in a “Georgia’s European Way”
conference 11 July 2014.
7Interview with a Georgian expert in Tbilisi on 25 June 2014; Proposal for
the Minister of Labour, Health and Social Aﬀairs of Georgia, Public Defender of
Georgia, 22 September 2014, http://www.ombudsman.ge/en/recommendations-
Proposal/winadadebebi/proposal-for-the-minister-of-labour-health-and-social-
affairs-of-georgia.page; Mari Nikuradze, Abkhazians go to Georgia for medical
treatment, 19 April 2012 http://dfwatch.net/abkhazians-go-to-georgia-for-medical-
treatment-58267
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Unfortunately, by the end of 2014 the prospects for cross-border
cooperation between Georgia and Abkhazia & South Ossetia appear
much less promising. Russia and Abkhazia signed a treaty on al-
liance and strategic partnership in the end of November.8 Not only
does the treaty call for the creation of common security and defense
space and coordinated foreign policy, but several points of the treaty
can prove detrimental to many of Georgian cross-border initiatives
aimed at conﬂict resolution and trust building. In fact, the new treaty
seems to oﬀer a Russian substitute for many initiatives introduced
in Georgia’s State Strategy and Action Plan. For example, Russia
pledges commitment to introduce Russian citizens (i.e. Russian pass-
port holders) residing in Abkhazia to its compulsory health insurance
system, thereby allowing them access to health care in Southern Rus-
sia. Moreover, according to the treaty, Russia has promised to ease
procedures for obtaining Russian citizenship for Abkhazians. The
treaty also envisages joint protection of all land and maritime bor-
ders and jointly providing technical equipment to the border with
Georgia; and also introducing free movement of goods and people
across the Russia-Abkhaz “state border.” Treaty also requires Abk-
hazia to harmonize its customs legislation in accordance with the
regulations of the Eurasian Union. The ﬁrst draft of the treaty pro-
posed earlier by Russia also included a proposal to close all cross-
ing points between Georgia and Abkhazia on the Enguri river except
one and gradually relocating border control assets from the Russia-
Abkhaz border to the Georgia-Abkhaz border.9 Even if the text of the
treaty does not mention the “checkpoints” directly, the assumption
is that the treaty will entail the previously announced goal to reduce
their numbers.10 According to theWhite Paper by the GeorgianMFA:
“The document provides for the de-facto abolishment of the so called
“Russia-Abkhazia border”, whereas the occupation line between the
8Президент России, Договор между Российской Федерацией и Республикой
Абхазия о союзничестве и стратегическом партнерстве, 24 ноября 2014 года.
9Moscow, Sokhumi Endorse Final Text of New Treaty, Civil.ge, 22 November 2014
http://www.civil.ge/eng_old/article.php?id=27841 Russia-Proposed Treaty with Abk-
hazia on ‘Alliance and Integration’, Civil.ge, 13 October 2014 http://www.civil.ge/eng/
article.php?id=27714 Sokhumi Oﬀers Its Draft of New Treaty with Russia, Civil.ge, 3
November 2014 http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27768
10Президент России, Договор между Российской Федерацией и Республикой
Абхазия о союзничестве и стратегическом партнерстве, 24 ноября 2014 года.
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Abkhazia region and the rest of Georgia will be further fortiﬁed.”11
The ﬁrst draft of treaty was met with growing protest and resis-
tance in Abkhazia. It was argued that the new treaty would under-
mine Abkhazia’s declared independence, statehood and sovereignty,
and Abkhazian opposition parties organized rallies against the treaty
in Sokhumi.12 It seems that the annexation of Crimea by Russia has
not gone unnoticed in Abkhazia and that surrendering large parts of
its “independence” to Russia would call into question the sacriﬁces
made in the wars in the beginning of the 1990’s.
From the point of view of cross-border cooperation, the current
situation presents a paradox. On the one hand, the environment in
which the CBC initiatives in Georgia’s conﬂict regions are to be im-
plemented is becoming more diﬀicult. But at a same time, these
CBC initiatives are becoming more and more important as a means
to keep people-to-people contacts and trust-building processes alive.
If Russia continues to pressure tighter integration of Abkhazia
to the Russia Federation at the expense of Abkhazia’s declared in-
dependence, meaningful CBC programs can perhaps appear more
attractive to Abkhazians as a way to balance out the increasing Rus-
sian pressure. Therefore alongside traditional distrust in Georgia in
Abkhazia, there might also be nascent distrust in Russia in Abkhazia.
Therefore successful cross-border cooperation initiatives should aim
at alleviating both types of distrust. The EU and its member states
are recommended to continue their support for the cross-border co-
operation programs, even in circumstances where their implemen-
tation in Georgia’s conﬂict regions appears to be more challenging
than ever.
11Non-paper on signing of the so called “treaty on alliance and strategic partnership”
initiated by theRussian Federation with the Sokhumi occupation regime, Ministry of
Foreign Aﬀairs of Georgia, 25 November 2014, p. 1.
12Jack Farchy, Vladimir Putin signs treaty with Abkhazia and puts Tbilisi on
edge, Financial Times, 24 November 2014 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/24239f90-
73e8-11e4-82a6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3KGIy8pN5 Abkhaz Reactions on Russia-
Proposed New Treaty, Civil.ge, 15 October 2014 http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?
id=27718
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